Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume VII, Arms Control and Disarmament

351. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union⁰

Washington, July 24, 1963, 9:44 p.m.

321. You must continue to press with regard to the matter raised in Deptel 305¹ concerning Paragraph 2 of Article III, especially as Gromyko’s comments² raise a question we cannot ignore. As treaty language now reads, instruments of accession must be deposited with all the Governments of the original parties. We cannot adopt a different position toward Nationalist China than the USSR adopts toward Red China. Yet under the present treaty language it is not clear that if one of the depositary states refuses to recognize the signature of an acceding state, the provisions of Paragraph 4 of Article III are complied with so as to make the accession of the depositing state effective.

Under these circumstances, the best solution would be for the insertion of the words “any of” between the words “of” and “the” in the second sentence of Paragraph 2. However, we need not insist upon that if there can be a written understanding by all original parties that if a state which one or more does not recognize deposits its instrument of accession with at least one original party, that will be sufficient to register accession. Such a written understanding could also record agreement that accession in no way affects degree of recognition granted by any party to another. FYI. This understanding would be most helpful to us with Bonn which is already raising question whether GDR accession is consistent with Hallstein doctrine. End FYI.

In raising this question with Gromyko you should make it clear to him that if he denies the accession of Nationalist China as a party upon deposit of an instrument of accession with the US, then we must deny the accession of Mainland China and other regimes not recognized by us if they deposit instruments of accession with the Soviet Union. In that event Mainland China and other regimes not recognized by the US could take the position that their desire to join was frustrated, and, thus, they had no responsibility for any inhibitions on testing. If your analysis is correct that the Soviet Union is seeking in the test ban treaty to obtain leverage on Peking, then this argument should be sufficient to persuade Gromyko to adopt a more acceptable position on this question. You might also point out that if the problem of non-recognition is injected as an impediment to accession, then many states will have problems since there will be many instances where a party does not recognize one or more other states. This would greatly diminish the scope and effectiveness of the treaty.

Rusk

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-4. Secret; Operational Immediate; Eyes Only Ban. Drafted by Rusk; cleared by Foster, Thompson, Ball, and Bundy; and approved by Read.
1. In telegram 305, July 23, 10 p.m. (drafted by Thompson; cleared by Bundy, Foster, Ball, and Read; and approved by Rusk), the Department stated its continuing concern over the ratification issue and inquired whether it was “contemplated” that each party would deposit its ratification with all three depositories. If so, the Department suggested insertion of language in Article II that would explicitly allow any acceding nation to deposit the ratification with any or all of the three original parties. This procedure “might take care of the Soviet problem if their concern is that there would be a disproportionate number of signatures or accessions deposited with Western parties.” (Ibid.)
2. Reference is to Gromyko’s comments on the ratification issue reported in telegram 312 from Moscow, July 24, received at 5:30 p.m., and telegram 316 from Moscow, July 25. (Both ibid., DEF 18-3 USSR (MO))