Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, American Republics; Cuba 1961–1962; Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath, Volumes X/XI/XII, Microfiche Supplement

554. Memorandum from Sorensen to President Kennedy, November 22¹

November 22, 1962

SUBJECT

• Wrapping up the Cuban Crisis

Alternative approaches to quickly “drawing a line” under the Cuban crisis which will neither sap hemispheric nor domestic confidence in our resolve or convince the Soviets that it is useless to bargain with us in good faith:

Alternative I—Nothing more is needed.

Persuade the Soviets that the President’s press conference statement, and the President’s letters of October 27 and 28, constitute all the non-invasion assurance that is needed or feasible, if Congress is not later to upset it and in view of the Soviets’ own inability to make good on the type of inspection and safeguards envisioned in U Thant’s letter of summary.

Alternative II—Further informal statements only.

For same reasons, offer a speech or statement by Ambassador Stevenson to United Nations General Assembly which does not have the status of a formal government document and which is based on the President’s press conference statement.

Alternative III—The Security Council.

If a Security Council meeting is deemed absolutely essential:

(a) How informal can we keep our statement or declaration?

(b) Do we need to risk getting involved with either the UAR Chairman’s summation or a Security Council resolution noting the declarations?

(c) How many of the following condition clauses (“if. . .” or “subject to. . .” etc.) can be included in any non-invasion pledge, in addition to the completion of the weapons’ withdrawal and their non-reintroduction?

(1) Our rights and obligations under the Rio Treaty and Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.

(2) Our ability to be certain that there are no offensive weapons remaining in or returned to Cuba.

(3) The efforts of the Western Hemisphere to halt subversion from Cuba, and our hopes for the freedom of the Cuban people.

(4) Cuba fulfilling her United Nations Obligations not to export aggression.

(5) No sudden or secret provocation as occurred this fall.

Theodore C. Sorensen

1. Wrapping up the Cuban crisis. Top Secret. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, Sorensen Papers, Classified Subject Files 1961–64, Cuba—Subjects, Material Used at Hyannis, 11/22/62–11/23/62.