Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume X, Cuba, January 1961–September 1962

182. Paper Prepared for the National Security Council by the Director of the Department of State Operations Center (Achilles)⁰

Washington, April 27, 1961.

PLAN FOR CUBA

Problem:

To remove the threat to the United States and to the hemisphere posed by the Soviet-dominated Castro regime in a manner which will advance rather than injure our other hemispheric and world-wide interests.

Among possible future courses of action toward Cuba, two strategic alternatives stand out. We can adopt a short term strategy of eliminating the Castro regime in the relatively near future, or a long term strategy of isolation and containment which might ultimately lead to change of regime, but would in any case make the present one relatively impotent beyond its own borders.

This paper does not elect between the strategies. It recommends that we undertake painstaking intelligence estimates and other studies before making an irrevocable choice. Such choice need not be made in the immediate future, since it is possible for the time being to prepare for the implementation of either strategy. An ultimate choice in favor of the long term strategy could, however, be prejudiced by the style and precipitateness with which we might implement certain of the paperʼs recommendations.

Discussion:

The complete defeat of the volunteer Cuban liberation force which had been encouraged by the United States and covertly assisted with training, equipment, and transportation strengthened Castro internally, weakened the morale of anti-Castro forces in Cuba and elsewhere and gravely damaged United States prestige. Part of the lost ground has been recovered by a declaration of President Kennedy on April 20 to the effect that if it should ever appear that the inter-American doctrine of non-interference merely concealed or excused a policy on non-action, and if the nations of the Hemisphere should fail to meet their commitments against outside Communist penetration, the United States Government would not hesitate in meeting its primary obligations, which are the security of our nation. The world is now waiting to see what the United States will do.

Action to correct the intolerable Cuban situation—which for practical purposes means the overthrow of the Castro regime—must be taken if communist penetration of the hemisphere and the disastrous drain on United States prestige in the world are to be stemmed. Yet the situation is not so bad but that ill-considered, poorly-timed action would not make it infinitely worse. It could disrupt the OAS. It could turn most of Latin America against us. It could weaken our position in other areas. It could trigger a World War.

Recommendations Concerning Courses of Action:

Whatever decisive measures may in due course be decided upon to bring about the downfall of the Castro regime it is clear that three courses should forthwith be pursued vigorously:

1) Implementation of the Alliance for Progress.

2) Development of a realistic, sound and honest moral posture based upon the Presidentʼs April 20 statement, which must be able to withstand before world opinion and in the U.N., the distortions of an all-out Communist propaganda offensive and provide the justification for progressively more drastic actions against Castro.

3) Develop the fullest and most accurate intelligence possible on the attitude of the Cuban people towards Castro. Such intelligence is essential before deciding upon possible courses of decisive action. If a majority is opposed to Castro, we must find the best means of helping the majority to overthrow him. If a majority support Castro and what he stands for, the problem will be far more difficult and military action would be undesirable as leading to a prolonged occupation of a hostile population with serious consequences elsewhere. If that is the case, slower methods such as quarantine and efforts to change the views of the maximum number of Cubans would be indicated.

Individual consultation with the other American Governments has been in progress since April 23 to ascertain their views towards the best means of removing the menace to hemispheric peace and security caused by the intrusion of extra-continental power into Cuba. The consultation is designed to ascertain whether the other Governments recognize the nature of this menace, whether they recognize the distinction between “intervention” in the internal affairs of another state and defense against a widening area of domination by extra-hemispheric powers, and their attitude toward OAS action or possible narrower collective or unilateral action. Effective action through the OAS if it can be secured would obviously be desirable. Many American Governments, however, while privately expressing the hope that the U.S. will act unilaterally, quickly and decisively to overthrow Castro, continue reluctant to stand up publicly and be counted and would in varying measure publicly criticize such U.S. action. Nevertheless, OAS consideration would be desirable provided that we have a clear view of the results desired and reasonable expectations that we would have the votes to obtain them.

If the recommended approach to the OAS yields nothing in the way of tangible support for us on the Cuba problem, we will still be able to consider moving unilaterally against Castro in support of the Cuban rebels, if that is what we want to do. Other recommended actions insure that the intervening time will not be lost.

Courses of Action:

I. U.S. should unilaterally, without awaiting outcome of other actions:

1. Push ahead energetically with the Alliance for Progress, including, as soon as funds are available, implementation of readied housing and other projects giving visible proof that it is being implemented.

2. Establish a strong moral posture commanding the respect of unbiased opinion everywhere based on steady development of the themes in the Presidentʼs April 20 statement and including the following elements:

a. U.S. love of and willingness to fight for “freedom.”

b. Recognition that the U.S. faces a world-wide relentless struggle against an expansionist Sino-Soviet bloc, including its use of non-military aggression.

c. U.S. has long since abandoned “intervention” in the internal affairs of its neighbors and cannot tolerate the intervention of extra-continental powers such as has occurred in Cuba.

d. U.S. objective is to see the Cuban people freed from alien domination and free to choose their own government and forms of economic and social development.

3. Maintain active overt and covert psychological campaign designed to weaken Castro in Cuba and outside.

a. Make an official public statement—to which other American Governments could subscribe—setting forth our liberal aspirations for a post-Castro Cuba in the political, economic and social fields.

b. Formulate and announce concrete measures which the U.S. contemplates to assist the Cuban people and economy after Cuba is again free.

c. See that campaign is fully and continuously coordinated between State,USIA, CIA and DOD.

4. a. Apply the Trading with the Enemy Act to Cuba.

b. Consider gradual reduction, through amendment of existing regulations, of the export of foods and medicines to Cuba.

5. Continue to give open encouragement to the Cuban liberation movement both in Cuba and outside.

6. Continue to assist Cuban liberation efforts by covertly:

a. Training Cuban freedom fighters, especially for guerrilla service in Cuba. (They are the indispensable component for any plan to oust Castro.)

b. Arming Cuban freedom fighters inside Cuba.

c. Supporting Cuban underground capabilities for intensified sabotage of Cuban economy.

d. Encouraging defections.

7. Develop study in depth of vulnerabilities of Castro regime and possible courses of action to exploit them, and of strengths and means of countering them.

8. Develop fullest possible intelligence on:

a. Degree of support Castro enjoys among Cuban people and why.

b. Castroʼs military strength.

9. Intensify measures to provide assistance to any Latin American country requesting help in defending itself against armed attack or subversion by Castroism. Implement existing programs and accelerate surveys of requirements of governments where this is a particular problem.

10. Establish system of surveillance in Caribbean to identify and frustrate armed assistance to subversive movements in other countries.

11. Deport known non-U.S. Castro agents from U.S.

12. Develop and hold in readiness military plans for forcible overthrow of Castro by:

a. Overt U.S. action, whether alone or assisted by Latin American countries.

b. Covert support of Cuban action sufficient to accomplish objectives.

13. Should any Latin American country offer to mediate differences between U.S. and Cuba, accept offer but only subject to Cubaʼs severance of relations with Sino-Soviet bloc and agreement to hold OAS-super-vised elections.

II. Redefine and reinterpret what constitutes aggression and what constitutes legal governments. We should elaborate a new doctrine in close association with certain Latin Americans and other friendly powers, which would spell out the concepts embodied in the Presidentʼs speech of April 20. Such an interpretation of our obligations under the UN and OAS Charters is needed to enable us to justify publicly the actions which might be necessary to deal with Communist takeovers from within a country. In this connection, we should consider recognizing and mobilizing support for a Cuban Government in exile as an alternative to Castro.

III. 1. With all deliberate speed carry on consultations with each Latin American Government regarding a possible Meeting of Foreign Ministers, either under the Rio Treaty or the OAS Charter, to consider a resolution calling on Cuba to:

a. Allow free exercise of normal civil rights and prepare for elections under OAS supervision.

b. Give effect to its OAS commitments with respect to communism.

2. If result of consultation is reasonably promising, request Meeting of Foreign Ministers.

3. Seek in Meeting of Foreign Ministers as wide agreement as possible on a line of specific sanctions, as follows, designed to quarantine Cuba in the Hemisphere, if Cuba refuses to heed call mentioned in 1 above:

a. Breaking of diplomatic relations with Cuba.

b. Expel or exclude Castro regime from OAS.

c. Economic sanctions.

d. Support for armed effort to liberate Cuba if Meeting is willing to [go?] this far.

4. Propose collective OAS quarantine against Dominican Republic similar to that against Cuba on grounds of interventionist activities and manifest suppression of human rights.

IV. If support of collective OAS action under III is insufficient to isolate Cuba in Hemisphere, seek to get informal agreement among as many Latin American countries as possible on course of sanctions mentioned in III-3-a, c, and d.

V. Upon completion of III and IV but not before, unless future developments so require, take decision as to whether danger to U.S. security is sufficiently great to resort to force to overthrow Castro in spite of our international commitments, and if so, whether action should be overt or covert. Then carry out action at earliest possible date.

VI. All planning and operations under this plan should be examined in the light of the repercussions their implementation would have in the U.N.

VII. Keep NATO, or principal NATO allies, informed of major U.S. decisions and actions under I to IV above, and at appropriate time seek their cooperation in the application of economic measures against the Castro regime.

0. Source: Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, Cuba and the Dominican Republic. Top Secret. According to a note on the source text, the final draft of this paper was prepared by Theodore C. Achilles, but the initial drafts were prepared in ARA in response to a request from Rusk on April 24. (Excerpt from a record of Secretaryʼs staff meeting, April 24; ibid.) The drafts were circulated within the Department for comment by senior concerned officials before the final draft was prepared. (Memorandum from Legal Adviser Chayes to Rusk, April 26; ibid.) A number of other papers were prepared for the April 27 NSC meeting. As a follow-up to the April 22 NSC meeting the Department of State prepared memoranda entitled “Information on Helpful and Unhelpful Governments” and “Strengthening Freedom in the Americas.” It also drafted recommendations proposing invocation of the Trading With the Enemy Act and an assessment of the proposed Caribbean Security Agency. (All ibid., S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, NSC 5402-Memoranda) The Department of Defense prepared a paper on the training of Cuban soldiers. (Ibid.)