Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume VIII, National Security Policy

101. Memorandum From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson) to Secretary of State Rusk⁰

Washington, July 29, 1962.

SUBJECT

• Report to the President on Implications for U.S. Foreign and Defense Policy of Recent Intelligence Estimates

As you will recall, the President at the NSC meeting on July 10 requested an inter-departmental review of the policy implications of NIE 11-8-62 and other related intelligence on Soviet military progress, under State chairmanship.¹

Our committee now has a draft report on which we shall meet Wednesday,² and which will then be submitted to you and the other Principals concerned for your review preparatory to its submission to the President.

I thought you might want to acquaint yourself with the draft report prior to our meeting on the final version for formal submission to you, and I would of course appreciate any comments you might have at this stage. I also want to alert you to the one disagreement in our considerations.

The divergence of view concerns the implications for our own programs of more rapid Soviet advances in anti-missile programs than we had previously expected. In our view, the rapid Soviet development of an anti-ICBM system, and recent initiation of deployment of an anti-IRBM system, counsels a fresh look at our decisions on deployment of an anti-missile system. We do not believe that we should inject ourselves into the controversy within the Pentagon over whether the degree of military utility of the presently developed anti-missile systems, in particular the Nike Zeus, is sufficient to justify at this time a decision on grounds of the military capabilities of that system. Secretary McNamara has concluded that it is not. However, since the question is one of degree, and since there will be powerful political and propaganda repercussions of who is first in deploying anti-missile defenses, we do believe that the question should be reexamined with due weight given to the political considerations favoring deployment as quickly as feasible at least on a limited scale.

Paul Nitze and, we understand, Bob McNamara prefer not to raise this question. Nevertheless, it seems to us that there is an appropriate policy implication of the new intelligence, calling for a recommendation to look again at this question. We would like to discuss this subject with you further, at an appropriate time, but I wanted now to outline the difference as it presently stands within our committee. The view of the JCS is not yet clear, and that of Max Taylor is not known. CIA has informally indicated agreement with the view we had advanced, but they prefer not to engage directly on the issue other than to support our reading of the intelligence.

Chip Bohlen and Foy Kohler have taken the lead in drawing the foreign policy implications.

0. Source: Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 70 D 265, NSC Meeting 7/9/65. Top Secret; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Raymond L. Garthoff, Johnson’s Special Assistant and Executive Secretary of the Special Committee. Copies were sent to Bohlen, Kohler, Kitchen, and Hilsman.
1. See Document 97.
2. August 1; see footnote 5, Document 100.