Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume VIII, National Security Policy

130. National Intelligence Estimate⁰

NIE 11-4-63

Washington, March 22, 1963.

SOVIET MILITARY CAPABILITIES AND POLICIES, 1962-1967

The Problem

To review significant developments in Soviet military thinking, policy, and programs, to assess the current Soviet military posture, and to estimate main trends in Soviet military capabilities and policies over the next five years.

Scope Note

This estimate presents our main conclusions on the broad range of major Soviet military problems. It includes, inter alia, summary versions of recent National Intelligence Estimates, updated as appropriate, devoted to individual military missions and other related questions.

Summary and Conclusions

Basic Views on War

A. The Soviets see military power as serving two basic purposes: defense of their system and support for its expansion. Thus, one of the most important objectives of Soviet military policy is to deter general war while the USSR prosecutes its foreign policies by means short of actual hostilities involving Soviet forces. The Soviets recognize that their deterrent must be credible in the sense that it rests upon powerful military forces. They also recognize that deterrence may fail in some key confrontation in which either they or their opponents come to feel that vital interests are under challenge. Against this contingency they wish to have a combination of offensive and defensive capabilities which will enable them to seize the initiative if possible, to survive enemy nuclear attack, and to go on to prosecute the war. We do not believe, however, that the Soviets base their military planning or their general policy upon the expectation that they will be able to achieve, within the foreseeable future, a military posture which would make rational the deliberate initiation of general war or conscious acceptance of grave risks of such a war. (Paras. 1-3)

B. A number of Soviet statements in recent years have expressed the view that limited war involving the major nuclear powers would inevitably escalate into general war. While such statements are intended in part to deter the West from local use of force, this official view also reflects a genuine Soviet fear of the consequences of becoming directly engaged in limited war involving Soviet and US forces. This probably also extends to involvement of Soviet forces with certain Allied forces in highly critical areas, notably Western forces in the European area. Nevertheless, they might employ their own forces to achieve local gains in some area adjacent to Bloc territory if they judged that the West, either because it was deterred by Soviet nuclear power or for some other reason, would not make an effective military response. They would probably employ Soviet forces as necessary if some Western military action on the periphery of the Bloc threatened the integrity of the Bloc itself. Should the USSR become directly involved in a limited war with US or Allied forces, we believe that the Soviets would not necessarily expand it immediately into general war, but that they would probably employ only that force which they thought necessary to achieve their local objectives. They would also seek to prevent escalation by political means. (Paras. 4-5)

C. The Soviets recognize another type of limited military conflict, termed a “war of national liberation,” in which pro-Soviet or anti-Western forces challenge colonial or pro-Western regimes in a primarily internal struggle. The Soviets have rendered active assistance in some such conflicts, and little or none in others, depending upon such practical factors as accessibility, the risk of defeat, and the attitude of other powers involved. In addition, the USSR has given military assistance to friendly, non-Bloc regimes. As new and favorable opportunities arise, the Soviets will continue to offer these various kinds of assistance. We believe, however, that they will remain chary of any great commitment of prestige to the support of belligerents over whom they do not exercise substantial control or in circumstances in which they feel that winning is unlikely, and they will seek to avoid risk of widened hostilities which might result from “wars of national liberation.” (Paras. 6-8)

General Trends in Military Doctrine and Policy

D. Current Soviet military policy stems from Khrushchev’s plan, announced in January 1960, to cut back the size of the armed forces and to place main reliance on nuclear and missile forces. The plan reflected his view that a general war is almost certain to be short, with victory decided in the strategic nuclear exchange, and with conventional arms playing a quite secondary role. Khrushchev’s plan was accepted only reluctantly by the military leadership; both the plan and its strategic justification have since undergone substantial modification. Present Soviet military doctrine holds that a general war will inevitably involve the massive use of nuclear weapons; it will begin with a strategic exchange, and its course and outcome may well be decided in its initial phase. Hence, doctrinal discussion emphasizes the importance of seizing the initiative by pre-emptive attack if, in the Soviet view, general war becomes imminent and unavoidable. However, the current doctrine holds that such a conflict will not necessarily be short, and it supports both the building of strategic attack and defense capabilities and the maintenance of large theater and naval forces. (Paras. 13-16)

E. The Soviet leaders evidently believe that the present overall military relationship, in which each side can exert a strong deterrent upon the other, will probably continue for some time to come. However, they almost certainly regard the present strategic posture of the USSR as inferior to that of the US, and they are aware of the continuing buildup of US forces for intercontinental attack programmed for the next few years. In this situation, they probably do not expect to be able to obtain a clear strategic superiority over the US, but we believe that the Soviets are far from willing to accept a position of strategic inferiority. Our evidence does not indicate that the Soviets are attempting to outstrip or even match the US in numbers of weapons for intercontinental attack; we believe, however, that they will attempt to offset US superiority by other means.¹ (Paras. 21-26)

F. The Soviets may see a possible solution to their strategic confrontation with the US in a combination of antimissile defenses plus very effective though numerically inferior intercontinental striking forces. We believe that deployment of antimissile defenses may be the largest new Soviet military program in the period of this estimate. Hardened ICBM’s and submerged-launch submarine missiles will contribute to Soviet strategic capabilities. In addition, over the next few years the Soviet arsenal will probably come to include new large ICBMs, armed with very high-yield warheads or capable of global ranges. Moreover, the USSR is almost certainly investigating the feasibility of space systems for military support and offensive and defensive weapons. (Paras. 27-28)

G. Official statements and military writings suggest that the Soviet leaders see in technological achievements the means by which they may improve their total strategic position relative to that of the US. They have made scientific military research and the development of new weapons matters of high urgency, and they have a demonstrated ability to concentrate human and material resources on priority objectives. If they develop new concepts or new weapons which give promise of military and political advantages, they will seek to add them rapidly to their arsenal and to gain maximum benefit from them. Thus, during the next five years, we expect the Soviets to be working on even more advanced weapons with which they may hope to enhance their strategic capabilities at a later date.² (Para. 30)

H. The USSR’s military programs and space efforts impose costly demands upon Soviet resources. The effort to modernize and strengthen all arms of the Soviet forces simultaneously squeezes hard on resources available for investment and consumption goals to which the leadership is strongly committed. Thus, Khrushchev may once again seek a reduction in resources devoted to theater forces on the grounds that growing nuclear capabilities will permit this cutback without endangering Soviet security. But while such a reduction would reduce expenditures for military pay and release manpower to the economy, it would not significantly reduce the demands of the defense establishment on critically scarce, high quality resources and highly skilled manpower. (Paras. 40-46)

I. Despite the possibility of a future reduction in theater forces, Khrushchev’s 27 February speech indicates that the Soviet leadership has recently taken economic decisions which reaffirm military priorities at the expense of consumer aspirations; beyond this it may reflect a decision to increase military spending above previously planned levels. The Soviet economy is capable of bearing a heavier military burden, but not without sacrifices in the program to raise living standards and perhaps also reductions in the future rate of industrial growth. For the present, the Soviets appear to have chosen to risk these consequences, but we believe that the problem of resource allocation will continue to plague the Soviet leadership. (Para. 47)

J. Soviet military policy will continue to be shaped, not only by a variety of strategic, technical, economic, and political factors, but also by differing views about the relative importance of these factors, and shifting compromises among these views. As a result, we believe that the numerous aspects of this policy will not always be wholly consistent with each other, and that force structure and future programming will reflect neither a fully-integrated strategic doctrine nor a firm timetable for achieving specific force levels. We do not believe that the Soviets conceive of existing weapon systems as the answer to their military problem, or that they have fixed and inflexible plans for their force structure in the period five to 10 years from now. Barring some major technical advance in weaponry, we believe that Soviet military policy is likely to continue along current lines, and that for at least the next few years large standing forces of all types will be maintained. Even in the absence of such an advance, however, we cannot exclude the possibility of new departures in military policy, perhaps resulting in major changes in the composition of the Soviet military establishment and in the relative emphasis given to forces designed to accomplish the major military missions. (Paras. 29-30)

Forces for Long Range Attack

K. Although missile forces for attack on Eurasia continue to grow, major emphasis in the building of long-range striking forces has evidently shifted to forces for intercontinental attack, primarily ICBMs. We estimate Soviet ICBM strength at the end of 1962 at 80-85 operational launchers, including a few silo-type hardened launchers. By mid-1964, the force will probably have reached 250-325, including 75-100 silos. The Soviet ICBM force estimated for the next two years will consist primarily of missiles equipped with warheads in the low megaton range; it could include a few missiles with very high-yield warheads. We believe that the major trends in this force to 1967 will be: growth of the force to some hundreds of launchers; hardening of a significant portion of the force; and availability of some missiles capable of delivering very high-yield warheads (up to 100 MT).³,⁴ (Paras. 48-57)

[Here follows a table that shows estimates of approximate totals of 175-225 operational ICBM launchers, including 30-50 hard launchers, by mid-1964.] [Footnote in the source text.]

[Here follows a table that shows estimates of approximate totals of 300-450 operational ICBM launchers, including 100-150 hard launchers, by mid-1964.] [Footnote in the source text.]

L. The Soviets now have operational about 45 ballistic missile submarines—nine of them nuclear-powered—which carry a combined total of about 125 short-range (350 n.m.) missiles designed for surfaced launching. The USSR is developing longer range missiles for launching from submerged submarines. In addition, the Soviets have developed submarine-launched cruise missiles, which are probably designed primarily for use against ships but could be employed against land targets. In mid-1967, the Soviets will probably have more than two dozen nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines, and about 20 nuclear-powered cruise missile submarines. By that time, they will probably have initiated routine submarine patrols within missile range of the US. (Paras. 64-68)

M. Soviet Long Range Aviation, by reason of its equipment, basing and deployment, is much better suited for Eurasian operations than for intercontinental attack. However, the Soviets have given considerable emphasis to aerial refueling and to Arctic training. Excluding combat attrition, we estimate that the Soviets could put about 200 aircraft over North America on two-way missions; of these, about half would be heavy bombers. Long Range Aviation now comprises about 170-200 heavy bombers and tankers and about 950 jet medium bombers and tankers. We continue to estimate a gradual decline in numerical strength. A portion of the Badger medium bomber force will be replaced by the new supersonic Blinder, already in units, but our evidence does not indicate that any new heavy bomber is being developed for operational use. By mid-1967, Long Range Aviation will probably comprise some 110-140 heavy bombers and about 750 mediums.⁵ (Paras. 69-75)

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, further estimates that a follow-on heavy bomber will probably be introduced in about 1964. The continued development of large aircraft capable of supersonic speed, and research in applicable materials, structures, and other components substantiate the Soviets interest in large supersonic vehicles and suggest an intent to increase their strategic attack capability by such means. The Bounder probably has served a most useful purpose as a test bed for many components, aerodynamic advancements, and a structural design which are directly applicable to a follow-on heavy bomber capable of supersonic speeds. He estimates the total Soviet heavy bomber and tanker strength will remain at approximately 200 aircraft throughout the period of this estimate, present strength levels being maintained by the introduction of modest numbers of a new heavy bomber. [Footnote in the source text.]

N. We estimate that the Soviet MRBM and IRBM force now comprises about 600 completed launch positions, deployed for the most part in western USSR within range of NATO targets in Europe. The bulk of these launch positions are soft, but a few silo-type hardened sites are probably operational. We believe that deployment of soft sites will have been virtually completed early this year, leveling off at about 600 launch positions; the hardened component of the force will continue to grow, probably reaching about 100-150 launchers in mid-1964. It is possible that as many as half of the soft launch positions are alternates, in which case the first salvo capability of the force would be considerably smaller, although still large enough to devastate Western Europe. (Paras. 58-63)

O. In the event of general war in the period of this estimate, the USSR would almost certainly employ against the US a mixed force of ICBMs, missile submarines, and bomber aircraft. By the mid-1960’s, the USSR will have acquired a substantially increased ICBM and submarine-launched missile capability to deliver nuclear weapons against the US, in addition to its already formidable forces for strikes in Eurasia. Significant portions of these forces will be relatively invulnerable to attack. The Soviets will be in a position to strike pre-emptively at the fixed bases of an important segment of the US nuclear delivery force, and they will have some prospect that a portion of their own force could survive an initial US attack and retaliate with high-yield weapons. With the forces which we estimate, however, the Soviets could still not expect to destroy the growing force of US hardened, airborne, seaborne, and fast reaction nuclear delivery vehicles. (Paras. 78-81)

Air and Missile Defense Forces

P. The significant improvements in the Soviet air defense system noted during recent years will be extended during the next few years, and successful penetration by manned bombers will therefore require increasingly sophisticated forms of attack. The Soviet air defense capability can be degraded by the increasingly complex forms of attack which the West will be able to employ, including air-launched missiles of present and more advanced types, penetration tactics, and electronic countermeasures. Even in such circumstances, the Soviets would probably expect to destroy a number of the attackers. We doubt, however, that they would be confident that they could reduce the weight of attack to a point where the resulting da the USSR would be acceptable. Unless and until the USSR is able to deploy a substantial number of advanced ABM defenses, the USSR’s air and missile defense deficiencies and uncertainties will sharply increase as ballistic missiles assume a larger proportion of the West’s total nuclear delivery capability. (Paras. 82, 89-105)

Q. The major development which we foresee in Soviet defense is the advent of a capability against ballistic missiles. For more than five years, the Soviets have been conducting a high priority and extensive program to develop antimissile defenses, and we estimate that several different ABM systems are under development. We believe that in 1963 the Soviets will achieve some operational capability with an ABM system now being deployed around Leningrad. We have no basis for determining its effectiveness, but doubt that it would be effective against missiles employing decoys or other countermeasures. The USSR is probably also developing an antisatellite system. (Paras. 83-84, 88)

R. To counter the more complex long-range ballistic missile threat of the mid-1960’s, the Soviets may seek to improve the Leningrad system, or may develop a more advanced system, or both. In any case, the USSR is likely to defer additional ABM deployment until a better system is available. If the Soviets develop an ABM system which they regard as reasonably effective against long-range missiles, a vigorous deployment program will probably be undertaken. We believe that such a program would contemplate the defense of some 20-25 principal Soviet cities and would require some five or six years to complete. We have no basis for judging whether or when the Soviets would consider their ABM system effective enough to warrant the initiation of such a program. (Paras. 85-86)

Theater Forces

S. The longstanding Soviet concern with concepts and forces for campaigns in adjoining theaters, especially in Europe, has resulted in a formidable theater force, strong in armor, battlefield mobility, and units in being. The tactical nuclear delivery capabilities of these forces are still limited, but they have been improved markedly over the past few years. In offensive operations, rapidly advancing theater forces would be in constant danger of outrunning their logistical tail, which is heavily dependent on railroads. Finally, the Soviets have traditionally exercised very strict supervision over the actions of their subordinates, but existing command and control systems do not permit this strict supervision over the widely extended deployment required on the nuclear battlefield or under the threat of use of nuclear weapons. (Paras. 106-124)

Naval Forces

T. The USSR’s capabilities to conduct naval warfare in the open seas rest primarily upon the submarine force, which is capable of mounting a large-scale torpedo attack and mining campaign against Allied naval targets and sea communications in the eastern North Atlantic and northwestern Pacific. Its capabilities for operations near the continental US are more limited, but are growing. Capabilities against carrier task forces have been improved by the conversion of jet bombers to employ anti-ship missiles, by the introduction of submarines equipped with cruise-type missiles, and by increased air reconnaissance of open ocean areas by Long Range and Naval Aviation. The Soviets have also placed increasing emphasis on improvement of ASW forces in coastal areas and in the open seas. We believe the Soviet Navy is capable of carrying out fairly effective ASW operations in coastal areas, but that it has a negligible ASW capability in the open seas. Despite the effort which they almost certainly are devoting to this problem, we believe that over the next five years, the USSR will be able to achieve only a limited capability to detect, identify, localize, and maintain surveillance on submarines operating in the open seas.⁶ (Paras. 125-147)

While over the next five years, it is probable that the USSR will have only a limited ASW capability in the open seas, it must be recognized that the effort being applied by the USSR toward solution of the ASW problem will reduce current deficiencies and possibly could result in marked improvement in Soviet open seas capabilities. [Footnote in the source text.]

[Here follows the “Discussion” section, 45 pages of text. See the Supplement.]

0. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Intelligence File, National Intelligence Estimates. Top Secret; Limited Distribution; Controlled Dissemination. A table of contents and Annexes A, B, and C (30 pages of tables) are not printed. See the Supplement. A note on the cover sheet reads in part: “The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Defense, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, AEC, and NSA.” The members of the U.S. Intelligence Board concurred except the Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, who abstained because the subject was outside his jurisdiction.
1. The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, agrees that the Soviets probably do not expect to be able to achieve a position of clear strategic superiority over the US during the time period of this estimate and that they are far from willing to accept a position of strategic inferiority. However, he believes that the USSR is pursuing an intensive research and development effort in the hope of attaining technological breakthroughs which, when translated into weapon systems, will result in a clear strategic superiority at a later date. [Footnote in the source text.]
2. See the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, footnote to Conclusion E. [Footnote in the source text.]
3. The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army, dissents to this projection of force levels. Since the Soviet ICBM launcher construction program for second generation systems has been under way for nearly three years and has resulted in only some 80 operational launchers, it appears most unrealistic to him to estimate that from 175 to 250 operational launchers will become operational during the next 16 to 17 months. He therefore estimates as follows:
4. The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, believes that available intelligence, collected over a long period of time, provides a basis for differing interpretations of the magnitude of the Soviet ICBM program and the approximate time required for site construction. Experience has shown that even with the best available intelligence, and where evidence appeared to be complete, continuing analysis had indicated that ICBM launch sites exist which were not initially identified. Because of the history of expanding ICBM locations and the absence of complete, up-to-date intelligence, he believes that undetected launchers in varying degrees of construction, now exist at the confirmed complexes. Further, he also believes there are additional complexes mostly under construction at yet unidentified locations. He would therefore estimate the number of operational ICBM launchers, including those at the Tyuratam test range, through mid-1964 as follows:
5. The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, does not consider that this paragraph accurately reflects the capability of the USSR to put aircraft over North America on two-way missions. He believes that with due consideration of all relevant factors, such as number of aircraft in Long Range Aviation, numbers of aircraft tanker configured and peak availability rate, the Soviets could commit about 750 aircraft to initial two-way attacks on North America. From this number committed, about 300 bombers could reach North American targets.
6. The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, would delete the last sentence and substitute the following: