Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, American Republics; Cuba 1961–1962; Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath, Volumes X/XI/XII, Microfiche Supplement

128. Memorandum from Katherine W. Bracken to Edwin M. Martin, April 26¹

April 26, 1962

SUBJECT

• Guatemala: Current Situation and Contingencies

A. Current Situation

Ten days have passed since President Ydígoras announced on April 15 that he would reorganize his cabinet and otherwise attempt a conciliation with the opposition. With the breathing spell afforded by the Holy Week truce, an announcement of cabinet changes had been expected on Monday, April 23, but still has not been made. Some minor disturbances and some work stoppages have occurred since April 15, but a threatened “general strike” on April 23 failed to materialize. The most potentially serious development is the stoppage of railway service into and out of Puerto Barrios which threatens paralyzation of this major port and has already caused spoilage of banana shipments. It appears that Ydígoras’ promise to seek a conciliation with the opposition did not mean he would agree to form a coalition government with the opposition or enter into any formalized agreement with them; his action so far indicates he was seeking a peace period in order to divide opposition elements. The opposition still distrusts Ydígoras and remains adamant in its position that he must resign.

The fact is, however, that time is running out for Ydígoras unless he promptly announces a new cabinet which will command wide public respect and support, which would in turn probably assure Ydígoras of the continued support of the military. On the other hand, if he is unable to put together such a cabinet, the opposition forces will redouble their efforts to oust him. The final straw might be major disturbances sparked by the forthcoming May 1 labor day celebrations.

Unless Ydígoras can achieve a rather drastic improvement in his current status, he seems almost certainly headed for replacement within the very immediate future. Should this occur, then one of the following contingencies (in the order of their probability) may develop.

B. Contingencies

1. Constitutional Substitution of Ydígoras.

Should Ydígoras voluntarily or forcefully be removed, the constitutional process could likely be preserved, especially if the military supported this solution. In this case, the First Presidential Designate, Colonel Ernesto MOLINA Arreaga (tough, unimaginative, pro-United States and strongly anti-Communist) would become President. Elections must then be held within four months. This solution is the more likely since it would appeal to the more conservative forces by avoiding abrupt changes and would still hold a promise of change to the more liberal forces through the electoral process.

2. Military-Civilian Junta.

Such a Junta may be formed if there is any split in the military. The major civilian representation would likely come from the opposition. However, the opposition was unable during the March disturbances to get sufficient military support to form such a mixed Junta. Since the constitutional succession (No. 1) would put in power Colonel Molina, nominated by Ydígoras as the First Designate (although at a time when the military were calling the shots), the opposition may prefer a mixed Junta where they could have representation rather than consent to the constitutional succession procedure.

3. Military Junta.

Should the political situation become chaotic to the point that a Communist or extreme left usurpation represents an imminent threat, or should there be no civilian agreement on either contingency Nos. 1 or 2, then the military will assume power themselves, to prevent anarchy and for self-preservation.

C. Suggestions for United States Action and Timing Under Contingencies

1. The United States should be prepared to support immediately and energetically a constitutional succession to Ydígoras, assuming that the constitutional provisions for election were immediately invoked.

2. Recognition of a military-civilian junta should be withheld for a short period pending clarification of its intentions and objectives, especially as regards a prompt call for elections. Recognition should be withheld until a consensus, especially in Central America, favors recognition.

3. Should military assumption of power be based only on failure or default on the part of the civilian powers, then recognition should be withheld until there is civilian participation with acceptable minimum guarantees of elections and freedoms.

1. Current situation and possible contingencies in Guatemala. Secret. 2 pp. DOS, CF, 714.00/4–2662.