Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume VII, Arms Control and Disarmament

358. Telegram From the White House to the Embassy in France⁰

Washington, August 4, 1963, 8:48 p.m.¹

CAP 63421. From Bundy to Bohlen. For opening of business Monday AM.²

Following is message received from de Gaulle today; our comment follows message.

Message follows: (de Gaulle letter)

Mr. President:

On the eve of the agreement that the United States and Great Britain concluded on July 26 with the Soviet Union you gave me in your message of July 25³ some indications concerning the negotiations in Moscow.

I have not failed to pay great attention to the fact that in your opinion certain indications would permit one to think that the Soviets would not be opposed completely to taking some steps on the road to disarmament. If on their side, as well as on yours, some measures were envisaged to bring about the effective elimination of nuclear weapons, France, as you know, would be very willing to discuss the matter. But it does not seem to me that we have reached that point. Nevertheless the French Government believes that the problem of the prohibition of delivery could be studied. It is ready to do so in common with the Government of United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union.

I must tell you Mr. President that certain other proposals which were made in Moscow by the Soviet Union could not obtain French acceptance. This is the case in particular regarding the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between on the one hand the members of NATO and on the other the Soviet Union and the countries which she holds under her yoke. Entirely apart from the fact that this kind of assimilation between the two sides could not be accepted by France, the Soviet proposal obviously tends to the recognition, that is to say reinforcement, by the West of the situation that they have created, and which they maintain by force, in Central and Eastern Europe, in particular the fiction of a German Democratic Republic. There is, moreover, every reason to believe that the Soviet Government would not fail in this event to renew its demands concerning the treaty, that is to say the fate of Berlin. The difficulty which would result in Europe and primarily in Germany from the acceptance, even partial, of these claims would react directly on the security and on the policy of France, so that she would be obliged to examine with particular care anything that eventually might be negotiated in Moscow on this subject.

Your message, Mr. President, informed me in the first place of the treaty which was about to be concluded by your negotiations with those of the USSR on the banning of nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in space and in the sea. In that respect, please be assured of my complete understanding of the decision which you have made. It is quite natural that the United States which has in the last twenty years made a very large number of atomic experiments of every kind and which is equipped with an enormous stock of very powerful and very varied weapons should now consider that new tests would no longer be useful and should undertake to make no more tests, it being understood that the Soviets would also abstain. France is, as you know, in a quite different situation. With her own means she has undertaken, later than the other nuclear powers, a program which will give her, in her turn, atomic armament, not as massive no doubt but of the same order. She could not therefore stop the necessary tests before attaining the goal.

You told me, without giving any precise details, that there exist methods of exchange which would permit the French Government to attain, by other means, the result which she is seeking. But over and above the fact that, no matter what hypothesis one bases oneself on, France would have to make tests; one cannot see how France could receive in this field the assistance of another state without conditions which would limit right to use of these weapons. This, France would regard as incompatible with sovereignty.⁴

de Gaulle

Our comment: Obviously delivery of this message invalidates preceding instructions⁵ and you should use only those parts of such instructions as are helpful in light of what follows.

President believes you should concentrate discussion on two aspects of de Gaulle’s letter. First you should express interest in knowing why de Gaulle says that “under any circumstances, France would have to make tests”. President is interested to know what view of technology and of partnership underlies this categorical statement.

Second question interesting to us is de Gaulle assertion that all assistance must imply unacceptable conditions. President has carefully stated desire to cooperate without stating any conditions. FYI: Object remains to put monkey of non-co-operation on General de Gaulle’s back, since in fact we remain willing to co-operate.⁶ End FYI.⁷

0. Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, President de Gaulle’s Correspondence with Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, 1961-1964 Vol. I. Secret; Operational Immediate; Eyes Only. The source text does not indicate whether the telegram went directly from the White House to the Embassy or whether it was relayed to the Department for transmission to Paris. The Department received the telegram at 12:11 a.m. on August 5.
1. The source text bears Greenwich Mean Time and date of 050248Z August.
2. August 5.
3. Document 352.
4. In telegram 475 from Paris, July 30, Bohlen stated that he had spoken to de Gaulle during a luncheon that day. de Gaulle “told me definitely there was no chance of France adhering to the test ban treaty.” Regarding nuclear information, de Gaulle stated that he did not believe Kennedy could, even if he wished, make it available to France; that he doubted whether Kennedy did seriously wish to make it available; and that, even if France received the information, it would have to test in order to verify the workability of its hydrogen bomb. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-4)
5. In telegram 661 to Paris, August 4, the White House instructed Bohlen to emphasize to Couve de Murville the serious desire of the United States for a discussion on nuclear cooperation, and that the United States was awaiting de Gaulle’s reply to the President’s letter to see if a dialog could begin. (Telegram drafted by Bundy and transmitted to the Department for transmission to Paris; ibid., POL FR-US)
6. In an August 5 letter to Macmillan, Kennedy stated that he thought de Gaulle not only did not want U.S. nuclear help but was unwilling to discuss the matter seriously. The President wanted to send de Gaulle another message to make it plain that it was not the United States that was unwilling to explore the issue. In a message to Bundy received in the White House on August 7, de Zulueta reported that Macmillan was “doubtful about the wisdom of going too fast” with de Gaulle, on the ground that de Gaulle’s language on sovereignty would seem to preclude any agreement. (Both in Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, ACDA, Disarmament, Test Ban Correspondence 7/12-8/7/63)
7. On August 8, Ball opened a lengthy memorandum to the President by noting that “particularly since last January, whenever the hand of friendship has been stretched across the sea, General de Gaulle has put a dead fish in it.” He went on to give arguments as to why a further nuclear offer to France would disrupt the Atlantic Alliance, isolate Germany, and confirm de Gaulle “in the rightness of his own obduracy.” (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 12 FR)