Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume VII, Arms Control and Disarmament

343. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State⁰

Moscow, July 23, 1963, 8 p.m.

292. From Harriman. In private talk with Hailsham and myself, Gromyko pressed us as hard as he could for a commitment on our attitude towards NAP. I carefully stated that we understood Soviet Government’s interest in this subject, that I would report our discussions fully on my return to Washington, and that I was sure we would consult our allies. I knew that my government was interested in extending the good will that had been created by the present talks to include all of Europe both the members of the NATO and Warsaw Pact, and that my government hoped that the test ban agreement, although having great psychological importance in itself, would lead to further understandings. Hailsham made a similar statement, perhaps a bit more definite.

Thereupon Gromyko said he understood from our statements that our respective governments were ready to make every effort regarding NAP and intended to consult allies. Taking this into account, Soviet Government was prepared not to link directly the signing of test ban with NAP. He hoped this would be duly appreciated by both governments. However, Gromyko said language of the communiqué proposed by Hailsham was not fully satisfactory,¹ and handed us his proposed draft.

We agreed to consult our respective governments and advise him tomorrow. At his request, I explained to him the details of the procedures we proposed for signing test ban treaty. He said he would consult his government since this question involved “the level and the timing.” It was agreed that we would initial the treaty tomorrow, or as soon thereafter as we could agree on communiqué. Communiqué and text of treaty should be given out simultaneously in three capitals promptly after initialing. Advise if this procedure satisfactory.

Gromyko’s suggested reference to NAP in communiqué follows:

“The heads of the three delegations discussed the Soviet proposal relating to a pact of non aggression between the participants in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the participants in the Warsaw Treaty. The three governments have agreed fully to inform their respective allies in the two organizations concerning these talks (peregovory, translated by Sukhodrev as ‘talks’; it could also be translated as ‘negotiations’) and to consult with them about the manner of continuing discussions (obsuzhdeniya) on this question with the object of achieving agreement.

An exchange of views also took place with regard to other measures, leading to a relaxation of tension, affecting the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Warsaw Treaty.”

Gromyko stated that if we wished to we could list some or all of the subjects raised in the discussions. Neither Hailsham nor I commented, and I would recommend against it.

Our comments on communiqué follow septel. Also full account of conversation.²

Kohler

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 US/Harriman. Secret. Received at 3:57 p.m.
1. See Document 339 and footnote 10 thereto.
2. Telegram 295 from Moscow, July 23. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 US/Harriman) See the Supplement.