Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume VII, Arms Control and Disarmament

90. Memorandum for the Record⁰

Washington, November 2, 1961.

SUBJECT

• NSC Meeting on Nuclear Testing, 2 November 1961¹

In addition to the regular members of the NSC, and the invitees, former President Truman sat in for about half of the meeting.² He made no comments on the substance of the material presented. The points discussed at the meeting can be usefully divided into the following categories:

a. The Secretary of Defense Recommendations.

The meeting opened with a brief statement from the SecDef pointing out that of the four types of nuclear tests—systems, proof, development and effects—only the last two are of importance to the United States at this time. The US could conduct about eight systems and proof tests between 15 December and 1 January, but DOD made no recommendation that these tests be conducted. Development tests and effects would take five to six months preparation, and DOD recommended that these preparations be commenced and that these tests be conducted.

b. Briefing on Soviet Nuclear Tests.

The President requested that before going further into the possibility of US testing, CIA should first present its analysis of the Soviet tests. Dr. Scoville gave the briefing and began by stating the Soviets had conducted thirty-seven, or perhaps thirty-nine tests, the last two being conducted this morning. The various tests had been conducted at the three different test sites in the Soviet Union. One test (#97) may have been an effects test for an AICBM; one (#98) may have been a failure; at least two (#82 and #86) appeared to be system tests of short range missiles; and apparently one sub-launched missile was fired (#103). The largest Soviet detonation may end up to be somewhat over 60 megatons. The intelligence community was impressed with the broad nature of the tests, which apparently included a number of system tests (at least five missiles and a number of air-drops, with at least one aircraft dropping two weapons), a number of effects tests (surface, sub-surface, and altitude bursts), and a number of weapons development tests (which gave the Soviets high yields and improved yield/weight ratios). There was nothing conclusive, but preliminary analysis did not indicate tremendous gains in weight/yield ratios. With respect to types of weapons, analysis of the tests has not provided us with as much information on tactical nuclear weapons as it has on strategic ones. From other sources, however, we do have information which shows that the Soviets are interested in nuclear warheads—for guns and mortars—as well as short-range missiles. Further, there is evidence that the Army had a requirement for a 1 KT warhead; as late as March of this year, however, they had none.

To conduct such a series of tests, the Soviets must have continued their nuclear development program during the moratorium (so did we); some evidence of our knowledge of this fact over the years was presented. Dr. Scoville concluded by saying that the Soviet’s nuclear weapons program was moving ahead fast, but that there is nothing to indicate any outstanding developments.

c. Discussion of Briefing.

The President opened the discussion by asking how long it would have taken the USSR to prepare for the conduct of such a series of tests, and was informed that given the Soviet’s attitude of meagre instrumentation of tests, preparations could be, and probably were, accomplished in the several months after May of this year. Next the President desired to know if there was any evidence of Soviet testing during the moratorium. Dr. Scoville replied that there has been nothing yet to indicate the Soviets would have had to test, and everything the Soviets have accomplished is explainable in terms of laboratory work. He added, however, that there is no conclusive evidence that the Soviets had not tested during the moratorium.

d. Discussion of US Nuclear Testing.

The President then turned to the problem of US testing and asked Dr. Seaborg for his views. Dr. Seaborg said he agreed in general with Mr. McNamara, but that certain development tests could be undertaken almost immediately and would not necessarily require the five to six months preparation indicated by the SecDef. (It later came out that this time difference resulted from Dr. Seaborg’s intention to conduct in the atmosphere some of the tests now being conducted underground in Nevada. These tests could be ready within a few weeks.) Dr. Seaborg stated that if the US tested only underground while the Soviets tested in the atmosphere, we would be in no position to compete with them. In response to a Presidential query, he stated if a decision were made to resume atmospheric tests on a large scale to test small nuclear weapons, the yield of all the tests could be limited to less than one MT—only a fraction of that involved in the Soviet tests. Dr. Seaborg concluded by stating if we are going to conduct tests in the atmosphere, an early decision had to be made in the choice of sites. The President then called on Dr. Harold Brown to discuss what specific tests were proposed by DOD and AEC, and what gains could be expected therefrom.

Dr. Brown agreed with SecDef that system tests and proof tests had only marginal value. With respect to development tests, his main point was they made for improved weight/yield ratios, noting that these were important for both Polaris and Minuteman. Dr. Brown centered most of his attention on effects testing. They would (1) judge the effectiveness of nuclear denotations on a hardened missile, (2) determine what effect Nike-Zeus warheads, exploded at high altitude, would have on incoming warheads, and (3) check the effects of the fireball on the radar systems of Nike-Zeus. Finally, a very high altitude burst [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] was planned to determine the effectiveness of such a blast on the blackout of communications and radar, as well as the sorting out of decoys.

Following Dr. Brown’s discussion, the President asked several questions concerning the total yield involved in all the tests discussed, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. He next asked the length of time the test series would take once they began. Firing with a rate of one or so shots a week, it came out the first series would last some four months. When the President indicated his preference for having the series shorter, if possible, Mr. McNamara filled a silence by stating that if the President wanted to move faster, it could be done, and that he would look into it with AEC. The President next called on Dr. Bradbury, in charge of the Nevada Test Site. Dr. Bradbury first stressed the need for development tests; he then turned to the present underground series in Nevada and stated that the problem has been as difficult, if not more difficult than had been anticipated. The big problem is to determine the yield, and even now we do not know the precise value of any of the systems recently tested. He emphasized, as had Dr. Seaborg, that if we tested only underground and the Soviets tested in the atmosphere, they would surely pass us in nuclear technology. One major point of interest was his emphasis on the fact that our past progress in the nuclear weapons program has resulted largely from our precise instrumentation in each test. Underground testing denies us the precise result, and there is at least six months lag between a test and the diagnosis of the data. Thus, underground testing denies us the principal source of our previous gains.

The President next turned to the neutron bomb and asked when that could be tested. Dr. Bradbury replied that this was an unfortunate name; there is as yet no such thing as a neutron bomb. It is true that an explosion with immediate radiation could take place, but it is not yet certain that it could be made to take place in a manner of value to the military. The US is not ready to test the neutron bomb; testing is not the problem in this area. The President then commented that while there was not much hope for explaining this to Senator Dodd, it should be explained to Senator Russell, who apparently had some misconceptions. Again, when no one stepped forward to take on this task, Mr. McNamara stepped in and said that he would talk to Senator Russell.

The President next turned to the question of where atmospheric tests should be conducted. Choices discussed were Nevada, the Johnston Islands off Hawaii, Eniwetok, or Christmas Island. The President voiced doubts that we could ever test in Nevada again for domestic political reasons. Ambassador Stevenson pointed up the difficulty of testing at Eniwetok, stating the Soviets would surely say that the US is willing to risk the lives of others but not US citizens. Dr. Bradbury pointed out that on Johnston Island there are at present no facilities for getting precise instrumentation but that certain tests could be conducted there. From a technical viewpoint, however, either Nevada or Eniwetok was preferred.

The President then asked for comments around the table. Ambassador Stevenson pointed out the fact that the US will test in the atmosphere is largely accepted in the United Nations, and that the real question now is to see that it is done in a way to minimize adverse publicity. He emphasized that (1) he did not think we should test anything that is not militarily valuable, (2) it probably would be a good idea to hold off until April, for then the General Assembly would have recessed, and (3) once the tests began, the shorter the series the better. Mr. Foster of the Disarmament Agency said that he was convinced that the atmospheric tests were necessary to get the military results desired, that there seemed to be a reason to test, and that he thought the US should test.³ Mr. Bowles said he had the same reservations already expressed, and that he had little to add on that count. He did, however, feel that the Presidential statement on nuclear testing prepared by Mr. Sorensen (Attachment A)⁴ was too long. This led to a discussion of the proposed Presidential statement.

e. Discussion of the Proposed Presidential Statement.⁵

The President admitted his statement might be a little long, but he said he wanted it to say two things primarily: First, in spite of the Soviet tests, the US is still stronger than the Soviet Union, and second, that no decision has yet been made on testing, but that authorization has been given to undertake preparation for testing. At this point Secretary Dillon, heretofore silent, said he would like to make a few comments. He then stated that the proposed statement was not the right kind of statement to make. It indicated a lack of clarity and decision, and it looked like the President did not know where he was going. It was too defensive in tone, and in addition, it said some dangerous things. Its reference to unborn children could backfire when we wanted to test. It over-stressed that the Soviets were testing for psychological results, when the evidence pre-sented was that there were some real military gains involved, and finally, it gave the impression that we are so strong that we would never have to test, when again the evidence was that we did need to test. The President appeared to appreciate the frankness of this approach (or at least not to be visibly taken aback), and asked if Mr. Dillon had any alternative, to which Mr. Dillon responded that he did, and passed to the President an alternate statement. The State Department then came forth with its draft.⁶ After some discussion during which the difficulty of walking the fence between indicating a decision to test and a decision not to test (Mr. Murrow of USIA was the only one who requested a clear statement to the latter effect)⁷ the President suggested that Secretary McNamara, Secretary Bowles, Secretary Dillon, Dr. Seaborg, Mr. Bundy, and Mr. Sorenson stay a few minutes with him to draft a statement.⁸

f. Future Actions.

The President concluded the meeting by stating that he felt three things required action. First, the steps that could be taken to speed up the tests once they began should be explored; second, the site for the tests should be determined; and, third, Senator Russell should be informed that the neutron bomb did not enter into the testing equation.

WYS⁹

0. Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, WYS Chron File Aug-Dec 61. Top Secret. Drafted by Major William Y. Smith of Taylor’s staff.

1. According to President Kennedy’s Appointment Book, this meeting, held from 10:15 am. to 12:30 p.m., was attended by 35 people; Bowles attended for Rusk. (Kennedy Library) Other accounts of this meeting are in Seaborg, Journal, vol. 2, p. 348, and in notes by Colonel Burris dated November 2 in the Johnson Library, Vice President’s National Security File, NSC Document on Nuclear Testing, WH Support Date. The latter is in the Supplement.

   In a November 1 briefing memorandum to Kennedy, Bundy stated: “There is strong Rusk-McNamara agreement on the central point: it is better not to test now ‘under Soviet umbrella,’ but to wait and test beginning about April 1962. But this implies clear determination to test about that time no matter what ‘world opinion’ says.” (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Nuclear Weapons Testing 11/1-28/61)

2. President Truman was an overnight guest at the White House November 1-2.
3. According to Burris’ notes, at this or a later point in the meeting, the President stated “that he did not want to leave the impression that this particular NSC meeting came to the conclusion that the United States will resume testing. He preferred not to state U.S. intentions or to commit himself to a future course of action. He said that he could agree only to an implication that preparations might begin if in the best judgment [testing] were absolutely necessary.”
4. Not printed.
5. Text of the draft statement, as circulated by Bromley Smith to the NSC on November 1, is in Seaborg, Journal, vol. 2, pp. 350-352. See the Supplement.
6. Neither found.
7. According to Burris’ notes, at this or a later point in the meeting, Murrow “stated that the reaction of most nations of the world to the Soviet testing was more one of anger than one of fear. He would like therefore not to invite this same kind of reaction toward the United States. He expressed the belief that the United States should announce its intention clearly not to resume testing at this time. The President replied that such an announcement was not possible.”
8. Text of the President’s statement issued later that day is printed in Documents on Disarmament, 1961, pp. 566-567.
9. Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.