75. Memorandum of Conversation0
SUBJECT
- Germany and Berlin, Disarmament, Red China
PARTICIPANTS
- US
- The Secretary
- EUR—Mr. Kohler
- S/B—Mr. Bohlen
- D/P—Mr. Akalovsky (Interpreting)
- USSR
- Mr. Gromyko
- Mr. Semenov
- Mr. Kovalev
- Mr. Sukhodrev (Interpreter)
[Here follows discussion of Germany and Berlin. A telegraphic summary of this part of the conversation is printed in volume XIV, pages 431–433.]
Without replying to the Secretary’s last comment, Mr. Gromyko said that he now wanted to express his views on some other problems not [sic] related to the question of disarmament and China. He thought that the principles agreed yesterday between the USSR and the US had produced a favorable impression on the Soviet Government and the Soviet people, as well as throughout the world.
The Secretary agreed that was right.
Mr. Gromyko resumed, saying that if there were a real desire to promote disarmament then the Soviet Government was of the opinion that progress could be made in the disarmament field, in bringing about a disarmament agreement, and in implementing such measures as would rid mankind of the burden of arms and lead to a radical improvement also in Soviet-American relations. It would be of great significance in promoting general and complete disarmament if the US and the USSR would agree on bringing the Chinese People’s Republic into the talks.
American statesmen, including the Secretary himself, had said that disarmament would be impossible without the participation of China. This was true, but it was not possible to elaborate a disarmament treaty and then simply submit it to the Chinese Government for signature when they had not been party to the negotiations. The United States had been negotiating with the Chinese People’s Republic at the ambassadorial level in Geneva and then Warsaw for many years, had participated in 1954 with the Chinese in the Indo-China conference, and was now negotiating [Page 185] at the same table on Laos. Consequently, what reason could there be for the United States not to negotiate with the Chinese People’s Republic on the all-important question of disarmament? Turning to Red China’s membership in the UN, Mr. Gromyko said that the Soviet Government considered the United States position on the admission of the Chinese People’s Republic to the UN to be unjustified. That position would find no support. Solution of this question would be important to the UN, to Soviet-American relations, and of course also to relations between the United States and the Chinese People’s Republic. In any event, this was not a third-rate problem.
Mr. Gromyko said he wanted to raise this question in these talks. Perhaps he and Mr. Rusk could reach some informal understanding which could later be formalized.
The Secretary replied that he would have to take this matter under advisement. There were some practical problems. Certainly the United States recognized that effective disarmament, at least in the long run, would require the participation of Peiping. In this connection, he cited the US position in the nuclear test proposals providing for release from obligations if other governments, such as the Chinese Communists, did not tie in. However, there were some differences between this problem and the question of UN membership. Moreover, our experience in trying to negotiate with the Chinese Communists had not been encouraging. He commented that the Russians might also have found life with Peiping to be difficult.
Mr. Gromyko denied that the Soviet Union had difficulties with the CPR.
[Here follows discussion of a press statement on the meeting.]
- Source: Department of State, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330. Secret. Drafted by Kohler and Akalovsky. The meeting was held in the Secretary’s suite in the Waldorf Towers.↩