Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, American Republics; Cuba 1961–1962; Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath, Volumes X/XI/XII, Microfiche Supplement

543. Memorandum for members of the NSC Executive Committee from Brubeck, November 19¹

November 19, 1962

INR Papers

Attached are three INR papers for your information and use.

William H. Brubeck

Executive Secretary

Attachment

November 17, 1962

SUBJECT

• Soviet/Cuban Reactions to US Retaliation for Attack on US Reconnaissance Aircraft

We have examined likely Soviet and Cuban reactions to possible US actions undertaken in retaliation for a Communist attack upon a US reconnaissance aircraft over Cuba. Bearing in mind Castro’s November 15 threat (in his letter to U Thant) to take violent countermeasures against intruding US aircraft, we conclude the following:

1) Attack on US reconnaissance aircraft under present circumstances is unlikely in view of the high degree of Soviet control over the Cuban air defense system;

2) Soviet SAM attack against U–2’s is improbable;

3) Independent Cuban attack against low-flying aircraft is possible;

4) Probable uncertainty as to responsibility for any attack and exploitable differences between the Soviets and Cubans suggest the desirability of tailoring US assertions of responsibility to the circumstances of the incident.

Who Operates the Cuban Air Defense System?

There is strong evidence that overall control of the Cuban air defense system is in Soviet hands and that the SAM sites (most effective against high-flying aircraft) are Soviet manned. Anti-aircraft artillery (effective against aircraft at lower altitudes) could be in either Cuban or Soviet hands but we believe the bulk of such weapons are Cuban operated.

Cuban or Soviet Responsibility?

If we are correct in believing the main Cuban air defense system to be under Soviet control, any attack launched by that system might logically be considered as Soviet instigated. In any case, it was clearly the Soviets who provided the weapons and created the situation in which reconnaissance was necessary and thus subject to interdiction. In the actual case of an attack (particularly a successful attack) on a US reconnaissance aircraft, however, responsibility may be less than clear.

If a U–2 were shot down from high altitude, we could assume that a Soviet-manned SAM was responsible, but we might not be able to exclude the possibility that a Cuban-piloted MIG–21 had zoomed upward and downed the aircraft. Who had manned conventional anti-aircraft artillery which downed a lower flying aircraft would be equally ambiguous, but the weight of presumption would rest with Cuban responsibility. Another possibility would be the accidental crash in Cuba of a US aircraft with the US unable to determine whether accident or enemy action was the cause.

In sum, uncertainty may well characterize our assessment of who or what was responsible for the loss of a US reconnaissance plane over Cuba. It is, therefore, not unlikely that we may, in justifying retaliation, have considerable freedom of choice in selecting the responsible party—the Cubans, the Russians, or both.

Are the Cubans and Soviets in Agreement?

Castro’s assertion that intruding US reconnaissance aircraft will risk destruction does not have explicit Soviet endorsement. While there is ample reason for the Cubans to be annoyed by continued US surveillance and for the Soviets to wish to support the Cubans in efforts to stop it, we believe it on the whole unlikely that Moscow would wish to face the risks of deterioration in the Cuban situation which would ensue from violent measures to end such surveillance. In his statement, in fact, Castro even suggests the unilateral nature of his threat by tying it to intruding aircraft “within the reach of our anti-aircraft,” which suggests he was not including SAMs. It thus seems likely that for the time being, at least, the Cubans and the Soviets are not in agreement on the desirability of firing on US reconnaissance aircraft. This implies that Cuban words may not foreshadow Cuban actions, particularly in view of the probable high degree of Soviet control over the Cuban air defense system. Maverick Cuban action against low flying aircraft cannot, of course, be excluded.

Reaction to US Retaliation

For the purpose of analysis we assume that the US accepts the principle of limited retaliation appropriate to the offense (e.g., elimination of a SAM site in response to destruction of a US aircraft by a SAM). We further assume that the USSR will be willing to run even fewer risks in defense of its present military installations in Cuba than it was willing to face over its surface-to-surface missile sites. We, therefore, do not believe there is any great risk of triggering a Soviet military reaction, within or without the Cuban context, even if Soviet personnel are killed in our retaliatory action.

Under these circumstances Soviet and Cuban reactions to possible US retaliation can be described as follows:

1. Reaction to verbal protest against unsuccessful attack on US reconnaissance aircraft.

A warning to the Soviets and to the Cubans that we would, if another effort were made to shoot down a US reconnaissance aircraft, retaliate immediately would give both of them cause to reconsider their courses of action. If we are correct in believing that the Soviets would not at this time wish to exacerbate the Cuban crisis and, therefore, would not indorse or carry out the attack, it is likely that Moscow would exert what pressure it could on the Cubans to resist from any further such actions. Whether or not we asserted Soviet as opposed to Cuban responsibility would not in this case basically affect the Soviet response although ambiguity on our part or assertion of Cuban responsibility could enable Moscow to avoid more gracefully a rise in US-Soviet tensions. As far as the Cubans are concerned, the protest and warning might induce some slightly greater degree of caution in their behavior although the original decision to attack would already have demonstrated some disregard for risk. Castro might calculate that a heightening of US-Soviet tension over the surveillance issue might work to his advantage in terms of ultimate arrangements between Cuba and the USSR as well as between the Communist side and the US. He would probably be eager to claim “credit” for the attack. The Soviets would be faced with the distasteful necessity of creating Soviet-Cuban ill-will to the extent they criticized the Cuban action.

2. Reaction to Specific Retaliation as a Result of Destruction of a Low-Flying US Reconnaissance Aircraft.

We assume that the specific action of retaliation would involve destruction of a Cuban anti-aircraft artillery complex or of hostile aircraft. Such action might or might not be accompanied by warnings to both Moscow and Havana against repetition of the incident. In turn the warnings might or might not specify responsibility for the original attack despite our belief the Cubans would most probably be responsible.

If our analysis is correct, it is likely that the object destroyed in Cuba would be Cuban-manned, although the possibility that some Soviets might also be done away with cannot be excluded. In this case the Soviets would protest violently against the “piratical US action,” but at the same time would be likely to use their influence with the Cubans to prevent a further incident even if we kept flying.

As in the case of an unsuccessful attack, a US warning to Moscow and Havana against repetition of the attack would provide Moscow with greater flexibility of action and would be more likely adversely to affect Soviet-Cuban relations if Cuban responsibility were asserted. The Cubans would hope for Moscow’s full support and would be annoyed to the extent they failed to get it or were pressured by the Soviets to cease their attacks. A US failure to specify responsibility in the warning would achieve about the same results in terms of Soviet-Cuban relations and, at the same time, would imply some Soviet responsibility. In this sense, ambiguity might usefully offer greater inducement to the Kremlin to exert pressure on Castro despite whatever ill effects this might have on Soviet-Cuban relations.

A US retaliatory action unaccompanied by warnings to Moscow and Havana might have much the same practical effect but would obviously be less controllable in terms of interpretation by either the Soviets or the Cubans.

3. Reaction to Specific Retaliation as a Result of Destruction of a US Surveillance Aircraft by a SAM.

Destruction of the offending SAM site would almost certainly be the most critical retaliatory action (short of invastion) we might take if we are correct in believing the SAM sites are Soviet manned. The original attack on a US aircraft almost certainly would have been ordered by Moscow and would represent a Soviet decision to increase deliberately the degree of US-Soviet confrontation.

At the same time the lack of Soviet desire to engage in strategically unfavorable escalation in the Cuban area (clearly demonstrated by Khrushchev’s decision to withdraw his missiles) makes it probable that any such Soviet decision would have very limited objectives. Moscow might feel that shooting down one US aircraft over Cuba would, despite an expected but limited US retaliation, serve to underline the dangerous nature of US insistence on overflying “sovereign” Cuba and thus to build political pressures in the UN and elsewhere which might force cessation of surveillance. Such an incident might also seem to the Kremlin to be persuasive to Castro as a demonstration of continuing Soviet support.

Under these circumstances a US warning to the Communists against repetition of the act which placed responsibility on the Cubans would probably be helpful to Moscow in attaining its ends. Castro would not be loath to accept responsibility and would presumably believe he had a high degree of Soviet support. On the other hand, a US warning which stated Soviet responsibility (or even joint Soviet-Cuban responsibility) would be less useful from Moscow’s point of view. The Soviets would probably believe that their limited political objectives (inducing the US to stop surveillance) were hampered to the extent that the US successfully described retaliation as something other than US aggression against a small neighbor.

In the unlikely event that a Soviet decision to interdict US reconnaissance was intended to protect some new Soviet attempt to build up an offensive capability in Cuba, the probability of Moscow’s running greater risks of escalating incidents would obviously increase.

Attachment

November 17, 1962

SUBJECT

• Prospects for Overthrowing Castro from Within

This paper examines cracks within the Castro regime and how the United States might exploit them. It is based on the assumption that, except for invasion, the only effective move to throw out Castro must come from within Cuba itself. It further assumes that a Cuban mass revolt is unlikely, and that therefore the only force capable of expelling Castro lies within the regime.

Competing Groups within the Castro Regime

The two main components of the “Marxist-Leninist” regime in Cuba—the old Communist Party members and the “new communist” fidelistas—are subdivided into informal groupings that vary in their degree of commitment to the Soviet Union. Ranked from most to least committed, five groups can be singled out;

1) Moscow-oriented veteran Communists, probably including Blas Roca and Lazaro Pena as well as Anibal Escalante;

2) Pro-fidelista veteran Communists: those who owe greater allegiance to Fidel (and/or the Revolution) than to Moscow, including apparently Carlos Rafael Rodriguez;

3) Communist Fidelistas: Raul and Che Guevara, for example;

4) Pro-Communist Fidelistas: persons, not trained Communists, who find Communism very attractive and useful. Fidel is No. 1 in this group.

5) Leftist nationalists owing strong allegiance to Fidel who are “Communists” by circumstance rather than by conviction.

In the past year two lines of cleavage within this heterogeneous grouping have been observed: one that separates the trained, Moscow-oriented Communists (group 1) from the others, and one that separates the “leftist nationalist” fidelistas (group 5) from those more heavily tainted with Communism. The groups at the two extremes have, with Fidel’s mediation, been able to get along. Fidel halted the old Communists’ program for gaining control of all responsible positions in the regime’s structure in early 1962, but he has not driven the old Communists out. The leftist-nationalist fidelistas still have grounds for resentment.

Given time and continued Soviet protection, odds are that the center groupings can forge a smoothly working coalition which will create a more monolithic regime by filling the government apparatus with the rising generation of recruits to communism.

The Leftist Nationalists in the Regime

The leftist nationalists in the regime constitute the only source for a coup and a break with the Soviet Union. They have less and less of a role in the new Cuba as long as it continues on its present course, and many of them have arms at hand.

We lack specific intelligence for a comprehensive picture of the names, numbers and power roles of regime supporters who dislike the Communist takeover of Cuba, but there are many indicators that displeasure exists. Numerous reports during 1962 rate displeasure in lower regime levels as widespread. Only in the Army is there much evidence of resentment at higher levels of authority. Lieutenants, captains and even majors (top rank in Cuba) have on occasion been reported as dissidents.

Resentment among the Army officers results from a three-way squeeze: 1) the old Communist thrust for control over the military; 2) Soviet takeover of critical military functions; 3) threat of displacement by indoctrinated young Communists. This unrest led internal resistance groups plotting a revolt during the summer to hope they might be joined by a large percentage of the Army.

However, in the four-year history of the regime, no coup plot has reached an advanced stage. Besides being deterred by the secret police and informer network, positive loyalty has kept leftist nationalists in the Army within the regime. Perhaps more than other groups, the military leaders—old Sierra Maestra men—owe personal loyalty to Fidel Castro, who put them where they are now. While he is the communizer of Cuba, he, oddly enough, still represents their bulwark against inundation by “the Communists”, as he showed by checking the old Communist drive in early 1962. Trusting in him, they have accepted with a certain amount of difficulty the wisdom of his alignment with the USSR and, more easily, his hostility toward the US. So long as these feelings were fixed, action from this group has been unimaginable.

Paving the Way for a Coup

Underpinning all elements in the regime has been confidence in Soviet power and will to protect Cuba, a belief steadily increasing since early 1960. The USSR’s unilateral decision to withdraw its strategic missiles in the face of US pressure seriously shook that confidence. In the still fluid situation created by the missile crisis, those least committed to the Communist course of the Revolution might be brought to reject alignment with the Soviet Union as well as rejecting Castro and regime leaders should they continue to favor this alignment.

Implications for US Policy

If the above analysis of the situation is correct, it might be possible for the US to promote resistance within the regime and eventually coup action by moves along the following lines:

1) Creating an attractive alternative. Leftist nationalist action would depend upon the creation of an appealing alternative to the Soviet alliance and to support for Fidel. At present the leftist nationalists see no place for themselves in a post-Castro Cuba, which they feel either would be “recaptured” by the US for the exiles or dependent on the Soviet Union in the face of continued US hostility. The US would have to:

a) convince them they could take charge of the Revolution after Castro;

b) assure them that in exchange for breaking their dependent ties with the Soviets and reestablishing a national Revolution they would get immediate normalization of relations with the West—perhaps through an OAS pledge.

2) Reducing Confidence in Soviet Protection. An important element in encouraging resistance would be the outcome of US-Soviet negotiations. The more the outcome weakens Cuban confidence in Soviet protection, the greater will be the effect in stimulating anti-Castro action within the regime. (See RSB–185, “Negotiations on Cuba: the Advantages of Stalemate,” for a discussion of the implications of a failure to reach agreement on Cuba.)

US moves which lend themselves to being interpreted as concessions (e.g. cessation of overflights) extracted by Soviet negotiators would tend to confirm the “wisdom” of Cuba’s present policies. On the other hand, certain military threats—such as threat of invasion or actual exile raids—would tend to draw regime supporters together, as they are still committed to the defense of Cuba against foreigners or “counter-revolutionaries.”

3) Undermining Faith in Castro’s Leadership. Faith in Castro has been shaken in recent weeks because of his identification with the missile episode. His stubborn insistence on the “five points” is an effort to recover lost ground, and it opens him to a further setback as these are ignored or flouted by such US actions as the following:

a) stepping up economic pressures through shipping blacklist and denial of markets;

b) strengthening Guantanamo forces; and

c) mobilizing additional OAS units in naval patrol operations.

Any weakening of Cuban confidence in Soviet support would contribute to reducing faith in Fidel. An OAS guarantee of normalized relations once Castro was overthrown and Soviet ties cut would put a price on his head, help to isolate him, and build him up for the role of scapegoat.

Attachment

RSB–185

November 17, 1962

SUBJECT

• Negotiations on Cuba: the Advantages of Stalemate

We have analyzed recent Soviet diplomatic overtures and Moscow’s propaganda linking a Cuban settlement with prospects for negotiations in other fields.

CONCLUSIONS

We conclude that a stalemate in the Cuban talks might actually be more beneficial to US interests in Latin America, in Cuba and in broader negotiations with the USSR than a settlement.

(1) The US would preserve its freedom for future action to force the downfall of Castro and the withdrawal of the Soviet Union from Latin America if a suitable opportunity presents itself.

(2) Continued Soviet presence in Cuba would be made as difficult as possible and relatively useless. Eventually, Moscow might even question the value of remaining in Cuba under such circumstances, though that result cannot be clearly forseen at this time.

(3) There would be an incentive for the Soviet Union to engage in productive negotiations on other issues, because the Soviet Union may wish to create a political climate which would impede further US action against Cuba.

Soviet Objectives in Cuba

In emphasizing peaceful coexistence, the possibility of an East-West détente, and the improving climate for negotiations, Moscow appears to be pursuing two separate sets of objectives.

In the immediate future the Soviets hope to secure an optimum settlement on Cuba. The Soviet Union has now made clear the outlines of what it wishes to achieve in a Cuban settlement.

—It hopes to create a political climate in which the US has the least possible justification for further action against Cuba.

—It clearly wishes to drive the best bargain it can get on US assurances to the Castro regime. And no matter how qualified the non-invasion assurance it finally obtained might be, the Soviet Union would attempt to interpret it in a fashion calculated to create a presumption that the US was acting in bad faith if any untoward events occurred in Cuba.

—It seeks to reduce to an absolute minimum, and would wish to avoid entirely if it could, any provision for on-site inspection or continuing UN presence in Cuba.

—It intends to maintain a presence in Cuba, and would prefer to maintain a military presence there.

—However, Moscow is apparently willing to trade off at least some elements of its actual or potential military presence (the IL–28s, for example) if it can thereby end the quarantine, minimize verification and maximize the acceptance of the Castro regime.

The Soviet Union almost certainly expects Castro to be disgruntled at the conclusion of the crisis. The Soviets probably estimate that even the most favorable terms which they can hope to obtain from the US will not leave the Cubans content, and Castro will continue to feel that he has been sold out by the Soviets. But the Soviets probably also calculate that their best chance for improving relations with Castro is to obtain a negotiated settlement with the US. If the Soviets can assure the safety of the Castro regime, they probably believe that they can in time use economic aid and political support to re-establish satisfactory rapport with the Cubans.

At the same time the Soviet Union will have succeeded in preserving a communist regime in Latin America as a foothold and as an example to other potential communist regimes. If the Soviet Union can thus assure Cuban security, it will do much to offset the damage to Soviet prestige involved in the missile withdrawal. The Soviets probably reckon that bloc critics would have less cause for thinking the USSR had been defeated if it could demonstrate that retreat was a sound tactic for preserving a communist foothold in Latin America.

Soviet Objectives in Other Negotiations

More broadly, the Soviets appear to be interested in using a Cuban settlement as a starting point from which to pursue other objectives vis-à-vis the West. These broader objectives are far less clearly visible than Soviet goals for a Cuban settlement; they may, in fact, still be under review in Moscow.

For the moment the Soviet Union has advanced only two more or less concrete negotiating proposals, on the temporary presence of Western troops in West Berlin under a UN flag and on the use of “black boxes” to monitor a testban. These proposals had evidently been planned for some time prior to the Cuban crisis.

Moscow’s present emphasis on the possibility of negotiated settlements could be nothing more than a tactical ruse to lure the US into a more favorable Cuban settlement. At the other extreme Moscow could conceivably have radically altered its view of the world in the three weeks since it decided that it would have to withdraw its missiles from Cuba; the Soviets may have concluded that given their strategic inferiority and the grim prospect of an endless and economically debilitating arms race, the time has come for a far-reaching settlement of outstanding issues such as Berlin and a start on general disarmament.

While neither of these extreme possibilities can be entirely ruled out on the basis of the evidence presently at hand, both appear improbable. On balance, past Soviet performance and the few indications of Soviet intentions that we have, point to an effort to engage the US in negotiations on a series of topics both for the sake of the atmospheric gains to be derived from the negotiating process itself and in the hope of obtaining some agreements on acceptable terms. While Moscow appears willing to make some initial concession in order to get negotiations started, there is as yet little indication of how far the Soviets may be willing to go in order to secure agreements.

Negotiated Settlement

Broadly speaking there are two principal alternatives by which the present negotiations in New York may be concluded—either a negotiated agreement or a stalemate in the talks.²

A negotiated settlement of the Cuban crisis would provide the Soviet Union with much or all that it could hope to achieve in Cuba under present circumstances.

Initially Castro’s dissatisfaction would be maximized. He would regard any Soviet concessions in the negotiations as selling out his interests to the US.

But the Castro regime would be substantially safeguarded from invasion, and by implication, at least, from other US actions against it. Soviet presence in Cuba, as a donor of economic assistance, a sponsor of subversive activities elsewhere in the hemisphere, and probably as a military protector as well would be assured. The cause of Castro’s dissatisfactions would be a single event which would tend to be obscured by subsequent developments, and with time Castro would have little choice but to reconcile himself to the status quo.

Communist China would doubtless support and encourage Castro in any charges of Soviet duplicity and disloyalty to principles of international communism. But as Castro’s relations with Moscow improved, there would be less opportunity for Peiping to attempt to manipulate Soviet-Cuban differences for the purpose of attacking Soviet policies. Similarly, Peiping’s ability to play up Moscow’s withdrawal of its missiles as a defeat for Soviet policy would be reduced as the demonstrable fact of continued communist presence in Latin America gradually overshadowed the withdrawal itself.

Moscow would be free to use the Cuban settlement as a point of departure for other negotiations, but once they had gotten what they could in Cuba the Soviet Union would feel little need to make concessions to the US on other issues for the sake of Cuba.

“No-peace-no-war”

The other major alternative would be to leave the Cuban crisis unresolved. Since the US is not likely to obtain its maximum demands for on-site inspection and continuing UN presence in Cuba, it could refuse to issue a non-invasion guarantee.³ Depending on whether or not the IL–28s were removed, the US might lift or maintain the quarantine on offensive weapons. Aerial surveillance would of course continue. The US would neither take immediate action to upset the present status quo to which Moscow’s prestige is heavily committed, nor would it commit itself to the preservation of the Castro regime and the Soviet presence in Cuba. In effect, the present crisis with the possibility of further US action against Cuba would be perpetuated. The talks in New York would soon be obviously futile and would probably be allowed to peter out.

Effect on the Soviet Position in Cuba

There would be little immediate effect on the Soviet position in Cuba. While the Soviets would almost certainly prefer the advantages of a clear-cut settlement and some form of explicit US commitment to Cuba’s safety the basic Soviet interest in maintaining a presence in Cuba would not at the outset be affected. There might well be no occasion for a dramatic response on Moscow’s part as the New York talks drifted into a stalemate, and the US took no direct action to upset the status quo.

This approach would not be calculated either to force the Soviets out of Cuba or to bring down the Castro regime. For the present, little short of invasion, the disappearance of Castro himself, or a major split in the Cuban ruling combination could be counted on to have that effect. For a discussion of the prospects of such a split see Research Memorandum RAR–45 which is a companion piece to this report. However, the US would be free to maintain as its ultimate goal the downfall of Castro and the end of the Soviet presence in Latin America, and would in the future be free to take whatever action it might find desirable.

As time went on the Soviet presence in Cuba would be made more expensive and difficult. Castro would have less immediate cause for dissatisfaction than he would under a negotiated agreement, but the sources of his discontent would remain, and over the long run Cuban-Soviet tensions would be reinforced.

Failure to obtain a guarantee of Cuba’s security from the US would tend to encourage Soviet-Cuban differences over policy toward the US and the degree of Moscow’s commitment to the defense of Cuba. Precisely because the future was uncertain, Cuba would seek more assurance from Moscow while the Soviets would be chary of extending commitments which they might be reluctant to fulfill.

Continuation of US surveillance, and the quarantine if maintained, would be another source of Soviet-Cuban differences. Castro would doubtless demand action which the Soviet Union was unwilling to take. The continuation of overflights and the quarantine would of course subject the US to a risk of incidents. These activities would however, provide a higher degree of assurance that Soviet offensive weapons were not reintroduced than would be afforded by any foreseeable agreement, and they could by changes in frequency, procedures etc be manipulated to stir up contention in Soviet Cuban relations.

Continued tension would tend to maximize the economic burden of Soviet aid to Cuba. Moscow would find itself in more frequent need to bribe the Cubans as disputes on other issues continued. At the same time there would be less possibility of Cuban trade with the free-world, and the burden of maintaining Cuba would fall exclusively to the bloc.

If Soviet-Cuban differences continued, Peiping would almost certainly wish to exploit them and the Cubans might seek to play off Moscow and Peiping.

At the same time the utility of Cuba to the USSR would diminish. Under the constant threat of US counteraction Moscow would have to be more circumspect about attempting to use Cuba either as a base for Soviet military forces or as a staging area for subversion in Latin America.

If the Soviets found themselves sufficiently uncomfortable in Cuba, and the utility of their remaining declined, the Soviet Union might at some future point decide that the game was no longer worth the candle, though that result cannot be assured by the simple expedient of perpetuating a chronic crisis.

Effect on US-Soviet Relations

At first glance it might seem that continued tension over Cuba would not be conducive to negotiations on other issues. Obviously, Moscow would prefer a more secure toehold in Cuba, and the Soviet Union might at some early point wish to show its displeasure by putting off some negotiations in which it had only a limited interest in order to make a point of alleged US bad faith.

But Moscow has important interests to be served by negotiations with the West (in many instances this is true even of negotiations which the USSR does not expect will eventuate in any agreements), and the Soviets will not long allow potential diplomatic advantages to be wasted for the sake of interests which are more Castro’s than the Soviet Union’s. And if Moscow has in fact made a fundamental and radical reappraisal of the desirability of far-reaching settlements with the West (which we doubt), the USSR would be all the more impatient to get down to negotiations.

Whatever Moscow’s aspirations for agreements with the West may be, continuation of a simmering crisis over Cuba would impel the Soviets toward creating an atmosphere of détente, and giving at least an appearance of being forthcoming in negotiations. For so long as the threat of further US moves against Cuba remains, the Soviets will have a motive for attempting to maintain a political climate in which the US might be inhibited from taking action.

1. Transmits three INR papers entitled: “Soviet-Cuban Reactions to U.S. Retaliation for Attack on U.S. Reconnaissance Aircraft”; “Prospects for Overthrowing Castro From Within”; and “Negotiations on Cuba: The Advantages of Stalemate.” Secret. 18 pp. WNRC, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 69 A 0926 Cuba 1962 (Sensitive).
2. We omit as infeasible under present circumstances a US invasion of Cuba. Obviously, in case of invasion the USSR would have to withdraw from meaningful negotiations with the US for a protracted period of time.
3. The US would be spared the problems which a guarantee for Castro would create for US policy in Latin America. No matter how carefully it was worded, a guarantee for Castro would be regarded by many Latin American governments as a recognition of the legitimacy of the Castro regime and as a tacit acceptance of communism in Latin America.