Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume VIII, National Security Policy

52. Paper Issued by the Joint Chiefs of Staff⁰

Washington, undated.

National Targeting and Attack Policy For General War: Guidance For the Preparation of the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP)

I. Purpose

To provide guidance for the annual preparation of capabilities plans for employment of United States nuclear offensive forces in that range of contingencies in which the United States would execute major nuclear attacks against the Sino-Soviet Bloc.

II. Scope

The Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) will provide for the optimum integration of committed forces of the unified and specified commands and for coordination with appropriate external commands, for all preplanned attacks on targets the destruction or neutralization of which will accomplish the objectives enumerated in Section III, below. It will determine the DGZ’s to be attacked, and the weight of effort against each installation consistent with its worth and the capabilities of committed forces.

III. Objectives

a. United States plans for nuclear offensive operations in the event of general war will be designed to achieve, in concert with other US and Allied offensive and defensive operations, the following objectives:

(1) To destroy or neutralize the military capabilities of the enemy, while retaining ready, effective and controlled US strategic capabilities adequate to assure, to the maximum extent possible, retention of US military superiority to the enemy, or any potential enemies, at any point during or after the war.

(2) To minimize damage to the US and its Allies, and in all events to limit such damage to a level consistent with national survival and independence.

(3) To bring the war to an end on the most advantageous possible terms for the United States and its Allies.

b. SIOP will contribute to the achievement of these objectives by accomplishment, as directed, of the following three tasks:

Task I: [11-1/2 lines of source text and footnote in the source text (4 lines) not declassified] Task I will also include penetration attacks essential to the accomplishment of the above. [1 line of source text not declassified]

[1 paragraph (4 lines of source text) not declassified]

Planning for accomplishment of Task I will provide for the possibility of selective withholding of all attacks [2-1/2 lines of source text and footnote in the source text (2 lines) not declassified].

Task II: The destruction or neutralization of other elements of [7 lines of source text and footnote (4 lines) in the source text not declassified]. Task II will be accomplished in such a way as to [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified].

Planning for accomplishment of Task II will provide for the possibility of selective withholding of all Task II attacks [1 line of source text and footnote in the source text (2 lines) not declassified].

Task III: The threat or execution of controlled, deliberate, attacks [4 lines of source text not declassified] the destruction of which will most effectively reduce Sino-Soviet wartime and postwar capability and will to continue the war.

Task III attacks are to be programmed primarily for [3-1/2 lines of source text not declassified].

IV. National Strategic Target List

a. A National Strategic Target List (NSTL) will be developed and maintained by the Director of Strategic Target Planning. It will include all target installations in Tasks I, II and III.

b. The NSTL will be developed from the Target Data Inventory without regard to the magnitude of US and Allied forces available for the execution of nuclear offensive tasks in general war.

c. The NSTL will identify the target installations corresponding to Tasks I through III and indicate those programmed for attack in the SIOP.

d. The NSTL will encompass all of the targets which may require attack under any of the varying circumstances of general war engagement. There is no single combination of targets which will represent the task of nuclear offensive forces under all circumstances. The strike task to be accomplished in initial operations will depend upon the specific circumstances attending initiation.

V. Target Priorities and Expected Damage¹

a. Expected damage, or an expectation of damage, is the average of damage that would be achieved if the attack were run many times.

b. In achieving the damage levels prescribed below, plans will take into account all pertinent operational factors including pre-launch survivability (appropriate assumptions described below), and cumulative damage effects from adjacent nuclear detonations. Expectation of damage against individual installations should be allowed to vary freely in order to take advantage of differences in target hardness and worth, enemy defenses, yields and CEP’s of available weapons, and other factors. The total reduction in enemy strength from all attacks against the categories of installations listed below should approximate what would have resulted if the established expectation had been achieved against each installation.

c. Available forces will be used to maximize the achievement of the objectives of the plan. The order of target categories prescribed in d(1) below are chosen to indicate relative priorities. The expected damage levels prescribed below are neither maximum nor minimum limits to the damage to be inflicted. If programmed capabilities will not permit the achievement of the prescribed levels of damage, lower levels will be accepted, with due regard for the indicated order of priority. If programmed capabilities will permit, higher expectancies of damage against the prescribed targets and the destruction or neutralization of other targets will be achieved in such a way as best to accomplish the strike tasks.

d. In the programming of forces under all options, priority will be given to the achievement of damage as follows:

[7 paragraphs (24 lines of source text) not declassified]²

(2) Programming of forces for (1) above will be done in a manner that will permit assignment of forces to Task III which are adequate to inflict significant damage.³ [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]3 DGZ’s for these forces will be selected in such a way as best to achieve Task III. (Floor space as such is introduced only to define the size of the forces to be allocated to Task III, not to define the targeting objectives.)

e. Programming of available and capable forces to other urban targets in Tasks I and III will be divided between destruction or neutralization of other military targets, and reassignment to reserve forces, in such a way as best to achieve the objectives and Tasks defined in Section III, above.

VI. Options and Flexibility

a. SIOP will be prepared in consideration of the following alternative circumstances of outbreak of war:

[2 paragraphs (14 lines of source text) not declassified]

The following pre-launch survival probabilities are provided to give an approximate quantitative expression to the intent underlying the contingencies defined above for the FY 1963 time period.

	[headings not declassified]
Air Alert Aircraft and Polaris on/near Station	1	1	1
Minuteman, Titan II	1	.95	.80
Hard Atlas	1	.95	.75
Alert Carrier Aircraft (At Sea)	1	.95	.70
Ground-Alert/*/ Land-Based Aircraft (ZI)	1	.85	.50
Ground-Alert/*/ Land-Based Aircraft (Forward Area)	1	.50	.05
Titan I, Medium Atlas	1	.80	.40
Soft Atlas	1	.40	.10
Non-Alert* Carrier Aircraft	.90	.70	.30
Non-Alert* Land-Based Aircraft (ZI)	.80	.15	.05
Non-Alert* Land-Based Aircraft (Forward Area)	.80	.05	.05

* Refers to normal peacetime readiness.

The Director of Strategic Target Planning will evaluate these factors in the light of the changing threat, changing composition and readiness of US forces, and the experience resulting from the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff analyses and war gaming, and other sources, and report any changes made, with the reasons therefore, to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

b. SIOP will provide for execution, when directed by competent authority, of the following:

Attack Option I. Execute Task I under conditions o. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] while withholding for possible subsequent use forces programmed for Tasks II and III.

Attack Option II. Execute Tasks I and II under conditions of [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] while withholding for possible subsequent use forces programmed for Task III.

⁴ Attack Option III. Execute Task I under conditions o. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] while withholding for possible subsequent use forces programmed for Tasks II and III.

Attack Option IV. Execute Tasks I and II under conditions of [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] while withholding for possible subsequent use forces programmed for Task III.

Attack Option V. Execute Tasks I, II, and III under conditions of [less than 1 line of source text not declassified].

SIOP will also provide for selective withholding of attacks [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] under each Attack Option, as indicated in Section III.b., above. (For example, there should be provision under Attack Option II for selective withholding of Task II attacks from [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified].)

c. Any conflicts which arise in force programming for the various attack choices will be resolved in favor of optimization for Attack Option V.

VII. Role of Theater Forces

a. Subject to the requirements of contingency plans and other theater requirements, unified and specified commanders will [2-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]. SIOP tasks will be the first priority commitment for SAC and Polaris under all circumstances.

b. [13-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]

c. [8-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]

VIII. Constraints

a. All plans will minimize civilian casualties and civil destruction in friendly, neutral, and satellite areas (i.e., all countries except the USSR [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] to the extent that military necessity permits.

b. In attacks to accomplish Tasks I and II, surface bursts, weapon yields and damage to population and industry will be held to a minimum consistent with military necessity.

c. Maximum permissible “expected doses” in key areas, computed as specified in “d” below are as follows:

[List (15 lines of source text) not declassified]

d. Expected doses from individual surface bursts will be determined as specified in Supplement No. 3 to WSEG Staff Study No. 46 and the mean annual templates referred to therein, which have been forwarded separately to DSTP and the commanders of unified and specified commands. The total expected dose at each key area will be determined by the following:

First obtain the expected dose from each programmed surface burst by interpolation using the mean annual templates referred to above. Then multiply each expected dose by the probability⁵ of detonation of the weapon in the target area. (This is the “probability weighted expected dose”). Finally, add all the probability weighted expected doses together to obtain the total expected dose.

e. In order to calculate total expected doses, it is necessary to know the detailed plans for all programmed surface bursts. This knowledge is not available until SIOP and the commanders’ plans have been prepared. Initial planning for surface bursts will be based on SIOP forces not exceeding 90% of the total expected doses (see c. above) and the other forces not exceeding 10% or the difference between allowed dosage and those expected to result from SIOP strikes.

IX. Responsibilities

• a. Joint Chiefs of Staff

  (1) Prepare annual guidance for the SIOP which will be incorporated in the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan.

  (2) Review and approve annually the NSTL, the SIOP and the plans of the commanders of unified and specified commands.

  (3) Provide a permanent JCS liaison group with the DSTP.

• b. Director of Strategic Target Planning (DSTP). The DSTP will be responsible to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the following actions:

  (1) Maintain a Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff (JSTPS) according to an approved manning table and the guidance provided by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

  (2) Develop and maintain the NSTL and SIOP in conjunction with the commanders of the unified and specified commands.

  (3) Resolve differences that occur during the development of SIOP; and highlight them when presenting the NSTL and SIOP to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for review and approval.

  (4) Submit the NSTL and SIOP to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for approval.

  (5) During the effective period of the SIOP, advise the Joint Chiefs of Staff as appropriate of any temporary inability to attain the levels of destruction or neutralization approved in the SIOP.

  (6) The foregoing responsibilities of the DSTP do not include command authority over forces committed to SIOP.

• c. Commanders of Unified and Specified Commands. The commanders of appropriate unified and specified commands shall:

  (1) Provide permanent senior representation with the DSTP for participation in the preparation and maintenance of the NSTL and SIOP and for liaison purposes.

  (2) Advise the DSTP of those forces of their commands which have an appropriate capability and which are available for commitment to the SIOP and which should be included therein.

  (3) Commit forces to the SIOP, in consonance with this guidance.

  (4) Program no attacks against SIOP targets unless provided for by SIOP.

X. Analysis and Review

a. DSTP will perform a set of Monte Carlo damage runs for each Attack Option and selected withholding provisions, using all pertinent operational factors, determining AGZ’s, and will report the following:

(1) Destruction achieved against military targets, by target category.

(2) Destruction (casualties, fatalities, floor space)⁶ in friendly, neutral, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] and the Soviet Union.

(3) Fallout radiation levels in the cities listed in Section VIII.c, above, and in the [1 line of source text not declassified].

b. DSTP will prepare an analysis of the impact on penetration and target destruction of the exercise of the option to withhold selectively penetration attacks against [less than 1 line of source text not declassified].

c. All data used in the preparation of the NSTL, SIOP, and their analysis, will be available for analysis and review by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

XI. Effective Period

a. To the extent that there are any conflicts with other guidance, this guidance represents national policy and supersedes all other SIOP guidance.

b. The SIOP will be prepared and reviewed annually, and amended as necessary to keep the plan current.

0. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD McNamara Files: FRC 71 A 3470, SIOP. Top Secret. This paper forms the appendix to an October 27 memorandum signed by Rear Admiral F. J. Blouin, Secretary of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which distributed it for implementation to the Joint Chiefs, major commanders, and to CINCSAC in his capacity as Director of Strategic Target Planning.
1. Priorities in this section are to be understood in the sense of allocation of limited forces, not in the sense of time urgency. [Footnote in the source text.]
2. Severe and significant damage as used throughout this document is defined in JCS Publication No. 5, 1 December 1960. [Footnote in the source text.]
3. Built up area may be used when tract data is not available. [Footnote in the source text.]
4. Chances of using this Attack Option are remote and it is, therefore, to be programmed as a last priority. [Footnote in the source text.]
5. This is the product of a prelaunch survivability, reliability and probability of penetration to the target area. Any “dead-man fuzed” weapons should be assumed to surface burst if the delivery vehicle penetrates into enemy territory. [Footnote in the source text.]
6. See footnote e on page 6. [Footnote in the source text. Reference is to footnote 4 above.]