Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume VII, Arms Control and Disarmament

5. Memorandum From the President’s Adviser on Disarmament (McCloy) to President Kennedy⁰

Washington, March 8, 1961.

SUBJECT

• Fisk Report

I am transmitting herewith the report of the Fisk Panel on Technical Capabilities of the Geneva System.¹ This Panel was established to study, review and bring up to date the technical considerations bearing upon the conclusion of an agreement for the discontinuance of nuclear tests. This report, in my judgment, from a technical standpoint buttresses the conclusion that it is in the overall interest of the national security of the United States to make a renewed and vigorous attempt to negotiate a test ban agreement along the lines now contemplated.

The consensus of scientific thinking and analysis contained in this report indicates that a test ban agreement along the lines of the Geneva system involves certain risks from the point of view of potential nuclear weapons development. General Loper, one of the members of the Panel, has expressed his separate views² as to these risks. Some of these risks are due to the inhibiting effect which the agreement might have on some areas of weapons development which may be more important to the U.S. than to the U.S.S.R. This is not true in all cases; the reverse situation exists in some. Some of these risks are due to the possibility of undetected testing by the U.S.S.R. either by underground tests which produce a seismic signal of less than 4.75 or by tests at high altitude. It is proposed to undertake further research in these fields which may increase the ability to detect such tests. In the present state of knowledge, however, it must be recognized that the effect of the agreement is to make undetected testing more difficult and expensive but that a determined evader could probably evade the technical detection system if it were to put enough of its national effort into the attempt. The increased effort would make detection more likely, however, by conventional intelligence methods.

These risks should not be disregarded; neither should they be overstated. They must be evaluated in light of our total military effort and plans. They must be appraised in the light of all the courses and risks facing the United States in its endeavor to reduce the likelihood of war and to promote strong conditions of peace. When so evaluated and appraised, they are, in my judgment and on balance, worth taking in order to achieve this first step towards a workable agreement on arms control.

Taking a first step in the field of arms control in the present world situation involves some risks but there are also real risks in not taking the first step. Moreover, the first step may well have such significance as to lead to the adoption of further advances toward the relief of tensions and the avoidance of war and its concomitant, a devastating nuclear catastrophe.

A test ban agreement, along the lines now contemplated, would be a significant step in the field of arms control. It would establish a control organization which will give experience in the problems of control and inspection which can be expanded and adapted to handle other measures of arms control. Installation of the high altitude control system will provide an opportunity for joint U.S.–U.S.S.R. cooperation in the exploration of outer space of the type suggested by you in your State of the Union message. The system contains the possibility of difficulties and irritations but, on balance, provides a useful mechanism for getting past a stage in the international control of arms which has proved impassable until this time.

A test ban agreement along the lines now being considered might well contribute to better and more stable relations between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. and thus help ease general international tensions. Moreover, by stationing Americans and other foreigners at control posts and on inspection teams it could contribute to the development of a more open Soviet society. It would involve the acceptance by the U.S.S.R. of the principle that inspection and control is a necessary and integral part of any agreement in the field of disarmament.

A second reason for supporting a test ban agreement is that it could be helpful in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons capabilities among other countries. By establishing an international legal order, to which nations would be asked and expected to join, it will tend to restrain the present non-nuclear powers from obtaining nuclear capabilities. The test ban agreement is certainly not sufficient in itself to prevent this spreading of nuclear capabilities. It will have to be followed by the negotiation of other measures. If the present nuclear powers are engaged in nuclear weapons testing, the possibility of effective agreements restricting the spread of nuclear weapons capabilities will have been severely limited.

The final reason for supporting a test ban agreement results from a comparison of the political gains which would accrue from a successful test ban negotiation, on the one hand, with the political disadvantages which would be presented by a resumption of testing, on the other. A workable test ban agreement, honestly sought by the United States, would gain credit for the United States in responsible world opinion which could conceivably firm up its alliances and produce a better atmosphere, both in the United Nations and elsewhere, for conducting further negotiations with the Soviet Union. If, on the other hand, the United States were to break off the test ban talks and resume testing, without a new and serious attempt to negotiate an agreement, it would, in my judgment, alienate world opinion, not only in the underdeveloped countries but among our major allies as well. Discussions during the past summer with officials from the United Kingdom illustrate how seriously even a staunch ally as the British would regard such an action. The damage to the stature of the U.S. in world affairs and the effect on U.S.–U.S.S.R. relations which might result if the U.S. were to fail to take reasonable steps necessary to reach a satisfactory test ban agreement, and then resume testing, would be serious. This consideration, and the other considerations which I have referred to, affect the security of the United States and make me feel that they outweigh the risks which are involved in the test ban agreement and which the Fisk Panel has identified.

This does not mean that the U.S. must continue to refrain from testing indefinitely and acquiesce in what is, in effect, a test ban with no safeguards during a period of unduly protracted negotiations. If reasonable and timely progress is not made in the test ban talks, the national interests of the U.S. may well require the resumption of testing. This should be done, however, only after the U.S. has exhausted reasonable steps to obtain a satisfactory agreement.

John J. McCloy³

0. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Nuclear Weapons, Fisk Report. Top Secret; Restricted Data. Attached to a March 9 note from Bundy, which reads: “This is a paper from McCloy—you are not the real target—Joint Committee is. It is part of the effort to present the whole story without asking for approval yet.”
1. See Document 4. The Fisk Report is in the Supplement.
2. Attached to the Fisk Report. Loper’s views were endorsed by the JCS in a March 4 memorandum to McNamara. The Chiefs stated that Section VII of the Report did not give sufficient emphasis to the consequences of a major breakthrough by either side in the nuclear field, to the need for testing to ensure weapons safety and reliability, or to the “urgent military requirement for obtaining of weapons effect data in various environments.” (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 69 A 926, 388.5 1961)
3. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.