Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume VIII, National Security Policy

111. Draft Memorandum From Secretary of Defense McNamara to President Kennedy⁰

Washington, November 20, 1962.

SUBJECT

• Ballistic Missile Defense

In 1961, the Army proposed full development of the Nike-Zeus and deployment of the system for the defense of 27 cities. The development program recommended by the Army was approved but, because of limitations in the effectiveness of the system, deployment of Nike-Zeus was disapproved. Congress appropriated $384 million in FY 1963 for ballistic missile defense development, including $274 million for Nike-Zeus.

During the past year we have gained a much broader understanding of the problems of ballistic missile defense, the level of defense that may be achieved, and the characteristics of the most effective system. The technical opportunities offered by alternatives to or modifications of Nike-Zeus were thoroughly examined by the Army. This effort led to the initial design of four major improvements:

1. Use of the Zeus discrimination radar as a high volume, lower accuracy target tracker.

2. Modification of the Zeus missile to reduce the minimum intercept altitude.

3. Development of a new high acceleration missile (Sprint); this missile would increase the time available for discrimination.

4. Development of a new phased array radar; this radar could simultaneously acquire, evaluate, and track a large number of objects.

The addition of (1.) and (2.) above to the Nike-Zeus yields Improved Nike Zeus. Nike Zeus Improved plus (3.) and (4.) provide Nike Zeus Augmented A and Nike Zeus Augmented B respectively. A system based on (3.) and (4.) (plus some small number of Zeus missiles) is Nike-X.

New programs are now proposed to incorporate these developments. Our currently approved program, the new Army proposal, and my recommendation for the future are briefly summarized below.

The Current Approved Program

Continue development and tests of the Nike-Zeus system and limited development of the phased array radar. Development costs for this program for FY 1964 through FY 1967 total $600 million. Initial deployment of this system, if it appeared worthwhile, could begin within four years of the time a deployment decision is made.

The Proposed Army Program

Develop both the Improved and Augmented Nike-Zeus systems and the Nike-X system. Sixteen Zeus batteries for twelve urban areas would be deployed beginning in 1967. Ten Nike-X batteries, for ten additional urban areas, would be deployed beginning in 1969. Sprint missiles and array radars would also be added to the first 16 batteries, and the Zeus missiles would be redistributed over all 26 batteries. Development costs for this program, beyond FY 1963, would total $1.4 billion, and the initial costs for a 26 battery defense would total around $12.2 billion. The twenty-two urban areas around which these batteries would be deployed include approximately 30 percent of our population.

The Recommended Program

Develop fully only the Nike-X system. (The Nike-Zeus test program would be reduced below the currently approved level and would be limited to the study of re-entry phenomena and defense techniques, including anti-satellite defense.) Development costs for this program, beyond FY 1963, would total around $1.3 billion. A decision to deploy the Nike-X system would be deferred until mid-1964. The first Nike-X batteries could be deployed in 1969 and a 26 battery defense could be completed three or four years later. The initial costs for a 26 battery defense would total around $11.7 billion.

The estimated costs of the Current Program, the Proposed Army Program, and my Recommended Program are summarized in Table 1.

[Here follows Table 1.]

The program recommended by the Army to begin deployment of a composite system incorporating the Improved and Augmented Nike-Zeus systems instead of the Nike-X development (and possible deployment) does not seem to me to provide an interim defense capability which is worth the minimum of $2.7 billion additional which it requires. This interim deployment proposal has the additional undesirable effect of providing, at completion of deployment, a heterogeneous system of somewhat lower quality than Nike-X. It also commits us at this time to the deployment of a ballistic missile defense system, which my recommendation does not. Without being convinced that the Nike-X system should eventually be deployed, I recommend that we proceed vigorously with its development on a schedule which will preserve the option of the earliest possible deployment.

The rationale for these recommendations is briefly summarized below:

1. The proposed Army program represents a substantial improvement over the Nike Zeus. The final Army system is almost as good as Nike-X against various types of determined attacks. However, in its early stages the Army deployment is a marginal effectiveness due to its limited target handling capability. Even in the final deployment the vulnerability of parts of the Army system to modest blast effects and the lower traffic handling capability make it somewhat inferior. The major arguments for the Improved/Augmented system are its earlier availability and the insurance it provides against unexpected problems in developing an advanced system.

2. The Nike-X system promises a sufficient capability to insure a more equal contest with offensive weapons and tactics. A Nike-X defense would probably still cost more than the cost of offensive weapons which could overcome this defense; such a defense, however, would significantly reduce the damage from any given number of weapons targeted against our cities. For the same deployment cost, Nike -X will provide a more effective system than the Army’s program, although the first units would be delayed two years.

3. The recommended program will make a potentially satisfactory deployment option available at the earliest possible time without a current financial commitment for procurement planning.

The remainder of this paper discusses in detail:¹

I. The Views of the JCS on Ballistic Missile Defense.

II. Additional Strategic Considerations.

III. A Description of the Alternative Systems.

IV. Effectiveness of the Alternative Systems.

V. Relation of Active Defense and Civil Defense.

VI. Some Key Issues.

I. VIEWS OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered the various options available for terminal ballistic missile defense. The Chief of Staff of the Army and the Chief of Naval Operations support the program proposed by the Secretary of the Army; they understood, however, that the Army program would cost only $380 million more than my recommended program instead of around $3 billion more. The Chief of Staff of the Air Force recommends that the Nike -X and Nike -Zeus research and development programs and Nike-Zeus tests should be conducted, but that a decision should not be taken at this time to begin deployment. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff supports the views of the Chief of Staff of the Army and the Chief of Naval Operations.

The following salient factors were presented by the Chiefs in support of their position:²

a. Chief of Staff Army and Chief of Naval Operations:

(1) Militarily, the most glaring present deficiency in the U.S. military posture is the lack of an anti-ballistic missile capability. CINCNORAD emphasizes that ballistic missile defense has first priority.

(2) There is growing evidence of a substantial Soviet AICBM effort. The extent of damage that the military and scientific prestige of the United States will suffer, if the Soviets are credited with a major achievement in this area, is most impressive.

(3) The absence of an anti-ballistic missile capability subjects the United States to the possibility of significant damage or public humiliation at the hands of minor powers who acquire a missile capability. Our recent experiences in the Cuban crisis stress the relevance of this concern.

(4) Without a defense, major urban areas are exposed to accidental, irrational, and unauthorized attacks.

(5) The program recommended by the Army will provide a defense two to three years earlier than possible with a Nike-X program. By 1973 the effectiveness of these deployments is comparable. A defense in the earlier years is considered vital to the security of the United States.

(6) The attainment of a much needed hard point defense capability using Nike-X components should be considered.

b. Chief of Staff Air Force:

(1) Parallel research and development of the Nike-X and Nike-Zeus proposals, to gain knowledge essential to the ultimate achievement of both an effective defense and an effective penetration capability, appears justified.

(2) A decision now for production constitutes acceptance before any measure of the defense system effectiveness has been established.

(3) A decision to deploy active ballistic missile defense should depend, in part, on the required complementary civil defense program.

(4) The terminal defense systems now attainable or forecast do not provide an effective defense for urban areas. They may have application to defense of selected and hardened elements of the national military comment structure.

In supporting the views of the Chief of Staff of the Army and the Chief of Naval Operations, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff believes that it is of vital national importance to embark at once upon a production and deployment program as recommended by the Secretary of the Army.³

II. ADDITIONAL STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS

The comments of the Joint Chiefs of Staff describe a number of the strategic considerations associated with a decision to deploy a ballistic missile defense. A broader range of strategic and economic considerations, together with the technical situation at the time, will determine whether such a defense should eventually be deployed. These additional arguments for deployment of a less than perfect ballistic missile defense are also pertinent:

a. A ballistic missile defense of limited capability would contribute to the deterrence of large attacks by raising doubt about the attacker’s ability to penetrate. Such a defense, even though limited, greatly complicates the design and tactics for offensive weapons. The Soviets may not pursue an extensive penetration aids program even though it is in their interest to do so; if penetration aids are developed, the total yield of an attack would be considerably degraded by the weight penalty.

b. A ballistic missile defense system with the effectiveness of Nike-X would significantly reduce the damage from a given number of weapons directed against our urban areas. Only a small proportion of the Soviet missiles may be used for an attack on urban targets in a general war in which either we or they initiate a counter-force strike.

On the opposite side of the issue, the following additional arguments are relevant:

a. Deployment of a ballistic missile defense would almost surely provoke a Soviet reaction. This reaction could be a penetration aids program, an increase in the number of missiles, or the deployment of very large yield weapons. The nature and scale of their response depends, in large part, on the cost of the actions necessary to overcome our defense. Some idea of their response can be gained from our own experience. The cost of our penetration aids program will be less than one-fifth the cost of a ballistic missile defense system and the lead time for improved penetration aids is substantially shorter. The incremental cost of the number of missiles required to overcome a good ballistic missile defense would be from one-tenth to one-half the cost of the defense. We cannot be sure the Soviets would respond on a scale necessary to overcome our defense, but the economic advantage is definitely in favor of the offense.

b. The value of a defense against a relatively small missile force in the hands of a minor power has been noted. Minor powers, however, could still threaten cities with a population of around one million that are not defended.⁴

[Here follow sections III-VI.]

0. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, FY 1964 Defense Budget Volume I. Top Secret.
1. Sections III-VI are not printed. At the close of Section VI, in which he outlined a number of technical problems, McNamara stated: “I therefore recommend against making a commitment now to deploy either Nike -X or the Army’s systems. I believe, however, that anti-missile defense is so important in the strategic equation that we must be willing to make very substantial development expenditures even if the probability of deployment is rather low.”
2. Paragraphs a and b below partially summarize Appendix A to a November 10 memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to McNamara. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 218, JCS Records, JCS 2012/219, JMF 4740 (6 Oct 62))
3. Taylor’s views are in a separate November 10 memorandum to McNamara, CM-103-62. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 66 A 3542, 471.94 16 Aug 62)
4. In a November 10 memorandum to McNamara, Wiesner enclosed the “Report of the AICBM Panel of the President’s Science Advisory Committee on the Nike Zeus System.” The Panel found that the “present Nike Zeus, because of its technical recommendations, would be inadequate to deal with the anticipated threat,” and recommended that it not be deployed “in its present form.” The Panel concluded that systems “growing out of the basic Nike Zeus concept” gave promise for the future, and that one using phased array radar and a high-acceleration interceptor should be intensively developed before commitment to deployment, which should be preceded by basic decisions on the role of AICBM and civil defense in the U.S. defense posture. (Ibid.)