I attended the meeting and made the remarks as in the attached paper.
There were no significant questions.
Attachment
CUBA
I. By a careful examination of all photography and other intelligence
sources, we have concluded that the Soviets have withdrawn 42
strategic missiles and 42 jet bombers and their related equipment,
and about four or five thousand personnel probably associated with
the maintenance and operation of this equipment.
A. We believe, but we cannot prove by aerial reconnaissance, that
this represents all the strategic weapons placed in Cuba by the
Soviets.
1. The strategic missile bases have been dismantled and no
IL–28 bomber aircraft
remain in sight.
B. Several categories of missiles remain in Cuba. These include
surface-to-air, short range surface-to-surface coastal defense, and
missiles for KOMOR type coastal ships. Quantities of these missiles
may be stored in caves in Cuba together with other items of
conventional armament. However, we doubt that attempts have been
made to hide
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intermediate range strategic missiles in
caves but this can not be proven by the aerial reconnaissance which
we are carrying on each day, weather permitting. Our program of
aerial reconnaissance which calls for a complete coverage
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of the
entire Island every week will, in our opinion, reveal any effort to
reintroduce strategic missiles or reactivate strategic weapons
systems.
II. Nevertheless there is still a substantial Soviet military
presence in Cuba.
A. From all intelligence sources, including photographic
reconnaissance, agent and refugee reports and other intelligence
assets, we conclude that:
1. Many thousands of Soviet military personnel remain—from
known table of organization of Soviet units, and from other
sources, this number may be in the order of 17,000.
2. the Soviets are operating the advanced MIG–21 fighters in Cuba,
3. Soviet pilots flew 26 of the 42 aircraft that appeared in the
January 2nd demonstration,
4. The Soviets continue to man the 24 surface-to-air missile
sites and the related sophisticated communications systems.
(Although these SAM remain
operational and their radars occasionally are activated against
our U–2s, no missile has to our
knowledge been fired since the shootdown of a U–2 on 27 October.)
5. the Soviets are maintaining four mobile ground units of
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some
1,500 men, each fully equipped with tanks, mobile field pieces,
short-range surface-to-surface tactical missiles, and other unit
equipment.
6. permanent barracks and other facilities are under construction
to house these units.
III. We have witnessed no introduction of new military equipment into
Cuba since late October.
A. However, we have indications that one ship, which passed
Gilbraltar 5 January, probably is carrying military equipment and
supplies.
B. Soviet Bloc shipping continues at an average of about one ship per
day; this is comparable to the rate of deliveries during the first
half of 1962, but considerably below the rate maintained during the
military build-up.
IV. In addition to the military equipment in the hands of the
Soviets, we note large concentration of tanks, trucks, mobile field
pieces, etc., which are at the disposal of the Cuban themselves.
V. There is no detectable change in the Castro regime’s goals or
methods.
A. Some reports indicate sharp differences between Castro and the
Soviets over the withdrawal of offensive weapons but these
differences have not reached a breaking point, nor
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have they impaired
Castro’s control of the political life of Cuba and its economic
program.
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B. Castro’s hatred for the United States and his determination to
foment revolutions in Latin America were repeated in his January 2nd
speech.
C. Castro’s decision to release the Cuban prisoners was based on his
judgment and the judgment of his advisers that the arrangement
represented a good deal from his standpoint, though there is some
evidence that it brought criticism from the hard-line Communists
within his organization.
VI. We see no evidence of a Soviet decision to make major withdrawals
of military equipment and personnel from Cuba. However, this is a
possibility with the passage of time. We note for instance that a
few short-range rocket transporters have recently been loaded on an
outbound ship.
At the present, however, we summarize the situation in Cuba as
follows: Castro remains in control, his attitudes seem unchanged,
but the Soviets have retained sufficient military capability in Cuba
to give them powerful leverage on Castro should he oppose their
policies too actively.
