Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume VII, Arms Control and Disarmament

375. Memorandum From the Ambassador at Large (Thompson) to Secretary of State Rusk⁰

Washington, December 19, 1963.

SUBJECT

• Meeting on Arms Control Issues, 14-15 December 1963, Executive Office Building

On Saturday and Sunday, all-day meetings were held on disarmament problems and particularly on a draft ACDA separable first stage disarmament proposal¹ which has not yet been put in the mill for clearance. The meeting included, in addition to ACDA, representatives of the Defense Department and Armed Services, the White House, CIA, Atomic Energy Commission, and others interested in the field. The Department was represented by Mr. Rostow and Mr. Garthoff and myself, and Mr. Johnson participated in the closing session.

In brief, the proposal provides for a thirty percent cut in strategic weapons and delivery systems with no cut in conventional armaments. Submarines would not be included. ACDA will re-examine its proposal in the light of the discussion, on which there was considerable criticism, or at least difficulties, which were brought out in the discussion.

One of the most interesting points made on the ACDA proposal itself was a statement by John McNaughton of the Defense Department that one reason Defense favored an across-the-board cut, including conventional arms, was that it was otherwise impossible to equalize the effect among the three Armed Services.

So far as the Department is concerned, and possible actions on our part, the most significant point which evolved from the discussion was that repeatedly it was brought out that we need to have discussions with the Germans in greater depth on these matters. [In?] Several of the papers prepared,² and in my own contribution to the discussion, the view was expressed that it was highly unlikely that any significant cut in armaments could be made without prior, or simultaneous, progress in political settlements, most important of which is the German problem. Even in discussing straight disarmament measures, the attitude of the German Government is a key one. I mentioned that through the Pugwash and other meetings of this type, we had done a great deal to educate the Soviets in the realities of disarmament problems and it seemed strange that we had not done so with the Germans. One of the difficulties is, of course, that the Germans tend to be so suspicious of our intentions, or at least were under Adenauer, that it is difficult to have a frank and open discussion of all the factors involved. Another, and related point, is that any such discussion is handicapped because of the limited extent to which we have disclosed our intelligence about the Soviet Union and the reliability of our estimates, which, in turn, involves some disclosure of our methods. It was agreed that Alexis Johnson would have another look at this latter problem to see whether further disclosures are advisable.

I raised the problem of the difficulty of having discussions of this nature with the Germans without bringing in at least the British and French. It would probably be impossible to set up with the Germans a Pugwash type of discussion, although, to some extent, this might be considered. Since at the recent NATO meeting it was suggested that the Ambassadorial group look into the possibility of developing further proposals on the German problem, this might be a useful peg for starting such discussions. In any event, it was brought out in the meeting that it would be best to approach this problem from the point of view of seeing how we could bring about German reunification or progress toward this goal rather than to approach it from the straight disarmament point of view, which the Germans might interpret as our trying to find a way to withdraw from Europe.

It is suggested that consideration might be given to having the President prepare the ground for discussions of this type with the Germans without being specific about how this would be handled. A suggested briefing paper for the President is attached.³

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18. Secret.
1. See Document 373.
2. A number of papers prepared for this meeting, largely of ACDA and DOD origin, are in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, ACDA Pubs, Volume I, 1 of 2)
3. Not printed. A December 21 memorandum from Wiesner to President Johnson reflects the same general conclusions and recommendations. (Ibid.)