Office of the Historian

98. Notes for Action0

Washington, July 10, 1962.

NOTES FOR DCI ACTION

1. At today’s meeting1 Secretary Rusk discussed a plan of the State Department to advise certain allies and neutrals of the board aspects of our satellite reconnaissance program. Rusk read from a draft paper which had been prepared for this purpose. CIA must follow this carefully and so should DOD as this has serious security implications and must not be carried too far in view of the known Soviet penetrations of both our allies and certain free nations.

Action: Discuss with Scoville.

2. The President indicated the appointment of a working committee to examine the implications of the Soviet rising long-range attack [Page 344] capability on their policy in disputed areas, most particularly Berlin. Committee to be headed by Alexis Johnson, DOD represented by Paul Nitze, and CIA to nominate a senior person as our representative. In the discussion McCone proposed the National Board of Estimates be used, and this was agreed. The Johnson subcommittee should prepare the definition of the problem for the Board. The President further directed that this committee should report to a committee of principals composed of Rusk, McNamara, McCone, with Lemnitzer representing JCS, and General Taylor the White House.

3. In discussing the NIE 11-8,2 McNamara gave the following figures as representative of the number of ICBM and MRBM sites in the Soviet Union (as contrasted with launchers). For 1967 the National Intelligence Estimate 11-8 gave a low of 363 and a high of 538; the Air Force in dissent had a low of 488 and a high of 663.

On September 23, 1961, Secretary McNamara presented a paper to the President3 which was used for the purpose of our long-range strike force capability in which he used the Soviet figures as a low of 550 and a high of 1400. McNamara made the point that to offset a Soviet capability of the magnitude indicated in his figures, he felt comfortable with the USIB estimate. Not mentioned, but pertinent, is the destructive power of the weapons as now envisaged in 11-8, as contrasted with the size of warheads envisaged last September.

John A. McCone
4
Director
  1. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80-B01285A, Box 9, Folder 5, DCI Memoranda 3/1/62-4/30/65. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by McCone.↩
  2. Reference is to the 502d NSC meeting; see Document 97.↩
  3. Presumably McNamara is referring to NIE 11-8-62, Document 96.↩
  4. Possible reference to Document 46.↩
  5. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.↩