1. The United States Intelligence Board, at a special meeting on this
date, considered the referenced report on the subject by the Committee
on Overhead Reconnaissance, and approved it subject to certain
amendments.
2. The report, in the form approved by USIB, is attached hereto.
Attachment
SUBJECT
- Requirements for Low-level Reconnaissance of Cuba
[Facsimile Page 2]
1. The minute of the meeting of the Special Group on 15 February 1963
requested a comprehensive study of low-level reconnaissance of Cuba.
The minute stated that “such a study would include consideration of
the strategic significance of proposed targets.” COMOR has reviewed its previous
recommendations for low-level photography and sets forth below its
present thinking pursuant to the above injunction.
2. Of major concern to the United States Government is the
introduction into Cuba of offensive weapons (MRBMs or IRBMs and bombers) or the release from concealment of
any such equipment which may not have been removed from Cuba and
which might be deployed to already prepared basic installations.
There is therefore a continuing requirement to investigate suspect
and unexplained military activities which might be associated with
offensive weapons systems and nuclear energy activities.
[Facsimile Page 3]
3. Two categories of targets which might give us information
concerning the presence or introduction of offensive weapons in Cuba
are ships suspect of carrying military equipment and personnel, and
a number of unidentified installations, which include underground or
unusual facilities.
a. Ships: We consider the monitoring of
large-hatch ships (suspect of carrying offensive weapons) and
other ships designated of “special interest” (e.g., troop
carriers) entering Cuba to be of major importance. FAR
photography while the ship is approaching the island and
high-level photography while the ship is in port have not thus
far and probably will not permit us to monitor these cargoes
adequately. COMOR considers
that while these ships are in port they should be covered during
the daytime by low-level photography to supplement high-level
coverage. In addition and based on recent experience, COMOR is convinced that
suspicious military equipment will be unloaded at night and,
therefore, believes that nighttime photography will likewise be
required.
b. Unidentified Installations: A number of
unidentified installations, the majority of which include
underground facilities,
[Facsimile Page 4]
have been isolated by high-level coverage.
These installations (listed at Tab A) are strongly suspect as
being established for weapons storage of some sort. With
high-level coverage and with some low-level coverage in the past
we have not been able to explain the enigma which these
facilities present. However, we do know that in many cases an
appraisal of the photography over a period of time shows the
growth and expansion of such facilities. We consider their
existence and continued development as sinister. We also believe
that low-level photography can contribute to explaining the uses
for which these facilities are intended. We again recognize that
in the course, depending upon the nature of our findings,
[Typeset Page 1615]
nighttime or other types of photography (such as camouflage
detection may be required and justifiable.
4. In addition to surveillance of any offensive threat the number of
Soviet personnel and the amount of [illegible in the original]
equipment presently located in Cuba is a cause of major concern.
[illegible in the original] battle for ground forces, including the
presence of such modern weapons as the FROG cannot be fully
established from high-level source photography or apparently from
collateral sources. Low-level photography if carried out
comprehensively and simultaneously might [illegible in the original]
to make a more
[Facsimile Page 5]
valid appraisal of the extent of Soviet
deployment including indications of the introduction or pullout of
personnel and equipment or turnover of equipment to the Cubans.
5. Surface-to-air missiles are not an offensive threat although the
nature of their deployment may indicate they are intended for the
protection of offensive installations. Originally this was the case
for some of the SAMs in Cuba but
such redeployment as has been accomplished since the departure of
the IRBM-MRBMs for the most part suggests strategic defense of
the territory of Cuba. At the moment we do not nominate SAMs as low-level targets although
this may change.
6. Cruise-missile sites have been covered regularly through
high-level reconnaissance and no ominous force level changes have
been revealed. As for the crates which have been associated with
cruise missiles, a comprehensive and simultaneous low-level coverage
of all [illegible in the original] periodically repeated would be
needed to be more [illegible in the original] on this question. It
is our opinion that at this time, the [illegible in the original]
missile activity is only a defense against invasion and is not
significant in terms of an offensive threat against [illegible in
the original] United States. This may change in which case
[illegible in the original].
[Facsimile Page 6]
7. If cruise-missile sites are deployed so as to pose a threat to
Guantanamo, the Board may wish to include this within the concept of
an offensive threat against the United States. In that case
cruise-missile sites in the vicinity of Guantanamo must be justified
for low level reconnaissance.
8. Recommendations
a. That high-level photography of activities related to
impending movement of Soviet personnel and equipment be
supplemented by low-level photography and where particularly
required, photography at night. This coverage should include the
ships in port identified as suspect and the associated
encampments listed in Tab B. There is an immediate need to cover
4 passenger and 4 cargo ships.
b. That high-level photography be supplemented by low-level
photography at the unidentified installations listed is listed
in Tab A in the order of priority indicated as soon as
practicable.
