538. Memorandum from J.J. Ewell to General Taylor, November 16, covering a draft
memorandum for the President in response to a request for further
information on the Soviet arms build-up in Cuba1
[Facsimile Page 1]
Attached is an estimate prepared by the Defense Intelligence Agency in
response to Captain Shepard’s telephone call that the President was
still looking for further information on the Soviet arms build-up in
Cuba.
It is a nice looking job and evidently reflects considerable effort. I
think it could very well be sent forward. It is a little unusual in that
the last paragraph of the summary (see paper clip) reflects an
operational evaluation which is hardly appropriate for DIA; however, it is an accurate reflection
of JCS papers on the subject. I do feel
that the estimate is to a certain extent a tabulation of available
information and does not represent too much deep thinking into the
subject. My main reservations are reflected in the attached memorandum
for the President. It also occurs to me that the estimate does not
reflect the location and time–space factors involved in the use of the
Soviet task forces in Cuba, the known or deduced organization of the
Cuban Army and its ability to use the equipment, or the extent by which
the Cubans or the Communists could protect themselves against air attack
by active or passive means during the implementation of Plan 312 prior
to the execution of 316.
If a quick answer to the President is what is desired, I would say the
estimate is completely adequate. On the other hand, if a more thorough
job is required, DIA could be requested
to go into some of the elements raised in the draft memorandum and
above.
[Facsimile Page 2]
Attachment
Memorandum for the President
I have been informed that you still have some questions in your mind
as to the effect of any increased quantities of conventional
equipment which have been introduced into Cuba.
[Typeset Page 1450]
The attached Defense Intelligence Agency Estimate, “Assessment of
Increased Conventional Military Capabilities of Cuban and Soviet
Units in Cuba,” has been prepared to meet this need. It is based on
available intelligence and summarizes latest JCS thinking as to the effect on our
operational plans.
I would like to add two comments:
a. First, it is quite clear that there are in Cuba at present about
four Russian armored combat groupings of larger than battalion size.
These groupings very probably have a nuclear capability. Although
our operational plans are such that these units could be handled
with reasonable facility, it should not be overlooked that the
presence of four highly trained Russian units with the most modern
equipment gives the Communist forces in Cuba a very useful general
reserve in the event of combat.
[Facsimile Page 3]
b. The quantities of equipment which have been shipped to Cuba are
quite large considering the size of the country and of the Cuban
forces. This is particularly true in the case of armor and
artillery. This can only be based on speculation but one might
harbor the thought that the Russians have deliberately sent more
equipment than is necessary with the thought of establishing
stockpiles in Cuba, either for the purpose of future shipment to
other Latin American countries or to support the rapid introduction
of Soviet military personnel in some future contingency. I am asking
Defense Intelligence Agency to pursue this thought further with a
view to testing out its validity.
It is also useful to speculate on the effect of the withdrawal of
Soviet military personnel. I think it can be stated that if the
operational personnel, particularly in the armored task forces, the
air defenses, communications and air units, were withdrawn in the
near future, the Cuban forces would be unable to maintain or operate
much of the equipment. If all Soviet personnel, including
operational and technical advisors and trainers, were withdrawn, the
ability of the Cuban forces to utilize any of this equipment, except
the most basic types, would be quite limited.
