Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, American Republics; Cuba 1961–1962; Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath, Volumes X/XI/XII, Microfiche Supplement

15. Memorandum from Cottrell (ARA) to the Special Group (Counter-Insurgency), July 31¹

July 31, 1963

TO

• Special Group (Counter-Insurgency)

THROUGH

• M—Governor Harriman

FROM

• ARA—Sterling J. Cottrell

SUBJECT

• The Situation in Bolivia

As stated in the Bolivia Internal Defense Plan approved by the Special Group on May 16, the major internal security threat is the danger of an extreme left wing takeover that would place in power a sector of the governing National Revolutionary Movement (MNR) which is heavily infiltrated by communists. This MNR left sector is headed by Vice President Juan Lechin.

The Department’s contingency planning foresaw the development of the present show-down between management and labor in the Bolivian state mining corporation (COMIBOL). Our planning is based on conversations Ambassador Stephansky held with President Paz, and on the Ambassador’s recent consultation in Washington. This show-down, brought about by our insistence that the Bolivian Government should carry out reforms which would allow the COMIBOL management, among other things, to move men and equipment without union interference, also has important political implications related to the main internal security threat. The struggle for power in Bolivia today is chiefly between the MNR center forces supporting President Paz and the MNR left sector and communist forces supporting Lechin. The COMIBOL management of labor reforms will tend to weaken the mining unions which form Vice President Lechin’s major base of support, thereby lessening the possibility of his winning the MNR nomination for President late this year and subsequently being elected in June 1964. Thus the Vice President is opposing these reforms with all means at his disposal.

Under our contingency planning a special fund of $4 million has been set up. In response to emergency requests, $325,000 has been authorized for projects to assist in the mining area, $65,000 has been authorised to aid Bolivian military movements in connection with the crisis and $118,000 of police riot control equipment is being airshipped to Bolivia (most of the shipment has already arrived in La Paz). In addition, funds are being made available from the regular A.I.D. public safety program for the supply on an emergency basis, of arms, communications, and transportation equipment to outlying police units. We have sent two special public safety advisers to Bolivia on TDY to look into possible further matériel as well as organizational needs. We are also considering a special factory rehabilitation program; which would allow the GOB to offer a solution to problems in the manufacturing field, thereby lessening the likelihood of a solidarity move by these workers with the mine unions. Certain [less than 1 line not declassified] programs designed to influence the direction of these developments are in operation and others are awaiting approval.

A threatened general strike did not occur this past weekend, since negotiations are under way between the mine workers and the mining corporation management. If an agreement is not reached, the miners have indicated a general strike may be called over the Bolivian independence holidays which begin on August 5.

Union leaders have threatened to seize quantities of ore and export it themselves, and they have made threats to destroy mining machinery and equipment. The unions wish to settle the dispute on the basis of certain wage increases and job reclassification. The mining corporation management, backed by the Bolivian Government, has insisted that the mine unions accept the entire COMIBOL reform program, that is, cut costs, increase production, and end union interference in management decisions. In the meantime, the management has informed the unions that the large Catavi mine, where the strike began, will be removed from the $38 million Operation Triangular rehabilitation program which is sponsored by the United States, West Germany, and the Inter-American Development Bank, unless a satisfactory agreement is reached.

Our Ambassador informs us that the situation remains explosive although negotiations between management and labor (i.e., between the Government and the Lechin-communist group) are continuing. On July 29 the first of what may be growing armed clashes between Paz and Lechin forces took place. A group of Catavi armed miners attacked a pre-Paz peasant militia group and killed its leader. The peasants had been sent by Paz to the mining area for a show-down, and apparently were attacked while sleeping. The miners outnumbered the peasants three to one. Paz has plans to send larger peasant and miners militia groups loyal to him to the mine areas. They are to be used in an attempt to break up a miners strike if it occurs, and to prevent a march on the capital. The GOB first plans to use the militias in a confrontation with the Lechin forces, since use of the armed forces might cause a violent reaction in other sectors in the country. Meanwhile the Bolivian Army commander has stated publically that the Army will take action if necessary.

We are not averse to seeing a violent confrontation between Paz and Lechin forces since this will tend to place them in irreconcilable positions from which they will find it difficult to retreat, and we believe that Lechin’s political standing will suffer in the event of such clashes. However, it is still by no means certain that a violent confrontation in the form of a general strike and/or widespread armed clashes will occur. The Communist Party reportedly is split on whether or not to support a violent confrontation with Paz forces, since many leaders believe Paz would win. At present, leaders who wish to avoid a violent show-down appear to be in control of the Party. Nevertheless, major communist labor leaders at the mines do not always follow Party instructions. Lechin in the meantime is in Rome at his Ambassadorial post, apparently waiting to judge developments.

Meanwhile, the Bolivian Government has taken steps to prepare for violence. Troops are on the alert and units have been strategically located in the mining areas. A top Bolivian Air Force official has suggested that Bolivia might consider calling on the aid of the United States special forces if the situation should deteriorate. It is not now planned to send such special forces. Were the situation to indicate the desirability of sending special forces, this would require a decision at the highest level of government and would involve consultations with the Organization of American States.

At present it appears that the GOB and the armed forces are fully capable of handling any foreseeable crisis. Nevertheless, it is always possible in a backward and disorganized nation like Bolivia, which is only now developing in its people a feeling of national patriotism, that a crisis of this nature could develop beyond the ability of the government to control it. The Embassy has made plans for the possible evacuation of dependents and others if events should make this necessary.

1. The internal security threat in Bolivia and contingency planning. Secret. 3 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Bolivia, General 4–7/63.