656. Memorandum from Sherman Kent to McCone, April 191
SUBJECT
- Comments on Proposed New Covert Policy and Program towards Cuba
1. The following comment was prepared by Messrs. Kent, Smith, Huizenga, and Whitman of this office. We are in general agreement with this paper’s estimates of specific Soviet reactions to specific measures against Cuba. In this connection, our only general comment is that reactions would probably be sharper to measures taken from outside Cuba (D1, 2, and 3) than to those mounted internally (d 4), since these latter could not be so successfully represented as US-inspired in Soviet political exploitation. With respect to anti-shipping measures (D1, 2), it is possible that reprisals would be taken against US ships in Latin American ports where local Communists have significant sabotage capabilities, e.g. Venezuela.
[Facsimile Page 2] [Typeset Page 1681]2. Turning to more general reactions, we think that the paper and its Annex are deficient in failing to consider how both the USSR and Cuba would interpret basic US policy toward Cuba in the light of actions such as those proposed here. We believe that, at the present juncture, both the USSR and Cuba wish to bring about a period of calm in the Caribbean, reduce the constant threat of a crisis, and in this way work for a stabilization of Cuba’s position and its de facto acceptance by its neighbors. We think they probably intend to continue this policy until they are satisfied that Cuba can again be used as a Communist base for forward action without excessive risk. They realize that the US is unreconciled to the present regime, but they probably hope that the US will limit itself to measures of isolation, and will refrain from more active and direct measures. In this, they are probably somewhat encouraged by the absence of low-level overflights and, to a greater extent, by US declarations and measures against independent exile attacks.
3. The unfurling of a program of more aggressive sabotage, harassment, and resistance activities would at [Facsimile Page 3] some point cause the Soviets and Cubans to question whether a period of calm could be achieved. As incidents mounted, they would be increasingly inclined to believe that the US could not be induced to let the Castro regime survive, and that tactics of non-provocation would not divert the US from its increasingly manifest intention to bring down the regime by indirect action. Fears of direct US action, including even an invasion, would be revived. We have no basis for predicting at what point the Soviets and Cubans would reach these conclusions, but it is likely that Castro would be more concerned, and earlier, than the USSR, with consequent strains in Havana-Moscow relations. Castro might at some point use his own military forces in a way designed to force the USSR’s hand.
4. The Soviets, in these circumstances, would look for ways to arrest a trend which appeared to point toward the ultimate fall of the Cuban regime and, in the meantime, was complicating their relations with Castro. One of their first acts might be to communicate privately with the President in a way which combined [illegible in the original] of direct retaliation with hints that Soviet-American relations as a whole were at stake in the Cuban [Facsimile Page 4] confrontation. In fact, under these circumstances, the Soviets probably would harden their attitude on other international issues; at a minimum, they would find it difficult to conclude major agreements at a time when US pressures on Cuba were high. This might be thought of as a disadvantage if we expected that any gains on other issues would result from US efforts to promote a more relaxed atmosphere. At the present phase, however, it does not seem likely that Soviet attitudes on matters like Berlin and disarmament will be much affected by such considerations.
[Typeset Page 1682]5. If the Soviets found that such measures failed to deter the US, and it appeared to them that covert action posed a real threat to the Cuban regime, the USSR would have to decide whether to take greater risks to arrest this trend. If they chose to do so, the issue of aerial surveillance would offer an appropriate confrontation. They might believe that continuing reconnaissance plus a rise in sabotage and harassment from outside Cuba offered a promising case for resort to the UN in an effort to force a major reversal of US policy toward Cuba. To dramatize their case, they might shoot down a U–2, absorb the likely US retaliation, [Facsimile Page 5] and thus seize the UN with a major crisis. From the Soviet viewpoint, however, the latter would be a hazardous move offering an uncertain outcome, and a decision to court such a showdown would depend upon numerous factors which are themselves constantly changing.
6. If the USSR were unwilling to incur high risks, it would probably seek to meet US activities locally and directly by aiding Cuba’s efforts to protect its shipping and installations and to suppress internal elements. If the USSR adhered to this policy, and Castro was in fact seriously weakened, it would probably content itself with trying to maximize the political costs to the US of having restored “imperialism” in Cuba.
National Estimates
- Comments on proposed new covert policy and program toward Cuba. Secret. 5 pp. CIA Files: Job 91–00741R, Mongoose Papers, Box 1.↩