Office of the Historian

55. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom0

Washington, August 16, 1961, 11:03 p.m.

790. Eyes only for the Ambassador. Following is President’s reply to Prime Minister’s letter of August 141 text of which repeated you FYI by immediately preceding eyes only telegram. Deliver following reporting time and date delivered:

“Dear Prime Minister: I appreciate having your views on the test negotiations. It is good to know that David Ormsby-Gore will be in Geneva.

It seems to me that we are quite close on the timing of the intensified effort in Geneva. Although Ambassador Dean will return there on the 24th of August, in order to confer with the United Kingdom and United States Delegations, he had not planned to participate in a formal conference session until August 28. I hope you agree it would be useful to have one or two meetings take place before the Belgrade ‘non-aligned’ conference convenes on September 1. There would then be sessions every other day for the next two weeks, and Dean and Ormsby-Gore could plan to depart around September 8. Their departure a week or so before the opening of the General Assembly would, I should think, be understood as a natural consequence of the need to prepare our case for the General Assembly debate.

On the matter of a comprehensive treaty, I agree that the moratorium issue is the most vulnerable position we have. Dean has acquainted us with Ormsby-Gore’s views on it. It is important that this issue not be allowed to overshadow our very strong case on all the other questions. We are now studying this problem and we will be in touch with you again on it in a few days.2 With warm regard, John F. Kennedy.”

Rusk
  1. Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 72 D 204, Kennedy-Macmillan 1960-1962. Top Secret; Priority. Drafted by Dean, cleared by McCloy in substance, and approved by the President through Bundy and by Rusk.↩
  2. Document 54.↩
  3. A draft of this letter, which indicates Goodby as preparer, includes the following final paragraph: “As for a resumption of testing, I agree with you that we should not, and indeed we have no intention to, resume testing for wholly negative reasons. I question, however, whether you and I could long tolerate a situation where, for example, the USSR tests and we do not or where the resumption of testing should otherwise prove really necessary.” (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, Disarmament General, 8/61) Concerning the removal of this paragraph, see Document 56.↩