139. Memorandum From the Director for Internal Defense in the Office of Politico-Military Affairs (Maechling) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Harriman)0
SUBJECT
- Future of Special Group (CI)
I assume that after Mike Forrestal returns from vacation you, he, and McGeorge Bundy may get together for your discussion on the scope and terms of reference of the Special Group (CI). I therefore thought it might be helpful for you if I set down some views on the subject, based on my experience with the Group. First, some general comments:
[Page 495]- 1.
- The primary utility of the Group rests in its ability to obtain from its members high-level policy decisions on our counter-insurgency effort in the underdeveloped world and to do so rapidly and with a minimum of formality.
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- The Group is also effective in overcoming bureaucratic roadblocks affecting high-priority projects in the MAP and AID programs, and in resolving interdepartmental policy differences without involving the institutional prestige of the departments or agencies represented on the Group.
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- The Group has also been successful in stimulating, developing, and monitoring programs that either cut across departmental lines of responsibility or require interdepartmental collaboration. Training for counter-insurgency, civic action, and police assistance are examples of this type of activity.
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- The weekly meetings of the Group provide a means for exercising close and continuing control over policies and programs in nine or ten “crisis countries” of the underdeveloped world.
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- The Special Group (CI) has developed an institutional character and some measure of continuity, based on (a) regular meetings; (b) forward planning of agendas; (c) dissemination of minutes; and (d) systematic implementation of decisions. The quarterly reviews of country Internal Defense Plans, together with periodic status reports on training, civic action, police, etc., constitute the backbone of its agendas.
With these considerations in mind, it is evident that the Group exercises a function quite different from other high-level interdepartmental committees, such as the NSC Standing Group. It covers a narrower range of subject matter but does so in greater depth and with more continuity. The question that arises is whether the Group’s activities are useful and productive, or whether its work is becoming routine and sterile. In my opinion, there is some indication that we are approaching a period of diminishing returns.
First, the counter-insurgency or internal defense label applies in its literal sense to a very small list of countries. Of the countries under cognizance of the Group, there is an active left-wing insurgency threat only in Vietnam, Laos, and Venezuela. Its application to other countries—both on the Group’s critical list and off it—represents in greater or lesser degree a distortion of the concept. Colombia suffers from rural banditry; Ecuador, Guatemala, and Boliva from chronic instability; the threat in Iran will most likely take the form of an attempted coup; while in Thailand the threat is from external infiltration as much as internal.
One consequence of rigid adherence to the counter-insurgency concept is that the list of countries under the cognizance of the Group has remained virtually frozen for eighteen months. This may be justifiable in Southeast Asia, but in Latin America during the past year there have [Page 496] been revolutions, coups, abortive coups, and serious internal upheavals in several Latin American countries not under the Group’s cognizance. In other geographic areas, there are serious situations of unrest and violence that merit high-level interdepartmental attention, if only on an ad hoc basis, but have not received it because they are not “insurgency” situations. For example, there is not now any high-level Government committee charged with coordinating our policies and programs in certain key African and Middle Eastern countries where the important factor is the political orientation of the government rather than an insurgent or guerrilla threat. In ex-French Africa our military and police assistance programs, which have been the subject of virtually continual policy differences during the past year, could stand some high-level interdepartmental attention. In the Middle East, the development of interdepartmentally coordinated policies and programs for Syria and Iraq is surely as important as continued surveillance over Guatemala, where the insurgency threat has largely receded.
Another consequence of the counter-insurgency approach is that we have been attacking such important programs as youth, labor, civic action and psychological strategy through the back door. This is better than not attacking it at all, but it distorts the true nature of the problem and may cause us to focus on lower priority situations.
Secondly, this rather doctrinaire counter-insurgency approach to the problems of underdeveloped countries has periodically created a feeling of uneasiness on the part of Mike Forrestal, the Attorney General (and perhaps the President too) that the Group is not coming to grips with the really important issues. As you know, the President has on occasion asked why the Group has not looked into such countries as Brazil. This feeling is likely to be intensified if we are entering an era in which the nature of the Soviet threat shifts to less aggressive but just as deadly forms of cultural and economic penetration.
Accordingly, I believe that the Special Group (CI) must develop a greater degree of flexibility if it is to continue as an effective instrument of government. It must focus on problems that require high-level attention. It should not go on indefinitely monitoring the internal security programs of eight or ten countries. Nor should it distort the complex problem of applying broad policies and programs in youth, labor, information, etc. to crisis areas by labeling them “counter-insurgency”.
What I believe we need to do is gradually convert the Special Group (CI) to a “Special Group (Critical Areas)” with terms of reference more flexible than we have now. As I see it, the Group would then perform the following functions:
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- Continue monitoring interdepartmental counter-insurgency programs such as training, civic action, police assistance, etc.
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- Limit its continuing surveillance functions to those countries that face an immediate external or internal insurgency threat—Vietnam, Venezuela, Thailand, and possibly Iran. (Drop Colombia, Guatemala, Ecuador, Bolivia, and Laos.)
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- Establish a system of periodic spot surveillance over a wider range of underdeveloped countries, concentrating on those where severe unrest or Soviet penetration poses a critical threat to U.S. interests. These countries would be placed under the Group’s cognizance for temporary periods as circumstances require, and kept there only long enough to assure that U.S. policies and programs are being carried out in a coordinated and effective manner.
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- Broaden the functional scope of the Group to cover such programs as youth, labor, psychological strategy, and economic counter-measures, as they apply to all critical areas of the underdeveloped world, not just those that have an insurgency threat.
If so broadened in purpose, a “Special Group (Critical Areas)” should operate in much the same way that it does now. A small White House staff of one or two officers would continue to be essential—not to recreate an OCB or generate paperwork, but to assist State in the forward planning of agendas and to flush out the problems that need high-level exposure. (No single department or agency can accomplish the latter.) As before, the primary purpose of the Group would be to expose program deficiencies, overcome bureaucratic obstacles, and force decisions on critical issues.
In writing the above I don’t mean to imply that our counter-insurgency effort has become “passe”. I do, however, think that the Group’s efforts will become less productive unless it recognizes that the Soviet threat in the underdeveloped world may increasingly assume forms other than insurgency.