14. Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency0
Washington, January 5,
1961.
SPECIAL GROUP MEETINGS—CUBA
5 January 1961
- 1.
- Mr. Douglas felt that Defense (Col. Prouty) was now in a position to iron out all the difficulties in connection with the Special Forces personnel [Page 24] for Guatemala. It was agreed that State concurrence in the arrangements should be obtained, but Mr. Douglas said Defense would not slow down its activities awaiting this.
- 2.
- Mr. Douglas then read from a paper1 left with him by Gen. Lemnitzer. This indicated a schedule of training time, if training were conducted under Army auspices, which would approximate 24 weeks or—on a sketchier basis—12-16 weeks. The memo also referred to numerous difficulties which might arise, such as medical care, pay, etc., as well as problems of cover, political orientation and the like. All agreed that a training schedule of this kind is totally impractical in current circumstances. The members appeared to agree that this constituted a good argument for a re-examination of basic concepts, particularly as to the need for overt intervention and early recognition of an exile government.
- 3.
- Mr. Barnes pointed out that due to the different political colorations of the emigres, if for no other reason, it would be difficult to name a government before members of it are physically on Cuban soil.
- 4.
- It was agreed that in any case a decision as to ultimate overt intervention is required, but that it will probably not be practicable to obtain this in the next fifteen days. Mr. Gray undertook to pass on the word that the Army plans, as outlined in the paper read by Mr. Douglas, were not responsive to the need. Mr. Bissell said that one alternative action that can be taken is to obtain Cubans who have already had military experience and to train them in the U.S. He recognized that this would constitute essentially an overt act.
- 5.
- Mr. Barnes pointed out the desirability, in the course of bilateral discussions with other Latin American countries, of attempting to obtain commitments for limited personnel support at an appropriate time. In answer to a question, Mr. Merchant said that he did not forsee the necessity for a temporary evacuation of the Guatemala base.