Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume VIII, National Security Policy

136. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Policy Planning Council and Counselor of the Department of State (Rostow) to Secretary of State Rusk⁰

Washington, July 23, 1963.

SUBJECT

• BNSP

I should report to you the state of the BNSP in the Pentagon.

You will recall that, at Secretary McNamara’s request,¹ you referred the draft BNSP back for another round of work which would give the JCS a chance to thrash out its views with DOD. After that work had gone forward nearly to resolution² Secretary McNamara shifted his earlier favorable view to a judgment that the BNSP was not necessary for the conduct of his business.

Henry Rowen reported to me today that there was a discussion between Secretary McNamara and the JCS in which, after expressing his skepticism, Secretary McNamara put the question: “On what problems do you need high level guidance?” Six issues emerged from the JCS;³ and Secretary McNamara set in motion work within the Pentagon to generate required guidance.⁴

Thus, so far as the Pentagon is now concerned the BNSP is dead.

As you know in this matter, as opposed to the conduct of specific planning operations, I do not feel a sense of personal responsibility for pressing the BNSP forward. I do believe, however, that you and the President should consider seriously the following aspect of the matter: the BNSP was first developed in the Truman Administration and was carried forward in several editions in the Eisenhower Administration. Whatever the limitations inherent in any such document, I doubt that it will redound to the credit of our Administration that we failed to thrash out any successor document. A BNSP obviously cannot substitute for specific policy judgments; and it should not tie the President’s hands. But it can provide an occasion for debating and defining the bone structure of policy and communicating it to the troops who never see the four star generals.

My first recommendation is, therefore, that you consider with the President whether or not you wish to consider the BNSP exercise as finished.

If you wish to keep the matter open, we might consider what forms such a document might take in the light of Secretary McNamara’s views and the passage of time.

If you decide that we should abandon the exercise, you may wish to consider what form a decent and unobtrusive burial might take; e.g., simply letting it drift off; a NSAM ordering suspension in the light of fast-moving world events; etc.

But before accepting some form of the latter alternatives, I do urge you and the President to pause for a moment on the prior question.⁵

0. Source: Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 70 D 199, Basic National Security Policy. Secret.
1. No record of this request has been found.
2. Information on work done during the winter and spring of 1963 by DOD/ISA on a basic national security policy paper is in Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 70 D 199, Basic National Security Policy and in National Defense University, Taylor Papers, BNSP. See also Document 132.
3. The issues were: targeting capability of strategic retaliatory forces; number of concurrent capabilities to be programmed for conventional forces; amount of capability NATO forces needed to attempt to reach a standoff in a potential theater conflict by non-nuclear means; what, if any, provision was to be made for supporting a satellite revolt; the level of military presence adequate for the United States in the area between Suez and Thailand; and whether U.S. military planners should assume that the United States would not wage large-scale ground operations on the Asian mainland. (Walter S. Poole, The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, Vol. VIII: 1961-1964 Part I, The Structure of National Defense, p. 18; Joint Chiefs of Staff, Historical Division, Joint Secretariat)
4. The Joint Chiefs tasked J-5 and the NESC to provide draft answers to the six questions, with the intention of sending the whole package to McNamara. When the drafts reached the JCS in late August, however, the Chiefs decided to “note” the replies and not forward them to McNamara, apparently on the ground that it would be preferable to consider the six issues within the context of the complete JSOP. (Ibid., p.19)
5. Rostow and Rusk met and discussed this memorandum some time before July 30. Rostow later wrote that Rusk agreed to the undertaking of another draft of basic national security policy, which would be discussed with the President and McNamara. According to Rostow, Rusk “mentioned” that if the President did not wish to “promulgate” the paper, he (Rusk) “might table with the NSC for the information of its members your concept of an appropriate policy statement of this kind.” (Memorandum from Rostow to Rusk, November 15; Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 70 D 265, BNSP 1963) A draft BNSP dated August 14 is ibid., S/P Files: Lot 69 D 121, BNSP Drafts 1963. Additional information on this topic is in Document 146.