Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume VII, Arms Control and Disarmament

88. Letter From the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission (Seaborg) to President Kennedy⁰

Washington, October 30, 1961.

Dear Mr. President: This letter will bring you up to date on the activities of the Atomic Energy Commission in the program for testing nuclear weapons and will inform you of our current thinking with respect to future steps that we believe should be undertaken. My discussion will draw upon past letters which, for your convenience, are listed in the attachment to this letter.¹

In keeping with your instructions, we have been making plans and limited preparations for atmospheric testing, confining ourselves to such steps as are considered to involve little or no risk of public disclosure of the fact of preparation. The specific steps so far undertaken include the following:—

1. The laboratories and supporting test organizations have been authorized to develop and fabricate devices and procure or fabricate such diagnostic equipment as may be required to carry out all of the tests listed in the enclosures to my letters to you of September 15th and 19th.² To the extent that it may be decided to test some of these devices in the atmosphere, these may be considered as preparatory steps.

2. Rehabilitation of available balloons and supporting equipment to use these balloons, including procurement of diagnostic equipment unique to tests on balloons, has been authorized. We are not procuring additional balloons or related equipment, nor have we embarked on such steps as the testing of those balloons on hand, because of the risk that such steps would become publicly known.

3. Certain coordination with and appropriate planning to support the Department of Defense has been authorized for some of the specific tests proposed in the letter of the Secretary of Defense to you dated October 9, 1961.³ However, our instructions do not permit us to take many of the steps required for complete preparation. [5-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]

4. Detailed review of the Eniwetok Proving Ground and Johnston Island facilities by Holmes and Narver (the contractor now supporting Pacific Missile Range effort) and preparation of a complete planning report have been authorized.

5. All three weapons laboratories have been authorized to accelerate their normal activities in the area of development of new devices, techniques, and diagnostic equipment.

6. Authorization has been given to these same laboratories to furnish technical support as requested to the Department of Defense agencies designated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to carry out proposed early Department of Defense proof and system tests. For example, diagnostic equipment is being installed in aircraft of the Air Force Special Weapons Command.

Perhaps the most important and certainly the most ramified preparations we are not making involve the Pacific Islands. The earliest use of these Islands in an atmospheric testing program would relate most importantly to the fact that air drops now proposed by the Department of Defense for proof tests, as well as AEC developmental tests could be instrumented with higher reliability and somewhat more sophistication if the detonations took place in such a location that ground-based instrumentation could be used. While the earliest actions necessary for such tests are the obvious operational ones which must be implemented by task forces of the Department of Defense, there are certain Commission actions that also would require attention prior to actual testing. For example, DOD ground crews and AEC technicians must proceed to the Island site some weeks prior to a test if this capability is to be exploited. While surveys of the applicable Islands have been undertaken, no steps toward the transfer of people can be taken until authorized, since it would be almost impossible to keep the fact from becoming public knowledge.

While the type of air-borne testing capability just discussed could fulfill the need for early testing, in the more complex developmental program we would need to supplement it by providing for operations from a considerably more adequately equipped island base. From such a base, tests could be conducted on the surface, on balloons, by air drop, and at very high altitudes, as may be required. This is a much longer range program. Study is under way to determine what Pacific base or bases should be proposed, but no actions have been authorized to move people to Johnston Island or Eniwetok for rehabilitation of test installations, nor—for fear of public disclosure—have we authorized procurement of long lead time items such as generators, instrumentation towers, communications equipment, aerodynamic balloons with launching and mooring equipment, and other supporting implements. These actions must await selection of the test site or sites.

In this connection, one might assume that Johnston Island (because of its missile launching capability) and the Eniwetok Proving Ground (because of installations already provided) are the logical choices. However, the Eniwetok Atoll is part of the Trust Territory which we administer for the United Nations. The State Department has informed us⁴ that very strenuous objections will be raised in the United Nations if we decide to go back into the Trust Territory to conduct nuclear weapons testing. We fully realize that representatives of various groups of the inhabitants of the Trust Territory, as well as many others, will again raise charges against us in the United Nations if we decide to resume testing in the Trust Territory.

Johnston Island does not fall in this category, but we are not now of the opinion that this Island is adequate to fully satisfy the needs of a comprehensive and meaningful test program. It may be adequate for tests requiring missile launching, since it has facilities for this purpose which are not available on other possible islands. An alternative possibility for a test base is Christmas Island, which has been used in the past by the United Kingdom. The possibility of using the Christmas Island site for our test program was mentioned during my discussions with Sir Roger Makins in London.⁵ A preliminary survey is under way to explore this possibility.

Meanwhile, our own deliberations have been assisted by detailed discussions with the Directors of the Weapons Laboratories who visited with us on October 17th, by my visit to the Nevada Test Site, to the Sandia Laboratory, and to Berkeley on my recent trip West, and by a recent meeting of the General Advisory Committee some of whose recommendations were transmitted to you in my October 27th letter.⁶ These discussions, and the more detailed knowledge resulting from the underground testing program, have increased our understanding of the requirements of the test program as a whole.

Additional experience has pointed up more clearly the limitations and difficulties of testing underground. To its limitations on testing larger weapons and its unsuitability for most important weapon-on-weapon effects tests must be added its relative slowness and the fact that great and time-consuming care must be taken to assure that useful measurements are achieved. In the case of tunnel complexes, there is the inherent danger that contamination may impede the conduct of future tests. Nevertheless, within its limitations, and with adequate precautions, the method is definitely useful.

Our deepened knowledge and understanding, together with the march of world events, have resulted in the formulation of certain definite opinions by the Commission as a whole. These are consistent with the position recommended by the Committee of Principals to you in their memorandum of October 11th,⁷ which the Commission heartily endorses. Hoping that these opinions may be helpful, I pass them on to you as follows:—

1. In view of the limitations of underground testing and in the light of the comprehensive nature of the recent Soviet tests, national security considerations require that the United States embark upon a program of atmospheric testing at the earliest appropriate time. Freedom to so test must be maintained, unless and until an enforceable test ban treaty is achieved.

2. Any atmospheric testing program should be carried out discriminately with the aim of holding to the minimum its contribution to the world-wide fallout. Although the dangers of such fallout have been greatly exaggerated in many minds, the best scientific evidence seems to indicate that it does contribute finite, though infrequent, undesirable genetic, and possibly somatic, effects. Hence, any particular test should be carried out only if its results will make a definite and important contribution to our defensive posture; in each case, every effort should be made to keep the fission yield as low as possible consistent with the results that are required. Important objectives that may justify a test include:—(a) significant technical advances—these include both anticipated advances requiring confirmation and unpredictable new knowledge acquired from experiments incorporating novel features; (b) the avoidance of potentially catastrophic situations—this includes avoidance of the danger that inadequately tested stockpile weapons may malfunction either by failure to perform their intended role or by untimely detonation with consequent damage to ourselves; and (c) weapons effects measurements including, importantly, weapon-on-weapon effects relating to anti-missile measures.

3. Whether or not we do proceed to atmospheric testing, it is mandatory that the underground program be continued. For certain low-yield tests requiring complex and accurate measurements, underground tests are superior to air-borne or balloon-based tests, and they are relatively free from restraints imposed by weather. They may continue to be or again become our only available testing method. Only by continuing to test underground can we develop the necessary experience and skill to conduct such tests effectively. For these reasons, as well as to minimize fallout, the Commission’s plans contemplate a continuing, comprehensive underground test program.

In conclusion, I respectfully reaffirm our earlier recommendation that the United States forthwith proceed to full-scale preparation for atmospheric tests, and that those preparations be publicly acknowledged as recommended by the Principals.

Respectfully,

Glenn T. Seaborg

0. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Nuclear Weapons Testing 10/30-31/61. Secret; Restricted Data.
1. Not printed.
2. Neither found. According to Seaborg’s journal, the September 15 letter concerned “a proposed AEC test program through next February” and that of September 19 “the follow-on test series.” (Seaborg, Journal, vol. 2, pp. 163 and 186, respectively) The initial test program became known as “Operation Nougat,” the follow-on as “Ivanhoe.”
3. See footnote 2, Document 82.
4. In a letter from Rusk to Seaborg, dated October 29. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Nuclear Weapons Testing 10/16-29/61) See the Supplement.
5. These took place on September 21, and are described in Seaborg, Journal, vol. 2, page 186.
6. Not found.
7. Apparent reference to Document 83.