534. Memorandum of meeting of Executive Committee of the NSC by McCone, November 161
All members were present, and in addition, Mr. McCloy of New York.
McCone gave an intelligence briefing, reviewing the daily memorandum.
Secretary Rusk reported on the Castro letter to U Thant, the Stevenson meeting with Kuznetsov, and several other communications of the last 48 hours. He summarized the situation by indicating there were three problems unresolved, namely, the removal of the IL–28s, verification that all missiles had been removed, and a plan to verify on a long-term basis that the missiles will not be reintroduced into Cuba.
Rusk urged that we press for the removal of IL–28s in exchange for the removal by us of the quarantine, and that we not attempt to solve the remaining problems too hastily. Various views were expressed; it was generally agreed that we should follow Rusk’s suggestions; the status of the IL–28 negotiation as covered by the November 16th memorandum by Mr. Bundy.
[Typeset Page 1442]Secretary McNamara reported plans for high-level reconnaissance flights but no low-level flights today and possibly tomorrow because the JCS had no specific urgent targets. Reference was made to the attached memorandum from Paul Nitze of 9 November on courses of action in case a surveillance plane is shot down or destroyed.
McCone reviewed in some detail CIA memorandum of November 15th on Soviet military strength in Cuba, emphasizing the viewpoint that the Soviets evidenced every intention of maintaining, and possibly building, their base as a bridgehead into Latin America. This was a repetition of the position taken by DCI consistently since October 14th, and before. In the discussion DCI again raised the question as to why the Soviets insisted on maintaining the SAM sites, pointing out that they would when “lighted up” shield Cuba from U–2 photography, thus permitting the covert installation of offensive capabilities.
[Facsimile Page 2]CIA was requested to take the following actions:
1. Develop all possible means of determining by observation current shipping activities, most particularly the cargoes that arrive on the several ships now bound for Cuba which have the very large holds and therefore might be carrying missiles or other armament. DCI agreed to undertake an intense operation utilizing all agent and refugee resources, [1½ lines not declassified].
2. The President requested a report by Monday, November 19, on the caves of Cuba. This report should be prepared so as to give him necessary information for his use in discussions, and most particularly to answer questions at his Tuesday press conference.
3. CIA was asked for an analysis of the effect of the Soviet-ChiCom altercation on the Communist parties throughout the world. The question was posed as to whether this altercation has influenced free world Communist parties such as those in Japan, Italy, France, Latin America, India, etc., to favor more strongly the Soviets, or conversely, to favor the Chinese Communists, or if the net effect has been to divide and weaken the free world Communists. This report to be prepared by CIA and carefully coordinated with Hilsman.
4. In the absence of critical low-level targets of interest to JCS, I believe that CIA, through our several resources, should directly or through COMOR, establish a list of priority low-level targets, such as areas in which extensive unexplained construction has been going forward, and convey this list to the Secretary of Defense through the DCI. Note: Of particular interest would be the Trinidad area mentioned to me [less than 1 line not declassified].
- Discussion of intelligence briefing by McCone; report on recent communications by Rusk; removal of IL–28s; high-level reconnaissance flights; Soviet military strength in Cuba; and four actions for CIA. Top Secret. 2 pp. CIA, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80–B01285A, Box 6, DCI Meetings with the President, 1 July 1962–31 December 1962.↩