647. Memorandum from Thompson to Rusk, April 51
KHRUSHCHEV’S MESSAGE
I. Possible Causes.
A. There have been indications that Soviet military have become more assertive toward Soviet leadership. The Soviets have an inferiority complex. The military, who have a sensitive pride, doubtless feel they have been exposed to a series of humiliations—viz:
1. Blockade actions during Cuban crisis.
2. Close and repeated surveillance by us of Soviet ships.
3. Continued overflight of Soviet military installations in Cuba.
4. Penkovsky spy affair.
5. Soviet military may have reluctantly agreed to three atomic test inspections under pressure from Khrushchev who may really have believed this would achieve agreement.
6. Message to Khrushchev delivered by Kohler probably considered by Soviets as adding insult to injury. It is one thing for us to overfly Cuba with tacit Soviet tolerance, another to remind them in official statement that we are and will continue to do so.
[Facsimile Page 2] [Typeset Page 1666]7. Two attacks by Cuban emigres on Soviet ships and our statements and actions indicating that Soviet military must withdraw.
B. Khrushchev pushed by CHICOMS and may be in a corner even with his own colleagues. He is faced with a whole series of failures—viz:
1. Cuban affair.
2. Bad handling of Chinese dispute.
3. Agriculture failure.
4. Cultural thaw which got out of hand.
5. Iraq and Syria.
6. Franco-German Treaty.
7. Multilateral Force prospects.
8. Berlin.
C. Khrushchev’s defense of his Cuban policy dependent upon survival of Castro at least until CHICOM dispute settled or until meaningful agreements reached with the United States. He is doubtless concerned that we may bring Castro down before that time. Moreover, our actions are making his support of Cuba expensive and burdensome in many ways. As Soviets train Cubans to operate SAM sites, Cubans have probably become more aware of extent and frequency of our overflights. Castro may be threatening drastic action such as turning to the Chinese unless Khrushchev stops overflights.
D. Khrushchev might have MRBM’s in caves in Cuba and want to stop overflights in order to get them into place for a showdown over Berlin or on other questions.
[Facsimile Page 3]II. Possible Motives.
A. Some of Khrushchev’s possible motives are implicit in the foregoing but to summarize:
1. He may be under pressure from his military or his party colleagues for forceful action and may wish to provoke a strong reaction to his message in order to deal with them.
2. He may hope to influence our position in the Berlin negotiations.
3. He may hope to stimulate stronger action by us against hit-and-run raids and/or to weaken our actions against Castro.
4. He may be using this message to bring about a Summit or high-level meeting to deal with the points mentioned above as well as other issues such as a test ban in order to decide how to handle his CHICOM problem.
5. He may really be backed into a corner in which he sees a possibility of losing power and be gambling that we will back down on overflights of Cuba.
6. Khrushchev may want to bring the question of overflights, and possibly our actions against the Castro regime, before the U.N.
- Analysis of possible causes and motives behind Khrushchev’s message passed to the Attorney General on April 3. Top Secret. 3 pp. DOS, S/S Files: Lot 77 D 163, Pen Pal Series, Special US–USSR Files, 1963.↩