Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume VII, Arms Control and Disarmament

72. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant (Schlesinger)⁰

Washington, September 15, 1961.

SUBJECT

• Disarmament Angles in UN Speech¹

Your draft strikes me as better than either Tom Wilson’s or Vince Baker’s.² I like it for the very reason which may make others dislike it, i.e. it is hortatory and argumentative. We are locked in a crucial test of wills. Everybody knows it. Everybody is worried. This is not a time to avoid the real issues and talk only glittering generalities, without ever jousting with the USSR.

Now for some nit-picks.

1. You do not emphasize strongly enough one key forthcoming aspect of our new GCD proposals.³ For years Khrushchev has been beating us over the head that we are really not for GCD (i.e. we are against virtue). Now for the first time we heartily embrace GCD. We should make this crystal clear in order to rob Sovs of their biggest propaganda argument. It might suffice simply to insert the following after “disarmament” on bottom line of page 9: “Let no one cast doubt on our dedication to this goal.”

2. Your crack at USSR on page 10 might gain strength by elaboration as follows:

“At one end of the spectrum the Soviet Union insists upon agreeing in advance on every step to be taken toward total disarmament—and embodying this agreement in a treaty acceptable to all UN members—before any disarmament whatsoever can take place. Their stand in effect stymies any concrete progress. Could this be their real intent?”

3. Another major feature of the new USDA proposals, which deserves highlighting in your draft, is that GCD alone is not enough. As we reduce armaments we must build up world peace-keeping machinery. Here our proposals are far superior to those of the Soviets, an advantage which should be exploited. Here too is an opportunity to take another whack at the troika. Even though Soviets say they will not use troika to prevent inspection if total disarmament takes place, they still insist upon it in the peace-keeping machinery. You could meet above points by beefing up first para. of VII on page 12.

4. Be wary of undue emphasis on starting disarmament process via “determination to eliminate reliance on weapons of mass destruction” (middle of page 11). To mention nuclears alone, without touting conventional arms reductions at the same time runs afoul of the so-called “linkage” issue which greatly concerns Defense. The President ruled on August 17⁴ that, while linkage would not be explicitly called for in USDA proposals, this was without prejudice to the merits of the case. If we now make policy through speeches which omit linkage, DOD may have a legitimate squawk. It should be consulted in any case. Moreover, our plan does not really call in early stages for “elimination” of such weapons, but rather for proportionate reduction by stages. True, the goal is eventual elimination but this should be clarified. One solution would be to mention that we favor conventional cuts (initially to 2.1 million) too.

5. Now we come to the two so-called Foster proposals⁵—the reduction of jet medium bombers (bottom of page 11) and similar reductions in fissionable materials.⁶ Both are very sensible noises. First they lend concreteness, and thus credibility, to a set of proposals that are otherwise glittering generalities. Second, I don’t see a prayer that Soviets would accept either of them. You may be aware that DOD (Nitze and perhaps Gilpatric) think such noises wholly inappropriate at a time of high tension over Berlin.⁷ Like de Gaulle, they regard it as nonsense to talk about disarmament when we are in fact building up. I emphatically disagree. To my mind, this is the very time when we should be most forthcoming in offering an alternative to the arms race. It is the obverse of the coin, the alternative road we would much prefer, the road which the Soviets are denying to us and to the entire world by their stance. We’ve never had the Soviets more on the defensive about disarmament. Let’s push our luck hard, and destroy their pose.

6. Moreover, a fissionable materials exchange at least would make real military sense in view of our vastly greater stockpile. As for the jet bombers, both sides were phasing these out up until the recent crisis; ergo, neither should find it so painful to resume doing so.

7. Beating the drum on self-determination is also highly desirable at this stage in history. On page 15 why not counterpoint our decolonization process against the “recolonization” process under the Bloc. For example, you might add to last full paragraph on page 15 the following: “Indeed, it is regrettable that at a time when the Western powers are granting the right of self-determination to their dependent territories, formerly independent nations have been denied this right in Eastern Europe by Soviet-dominated regimes.” I don’t think this smacks too much of “liberation.”

R. W. Komer⁸

0. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Robert W. Komer 9/61. Confidential. Copies were sent to Sorensen, Rostow, and Bundy.
1. Reference is to the President’s forthcoming speech on disarmament before the U.N. General Assembly. For information on the final stages of the drafting of this speech, see Theodore Sorensen, Kennedy, pp. 519-521. For text as delivered on September 25, see Documents on Disarmament, 1961, pp. 465-475.
2. Drafts not found. Thomas W. Wilson was Special Assistant for Public Affairs in IO, and Vincent Baker was Deputy Director of the Political Office in the U.S. Disarmament Administration.
3. The proposals as presented to the General Assembly on September 25 are printed in Documents on Disarmament, 1961, pp. 475-482.
4. See Document 56.
5. Two drafts of the “Foster Plan,” No. 6 dated August 30 and No. 9 dated October 12, are attached to a summary of No. 9 dated November 2 by Major William Y. Smith of General Taylor’s staff. (National Defense University, Taylor Papers, #1 Disarmament 1961) The summary is in the Supplement.
6. In a September 20 memorandum to McNamara, the JCS opposed the Foster Plan’s proposal that the United States and the Soviet Union deposit 30 medium-range jet bombers apiece with the United Nations for destruction. The JCS also opposed any plan for transfer of fissionable materials to international control prior to verified cessation of the production of fissionable materials by all producing states. A draft undated memorandum from McNamara to Kennedy, not sent, states that at a meeting among Nitze and White House staff on September 19 it was agreed to omit a draft paragraph in the U.N. address on transfer of medium jet bombers, but to retain another on transfer of fissionable material. (Attachments to memorandum from Nitze to McNamara, September 20; Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 65 A 3464, Atomic 400.112, 23 Mar 61)
7. More information on the intragovernmental debate on the desirability of presenting U.S. general disarmament proposals during the Berlin crisis is in Schlesinger, A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House, pp. 484-485. An unnumbered telegram from the Department to Hyannis Port, September 16, contains a message from Dean to the President supporting delivery of the disarmament address. (Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/9-1661)
8. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.