Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume X, Cuba, January 1961–September 1962

178. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara⁰

Washington, April 26, 1961.

JCSM-278-61

SUBJECT

• Cuba (U)

1. Reference is made to your memorandum to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, dated 20 April 1961, subject as above.¹ This memorandum with Appendices is responsive to questions posed by you in reference memorandum.

2. Appendix A contains an analysis of courses of action. Appendix D contains a brief outline plan based upon CINCLANT Operation Plan 312-61² which will provide for the overthrow of the Castro government by the application of US military force, the course of action considered best suited to accomplishment of the objective.

3. This plan, with appropriate additional instructions to CINC-LANT as to timing and manner of execution, is responsive to the requirement for a military plan to accomplish the desired objective. The plan is well conceived, has been reviewed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and will insure quick overthrow of the Castro government.

4. There is a need for a well conceived political program to insure rapid turnover of control of government to designated Cuban authorities and permit the rapid withdrawal of US forces. It is recommended that the Secretary of State be requested to develop guidance in support of this operation.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Earle G. Wheeler³

Appendix A

ANALYSIS OF COURSES OF ACTION

1. The objective as stated by the Secretary of Defense is to overthrow the Castro regime by the application of military force.

2. The analysis which follows has taken into consideration the world reaction to the abortive invasion of Cuba. Most nations apparently believe that the United States was wrong to give any support to this operation, particularly since there was no resultant uprising by the Cuban people. In the United Nations the prestige of the United States has deteriorated, and there are indications that the Latin American nations have lost some confidence in the United States. Within Cuba the incident has probably had the effect of strengthening the control held by the Castro government, instilling confidence and loyalty in the militia and other forces, and demoralizing the dissident elements which remain.

3. Any military effort undertaken by the United States against Cuba will engender strong criticism by most of the world. If a military action or series of actions take appreciable time to accomplish the overthrow of the Castro government, this time can be used to the advantage of the Sino-Soviet Bloc and Castro in strengthening his defenses. More important, world Communism can use this period of time to advantage in building up a massive, world-wide, anti-US propaganda effort against the United States course of action, including introduction of a resolution to the UN. If the United States were to embark on such a course, and then, through the pressure of world opinion be forced to abandon its action, the result would be a severe blow to the prestige, the objectives, and the national interests of the United States. Achieving world-wide surprise in an undertaking like this is extremely important. It seems apparent, therefore, that any military operation undertaken to accomplish the above objective should be swift, sharp, and overwhelming and should present the remainder of the world with a fait accompli.

4. The following alternative programs have been considered:

a. Naval and Air Blockade. A blockade could be instituted immediately and could be effective. It would stop the influx of Bloc military equipment and personnel, and would do much to halt the export of Communism from Cuba to Latin America. The Cuban economy, in particular the oil industry, is especially vulnerable to blockade, and it is believed that a blockade, by itself, could reduce the Cuban economy to chaos.⁴ However, a blockade would force great hardships on the Cuban people regardless of political belief, and it is likely that their plight would generate strong resentment in all of Latin America. Since a blockade must be time-consuming, world resistance could be skillfully built up by the Bloc, as pointed out previously, and the blockade might have to be abandoned. Since use of blockade would not, by itself, assure the objective it is not recommended as the only course of action. However, blockade should be utilized to complement a military invasion and, if such an invasion is to be delayed for an appreciable period of time, a limited blockade against military supplies and equipment should be instituted to prevent build-up of Cuban military strength.

b. Overt Support of Cuban Dissident Forces. This course of action would strengthen the dissident elements both materially and psychologically. The recent defeat of the invading dissident elements has undoubtedly had a demoralizing effect on them, and has probably weakened them in numbers and organization. Reorganizing these groups, and attracting additional numbers in face of current repressive measures taken by Castro will be extremely difficult. Even if sufficient numbers could be organized, their training would take much time, and it seems evident that their quality could never come up to US standards. These factors all seem to indicate that this course of action by itself would give little assurance of accomplishing the objective, and it is therefore not recommended. While support to dissident elements should not be chosen as the main course of action, it should not be abandoned. These elements can be of great assistance in intelligence collection, serve as focal points for uprisings, and assist in military operations and continual harassment of the Castro regime. Some form of support in Cuba is necessary to give encouragement to resistance movements in Cuba and other countries and to impress them with the fact that the United States will not abandon them. The success of a military operation against Cuba, however, should not be made dependent upon the actions of any dissident elements.

c. Military Intervention by the Organization of American States. In world opinion, the US has replaced its previous policy of unilateral US action to prevent extra-continental interference in the affairs of this hemisphere, fundamental to the Monroe Doctrine, with a policy of collective action through the Organization of American States (OAS) and the Rio Pact. While instability in Latin America is due fundamentally to the lack of social and economic progress, instability has been increased and intervention by the Sino-Soviets in the affairs of this hemisphere has occurred partly because of the unwillingness of the United States to act unilaterally in the face of its treaty restrictions and the unwillingness of the OAS to act. The unwillingness of the OAS nations to act against Cuba may be attributed to a long-standing fear of intervention by any country (particularly the United States) in their own internal affairs, as well as fear of reaction within their individual countries. Actually, the organization itself is weak. It is a system of 21 sovereign nations, each of which has equal vote. Any decision by the OAS must be a compromise that is acceptable to two-thirds of the member states. OAS military actions would be unlikely unless a majority of the states were convinced that they were faced with a clearly discernible external threat. Communist tactics, however, are subtle and cleverly screened. Although there is a growing awareness among the Latin American nations that the total-itarian Castro government is becoming a threat to their security, they do not yet consider it a clear and present danger. For these reasons OAS military action against Cuba is unlikely for the present.

d. Overt US Actions Supported by Latin American Volunteers. Participation by volunteers from Latin America in direct US military action against Cuba would soften the impression that the United States would be taking unilateral action contrary to the spirit of the UN and the OAS. In order to be convincing, it would have to be evident that there was a large number of volunteers coming from a variety of Latin American nations. The assembly and organization of these volunteers would be time-consuming, and all security of the operation would be lost. The success of this course of action seems unlikely and it is not recommended in any form.

e. Unilateral US Action

(1) Unilateral military action by the United States offers the advantages that there need be no compromise in pursuing US objectives, and that a reasonable degree of surprise can be achieved. Disadvantages are that strong criticism will be voiced by many nations of all political beliefs, and that the Latin American nations may become particularly distrustful of the United States.

(2) If the United States could overthrow the Castro government through a swift and decisive action, it is believed that all nations would, even while criticizing, accept a fait accompli, especially since they recognize the inherent danger to the basic security of a nation posed by a hostile regime located in close proximity. There is also a good possibility that a decisive action taken by the United States against Communism would renew the confidence of many in the Free World whose faith in our leadership has been faltering.

(3) An overt US action, if taken, must be assured of success. Physical capture and control of the Cuban government and key facilities is the only means of insuring that the objective of overthrowing the Castro government is achieved. CINCLANT Operation Plan 312-61 (Cuba), which has previously been reviewed and approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, provides the means of achieving this objective. Implementation of the plan should be in such a manner as to achieve surprise, both world-wide and tactical, and to accomplish the objective in the shortest time possible.

(4) Concurrent supporting actions should be taken as required, to assist in the accomplishment of the objective and to insure the establishment in Cuba of a situation satisfactory to the United States following the overthrow of the Castro government. Appropriate agencies of the Federal government should participate in this planning. One action that is recommended is the creation of an incident which will provide justification for the overthrow of the Castro government by the United States. Such an incident must be carefully planned and handled, to insure that it is plausible and that it occurs prior to any indication that the United States has decided to take military action against Cuba. Premature exposure of the fact that the incident was created by the United States could cause a shift in sentiment by the Cuban people against the United States.

5. More deliberate action

a. Another alternative to be examined is that of following a more deliberate course, characterized by extensive preparations both military and political. The military forces to be used in the operation could be brought to peak effectiveness at the time desired, and logistic arrangements could be thorough and complete. If the military posture in Cuba continued to improve, requiring additional assault forces to invade Cuba, these forces could be obtained through a selective increase of forces as shown in Annex C to Appendix F.⁵ The time of assault could be chosen during a period when world tensions are low, minimizing the risk of having to conduct military operations in more than one place. The chances of achieving tactical surprise might be enhanced by planning the invasion for a time which coincided with routine training exercises.

b. With sufficient time available a “Freedom Brigade” composed of Cuban Volunteers inducted into the US Army could form the basis for a flexible organization which could contribute to guerrilla and unconventional operations, the spearhead of any overt military action and post combat reconstruction. Such a force would also have a psychological effect on Cuba and could be used to absorb Cuban manpower in the US and Caribbean area. The unit, as US leadership is replaced by indigenous leadership, could be discharged to be utilized as a purely national force.

c. Politically the United States could make a concerted effort to establish world support and acceptance of the necessity for taking action against the Castro government. Advantage could be taken of favorable political situations as they develop. Military action could be planned for a time when international bodies such as the UN and the Organization of American States are not in session, and when nations are preoccupied with other problems. Particular effort could be made to get OAS to propose or support action in Cuba.

d. While a more deliberate course of action offers some advantages, past history seems to indicate that time is on the side of Castro. An invasion should not be conducted during the hurricane season, which lasts from August through November. The Castro regime could use this time to strengthen itself militarily and internally to the point that it would require a large-scale effort to overthrow him. Since this course of action would probably require large military effort, and shows little assurance of achieving the implicit political objectives, it is not recommended.

6. From a military point of view, it is recommended that the course of action proposed in paragraph 4 e above, in conjunction with the courses of action discussed in paragraphs 4 a and 4 b, be adopted if it is decided to accomplish the stated objective.

[Here follow Appendix B, “An Appraisal of the Strength of the Cuban Military Forces”, and Appendix C, “An Appraisal of the Probable Behaviour of Cuban Civilian Population During the Period of Military Action”.]

Appendix D

OUTLINE OPLAN

Task Organization (See Annex A Attached)

1. Situation

a. Current Intelligence

b. Enemy forces are organized Cuban military forces, Cuban militia, para-military groups and mobs, and possibly, pro-Castro “volunteers” from Latin America communist elements.

c. Friendly Forces:

(1) US Department of State is responsible for evacuation of non-combatants, establishment of “Status of Forces” agreements, provisional local law enforcement agencies, base rights and overflight rights as required; and will provide for logistic support to indigenous personnel after the first five days of the operation.

(2) MSTS and MATS will provide augmenting transportation as directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

(3) Central Intelligence Agency will support the operation.

(4) Rio Pact forces and indigenous forces may offer assistance.

2. Mission

Commander in Chief Atlantic will, when directed, conduct military operations in Cuba in order to accomplish the following: Defend the Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay; restore and maintain order; support or reestablish the authority of a Cuban Government friendly to the United States, and support the national policy of the United States.

3. Execution

a. In the event that military operations are directed, any or all of the following courses of action may be undertaken by CINCLANT:

(1) Reinforce and actively defend the Naval Base, Guantanamo Bay.

(2) Interdict Cuban lines of communication.

(3) Neutralize Cuban offensive capability by overt attack against military installations.

(4) Conduct Naval and air blockade of Cuba.

(5) Conduct assault operations to accomplish the mission.

b. Concept of Operations

(1) Western Cuba. When directed, operations in Western Cuba will be conducted by Army Airborne, Naval Amphibious, and Air Force and Naval Air Forces with the objective of seizing the Havana port and airfield complex, communications and government facilities in order to establish a base for further operations. Thereafter, operations will be expanded as required in order to accomplish the over-all mission.

(2) Eastern Cuba. Naval and Marine Forces under command of COMNAVBASE GTMO, will conduct operations to (a) defend the Naval Base at Guantanamo, (b) protect and/or evacuate United States and other designated nationals, (c) maintain a base for further operations.

(3) It is essential that operations be conducted with rapidity and decisiveness by a concurrent amphibious and airborne assault in Western Cuba. This will require that the amphibious elements be mounted and sail prior to deployment of airborne elements to the objective area. The combined airborne-amphibious assault and link-up of forces will ensure early availability of medium tanks and artillery in support of the airborne forces. The army seaborne echelon must be loaded out and sail so as to be available to commence off-loading on D-day.

(4) Amphibious forces in Western Cuba will be relieved and withdrawn as soon as practicable for further operations in the Eastern Cuban area.⁶

(5) By 60-90 days after the initial landing of combat forces it is expected that conditions will permit the utilization of other forces as occupation troops.

(6) The “objective areas” are initially the Western Cuba area for Army-Naval-Air Force operations and the Guantanamo area for Naval operations. Other objectives such as the Isle of Pines, specific cities, industrial plants or transportation facilities will be designated, depend-ent upon conditions prevailing at the time.

c. Phasing

(1) Phase I

(a) Activation of operating headquarters.

(b) Reinforcement and defense of Naval Base at Guantanamo.

(2) Phase II

(a) Naval Task Force deploys to objective areas.

(b) Army Task Force deploys combat and service units to staging bases, prepared for airborne assault operations; deploys to objective area on order.⁷

(c) Air Force Task Force deploys tactical elements to advanced operating airfields as required and air lifts elements of the Army Task Force to staging bases.

(3) Phase III

Commander Joint Task Force conducts concurrent airborne and amphibious assault operations in the Havana area and supports defensive operations in the Guantanamo area.

(4) Phase IV

(a) Commander Joint Task Force conducts amphibious assault and other operations in the Eastern Cuban area to seize Santiago and other objectives as required.

(b) Offensive land operations will be subsequently conducted to link up Army Forces, Western Cuba and Marine Forces, Eastern Cuba, if required.

4. Administration and Logistics are normal for Joint Operations and will be based on the anticipation of sustained operations for a period of 60-90 days.

5. Command and Signal matters are normal for Joint Operations. Commander Amphibious Force, US Atlantic Fleet will be alternate Joint Task Force Commander to Commander Second Fleet. Communications will be in accordance with current CINCLANTFLT procedures.

Annex A to Appendix D

TASK ORGANIZATION

1. Atlantic Command—CINCLANT

a. US Atlantic Fleet—CINCLANTFLT

b. Joint Task Force—COMSECONDFLT

(1) Naval Task Force—COMSECONDFLT

(a) Striking and covering forces which comprise combatant air and naval elements plus underway replenishment group.

(b) Amphibious Task Force which comprises amphibious shipping, one command ship, eight destroyers and a landing force (II Marine Expeditionary Force) made up of:

• Headquarters, II MEF
• 2nd Marine Division (-)
• 2nd Marine Air Wing (-)
• Force troops, Atlantic

(2) Army Task Force⁸

(a) XVIII Airborne Corps Headquarters

(b) 82nd Airborne Division

(c) 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment

(d) 4th/68 Tank Battalion

(e) 2nd Infantry Brigade

(f) 56th Artillery Group

(g) Special forces and civil affairs teams

(3) Air Force Task Force

(a) One Command Headquarters

(b) Two Troop Carrier Wings

(c) Four Tactical Fighter Squadrons

(d) One Tactical Control Element

(e) One half Tactical Reconnaissance Sqaudron

c. CIA Force Atlantic (when activated)

d. Special Operations Task Force Atlantic (when activated)

e. On Call Forces

Additional US forces as designated and directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, if required. It is anticipated that “On Call” forces will be the 4th Infantry or 101st Airborne Division, one Armored Combat Command, two additional Tactical Fighter Squadrons and uncommitted forces of the Atlantic Fleet. State of readiness to be determined by JCS.

f. Augmentation of Air and Surface Lift

MATS and MSTS provide air and surface lift as directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Annex B to Appendix D

OPTIMUM TIMING

1. The Castro regime is currently occupied in rounding up those dissident elements which have been exposed or which are in any way under suspicion. Time affords the regime the opportunity of crushing most opposition, imposing tighter control, strengthening its military posture, and propagandizing the public. If time passes without an indication that outside help will be provided to the Cuban resistance movement, the will to resist will be progressively weakened. Time allows world communism to marshall opposition to any move taken by the United States to overthrow Castro.

2. The hurricane season in the Caribbean normally begins in August. A military operation in that area should not be started later than July.⁹

3. National Guard and Reserve Army divisions are brought to active duty for annual training commencing in June. If the Communist Bloc creates incidents in other areas these divisions could remain on active duty and other forces such as the 1st and 2nd US Army divisions released for action in other areas.

4. Subsequent to the overthrow of the Castro government a regime which is satisfactory to US objectives must be established in Cuba. In view of the current disorganization within the Cuban resistance movement, the time required to insure that such a government is prepared to take firm control is unknown. Since the political actions which will follow military operations will probably determine the long-range success or failure of the entire operation, this factor assumes great importance.

5. With no previous warning it will take a period of 18 days from the time preparatory actions are started until the first assault landings can be made in Cuba. Prior warning, permitting preliminary preparation, could reduce this time to ten days without giving advance notice to the rest of the world. Every effort should be made to conceal the purpose of the operation once troop embarkation has commenced.

6. If it is decided to overthrow the Castro government, the operation should be initiated as soon as possible.

Annex C to Appendix D

ESTIMATE OF TIME TO ACCOMPLISH OBJECTIVES

D-day and A-hour are the day and time of the coordinated airborne and Marine assault on Western Cuba in the Havana area. Specific military actions, in phases, as included in current planning are shown below:

Phase	Day	Events
Phase I	D-1810	Decision to implement or prepare to implement plan for US intervention in Cuba.
		—Alert CINCLANT, CIA, Department of State and other Unified and Specified Commanders.
		—CINCLANT notifies his component commanders, forces alterted. Joint Task Force Headquarters activated.
		—Implementing forces prepare for deployment.
		—Amphibious shipping proceeds to embarkation ports.
		—Reinforcement of Guantanamo.
		—Evacuation of dependents from Guantanamo.
		—Marshalling of supporting MSTS sea lift.
		—Commander Special Operations Task Force Atlantic reports to Commander Joint Task Force.
Phase II		—Form and deploy Naval Task Force.
		—Deploy Army forces to staging bases and loading out ports. Load and deploy on order.
		—Deploy Air Force tactical elements to advanced airfields and prepare for air operations.
Phase III	Day: D-5	—Decision to accomplish plan for US intervention in Cuba, if not previously determined.
		—Departure of Army ground forces via sea lift.
		—Departure of Marine forces in amphibious shipping.
		—Diversions, as may be planned by CINC-LANT concerning weather, and cover activ-ities.
	D-day	—Coordinated airborne and Marine assault Western Cuba with supporting air strikes, air reconnaissance and blockade as required.11
	D+2 to D+4	—Isolation of Havana.
	D+6 to D+8	—Control of Havana.
Phase IV	D+17 to D+19	—Control of Santiago De Cuba.
	D+24 to D+34	—East-West Linkup of US forces.
	D+30 to D+54	—Cessation of Organized Resistance.
	D+60 to D+90	—Withdrawal of combat forces.

Annex D to Appendix D

ESTIMATE OF CASUALTIES

1. No reliable estimate of either friendly or enemy losses can be stated at this time. Such losses will be directly related to the intensity of Cuban resistance and inversely related to the speed and effectiveness of the assault by US forces.

2. Assuming that Army forces are committed in both the number and manner envisioned in the current operations plan, Army planners have estimated that ground forces would sustain approximately sixteen (16%) percent casualties.¹² This estimate includes casualties of all types and is based upon a thirty (30) day operation with four (4) days of heavy fighting, the intensity of combat tapering off after that time.

3. In view of the influence of political, psychological, and other similar considerations, the effect of which is unknown at this time, any estimate of Cuban casualties would be so hypothetical as to have little practical value. No estimate of Cuban casualties, therefore, is provided.

[Here follow Appendix E, “Contingencies That the US Should Be Prepared To Face in the Event of Operations in Cuba” and Appendix F, “Residual US Forces”.]

0. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD (C) A Files: FRC 71 A 2896, Cuba 381 (Sensitive). Top Secret.
1. Document 159.
2. Not found.
3. Wheeler signed for Burke above Burkeʼs typed signature.
4. McNamara added a marginal handwritten note at this point which reads: “how soon would it force [illegible word] capitulation?
5. Neither printed.
6. McNamara added a handwritten marginal note at this point that reads: “Should not Eastern and Western plans be carried out simultaneously?”
7. At the bottom of this page of the Outline Plan McNamara noted: “Too much boiler plate and not enough detailed planning”.
8. In the margin at this point McNamara posed the question: “Is this enough?” At the bottom of the page he asked for the total number of men involved in the Army Task Force.
9. A note by McNamara at this point reads: “between 7/15 + 12/1?”
10. McNamara noted at this point: “could be cut to D-10 with prior warning”.
11. At this point McNamara posed the following question in the margin: “Should not force be expanded to permit simultaneous strikes West and East Cuba?”
12. McNamara added a marginal note at this point asking for a specific number of pro-jected casualties.