360. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany0

374. Eyes only for Ambassador. The following message from the President should be delivered to the Chancellor’s office as soon as possible. Unless rumors about Chancellor’s discussion with McNamara have spread, there should be no other distribution or discussion of this letter. If rumors about Chancellor’s discussion with McNamara or of contents of this letter should begin to spread outside Chancellor’s office, you should make recommendation and seek instruction.

“Dear Mr. Chancellor:

Secretary McNamara has just come back and reported to me his long conversation with you.1 He has suggested that it might be useful for me to send you a letter commenting on some of the things which you and he talked about, and I think his suggestion is a good one. As he reports the conversation, you talked about two major topics. The larger of them is the question of the basic policy of the West toward the Soviet Union, in which, as I understand it, your worry is that the U.S. may be too easily beguiled by the smiles and tricks of the Soviet Government.

I understand this concern, but I must tell you in all frankness that I do not think it is justified. It seems to me, in fact, as far from the mark as the kind of thing I sometimes hear from political groups in this country who say that it is wrong to trust the democratic commitment and the loyalty to the Alliance of the Federal Republic. The truth is, in my judgment, that one of the wisest things our two countries have done the last fifteen years is to trust each other, and I think the record of the United States Government as a whole, and of this Administration in particular, makes it pretty clear that we are not disposed to be taken in by Soviet duplicity.

I myself believe that it is much too soon to throw our hats in the air because of a single agreement on a single subject, the limited test ban—important as that subject is. I believe that we have reached even this small [Page 871] understanding as much through our strength and resolution as through the process of negotiation, and I recognize, as you do, that we are dealing still with a government which has repeatedly posed threats to the freedom of West Berlin and which, as late as October of last year, undertook a peculiarly dangerous and reckless act of duplicity in Cuba. So we are not under illusions about the Soviet Government, and you may be quite sure that Secretary McNamara, who has pressed so hard and so successfully for a strengthening of Western defenses in the last three years, is not a man who is likely to be lulled into forgetfulness or neglect of his duty by a single limited agreement. It is Secretary McNamara, after all, who has been my chief lieutenant in a process of reinforcement which has added nine billion dollars a year to our defense budget, and has increased the number of our battle-ready divisions by forty per cent. It was with Secretary McNamara that I called up 150,000 Reserves at the height of the Berlin crisis in 1961. And he and I feel, just as you do, that this is no time to let down our guard.

It may be, as you say, that there is some danger of relaxation in Europe, and you can count on us to work energetically against any such tendency. That is one reason why Secretary McNamara has pressed so hard in Bonn to find ways and means of meeting the overseas cost of the great forces which we have placed in Germany for the common defense.

Our own commitment and alertness, of course, have to be world-wide. If the Chinese should break out into new acts of aggression, it is only the United States among Western countries that will have the necessary means and determination for reply. We are the only Western power fully engaged in a two-front struggle in the cold war, and I think there is little reason for any feeling that we are blind to its dangers and demands.

Let me repeat that I do understand and respect your honest concern here, for I recognize also that in a large and varied country like this one there will always be people who can bring you reports that this or that individual or group is spreading dangerous opinions. But such rumors deserve to be set against the reality of what our Governments have done together for fifteen years.

As to the particular question of the limited test ban treaty, I am glad to see both in Secretary McNamara’s and in William Tyler’s reports2 that you do regard it as a success, although you have some specific questions about its possible impact on the status of the regime in East Germany. I too think it a success, for reasons which I stated at length last week and with which I will not bother you again now. I do not think it matters much where a treaty of this kind is signed or who claims the credit for it. [Page 872] The point about the treaty is that it makes sense for the world and that it does not jeopardize the essential security of either side. That is what makes it possible and useful.

The problem of the status of the East German regime is an important one, and I fully recognize your special concern with it. In our judgment, fully adequate precautions have been taken on this point. We do not think that either as a whole or in its separate parts does the treaty create any danger of increased recognition or international status for the East German regime. The use of the term “states,” which goes back a year, and the reference to sovereign rights, which is a product of the more recent negotiations, are both of them standard phrases which do not confer any new standing upon any regime which adheres to the treaty, and this solid legal judgment is one which we are prepared to make clear as often as is necessary. Moreover, we believe that the new process of accession is distinctly advantageous to us from this point of view, in that the Federal Republic, which is recognized by all three depositary governments, has an opportunity to deposit its accession without challenge from any of them, while the Pankow regime will obviously have to confine its accession to the USSR. Thus the process of adherence itself will make it clear which regime is recognized by all, and which is a puppet of one.

Having heard Secretary McNamara’s report, I have asked Dean Rusk to follow up with a visit in Bonn over this weekend,3 particularly so that you may be able to talk with him about the wider problems of our dealings with the Soviet Union. You will find him both careful and determined. You may be sure that he commands my full confidence. He won his diplomatic spurs in the first hard months of the Korean war, and you may speak to him in full assurance that neither he nor the Government for which he speaks is less deserving of your trust than any with which you have dealt in the past.

With warm personal regards,

Sincerely, John F. Kennedy

His Excellency

Dr. Konrad Adenauer

Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany

Bonn”

Ball
  1. Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, Correspondence with German Officials, 1963-1964 Vol. II. Secret; Operational Immediate. Drafted in the White House.
  2. In a meeting with Adenauer on July 31, McNamara learned that the Chancellor “did not believe the Moscow agreement was a great success for the United States” and that Adenauer “recommended the greatest possible caution in future negotiations” with the Soviets. Adenauer also repeated German concerns about adherence of East Germany to the treaty and said the treaty would encourage Western complacency. (Memorandum of conversation by McGhee enclosed with airgram A-20 from Bonn, August 2; ibid., Central Files, DEF 18-4) McNamara and Chancellor Adenauer met again on August 5, when the Chancellor voiced the same concerns. A report on the meeting is in telegram 475 from Bonn, August 5, printed in vol. XV, pp. 546552.
  3. Tyler’s meeting with Adenauer on July 30 is reported in telegram 394 from Bonn, July 30. The Chancellor stated that initialling of the test ban treaty was a certain success, but that success should not be exaggerated. (Ibid.)
  4. August 10-11.