Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume X, Cuba, January 1961–September 1962

148. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State⁰

New York, April 19, 1961, noon.

2937. For President and Secretary from Stevenson. Cuba.

1. Atmosphere in UN, among both our friends and neutrals, is highly unsatisfactory and extremely dangerous to U.S. position throughout world. Sovs and Castro Cubans have been able capture and so far hold moral initiative. This is at least partly due to lack of advance planning on how to defend ourselves politically.

2. With sufficient high level approaches to friendly govts explaining our policy, Dept should be able assure enough votes to provide blocking third against Sov¹ or Rumanian res² and against any Asian res or compromise if it is sufficiently slanted against us. If LAʼs prepared vote against Mexican res³ because of their own, we might be able defeat it as well. 7-power res⁴ is best we can do. How strongly we should come out for it in capitals at this point, however, I am as yet uncertain but will make recommendation shortly.

3. So far we have received virtually no support in speeches of others. Immediate approaches in capitals is necessary if Dept desires favorable speeches. Situation so difficult here no one will speak, except those hostile to us, without definite instructions on their govtʼs policy. Introduction by 7 LAʼs of res may help this because it gives focus around which to turn debate.

4. We are also exposed with large number of other dels with whom we have policy disputes on other issues in UN. At just wrong moment we have managed alienate Arabs on Palestine refugees item and on Jordanian case in SC against Israeli Jerusalem parole. We are in difficulty with whole Brazzaville group because of Cameroon plebiscite. If we had known we would have to face current situation we would have undoubtedly followed different policies and could have avoided present strained relations which are seriously damaging our bargaining power with them on Cuba.

5. Everyone, of course, friend or foe, believes we have engineered this revolution and no amount of denials will change their minds. Our prestige is thus committed, particularly in Latin America. Some states—Communist and “positive neutralists”—are very hostile. Others are uneasy. And those who are for us, especially LAʼs, are afraid to speak out because they fear internal repercussions of fight in Cuba on their own countries; they pray that this revolt will succeed within hours. Also urgently need if possible language to meet universal view that aiding, instigating and organizing from outside is as culpable as intervention in international and inter-American law.

6. Whatever happens now we are in for period of very serious political trouble. If revolution succeeds within days without overt U.S. intervention our problem minimized but by no means overcome. If it fails, we will lose stature and strength, with all that this implies for our position in OAS, the Alliance for Peace Program, the attitude of LAʼs toward Sov blandishments, and their ability resist other Cubas in LA; these stakes are high and having started this operation and having already paid heavy political price for it, I hope we will use covert means to maximum, to make it succeed and succeed fast. If nevertheless it fails we can then only say we were not involved, we are appalled at victory of oppression; and we are confident that in time Cuban people will again be free. From viewpoint U.S. position in world as reflected in UN, overt U.S. intervention in Cuba, after all we have said, would probably be worse than failure present effort. Green (Canada) told me today if U.S. intervened directly it would put us in impossible situation.

7. If worse comes to worst and there is prolonged military stalemate in Cuba which we are committed to support most serious situation will arise which will put us in grave difficulties in UN. Overt U.S. military support of rebels in absence legal framework or adequate provocation would be politically disastrous. It would be considered as another Suez and we would have to expect world to react accordingly. Overt aid, if decided upon, must be based on sound legal position even if it is fiction. We feel there must, for example, at least be rebel govt established in Cuba with control of substantial section of Cuban territory and including major city as capital and which can appeal for help before we even consider such step. I wish make clear I am not recommending this be done; considerations which govern such decisions are not sufficiently known to me here. But if this point should be reached we must have legal position at least as firm as USSR has in Laos.

Stevenson

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.37/4-1961. Top Secret; Niact; Eyes Only. The outgoing copy of this telegram at USUN indicates that it was drafted by Yost and Pedersen and cleared in draft by Stevenson. (USUN Files: NYFRC 84-84-002, Outgoing Tels 1962)
1. On April 19 the Soviet Union submitted a draft resolution in the First Committee that called for the General Assembly to condemn armed aggression against Cuba, which the Soviet Union stated was sponsored by the United States, and called upon member states to render such assistance to Cuba as might be necessary to repel such aggression. (U.N. doc. A/C.1/L.277)
2. Romania submitted a draft resolution on April 17 that called for the General Assembly to demand the immediate cessation of military activities against the Republic of Cuba and to issue an urgent appeal to the states whose territory and means were being used to support the attack to stop such assistance. (U.N. doc. A/C.1/L.274)
3. On April 18 Mexico submitted a draft resolution in the First Committee that made reference to the obligation of observing the principle of nonintervention in the internal affairs of any state. The resolution called for the General Assembly to make an urgent appeal to all states to ensure that their territories were not being used to promote a civil war in Cuba and to urge cooperation in the search for a peaceful solution to the situation in Cuba. (U.N. doc. A/C.1/L.275)
4. An additional draft resolution was submitted in the First Committee on April 18 by Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Honduras, Panama, Uruguay, and Venezuela. This resolution made reference to the general obligation to seek a peaceful solution to disputes and called for the General Assembly to encourage the member states of the Organization of American States to lend assistance in achieving a settlement. It also called for the General Assembly to exhort all member states to abstain from any action that might aggravate existing tensions. (U.N. doc. A/C.1/L.276)