Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume VII, Arms Control and Disarmament

323. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State⁰

London, July 12, 1963, 8 p.m.

232. From Harriman.¹ After lunch by Prime Minister for principals in both US and UK teams,² he asked me to stay on for discussion alone.

1. Although he obviously would like a summit meeting, provided an agreement on some subject could be reached, he understands disadvantage of delaying agreement on test ban if it is obtainable. He specifically agreed that we should attempt to conclude test ban if it could be done untied to other issues. On the other hand, he strongly urges a summit meeting if that is only way an agreement can be reached on test ban or other desired objectives. He suggested possibility of Western summit meeting, with Adenauer and de Gaulle, to thrash out subjects other than test ban.

2. He understands that to satisfy France, some special arrangement must be made in order to obtain France’s adherence to test ban and non-dissemination. He volunteered to do the job.

3. He suggested we drop word “pact” and develop new term for non-aggression arrangements which might be more palatable to Germans.

4. He agreed to instruct Hailsham to support our position on any points of disagreement, specifically, as example, our unwillingness to accept any Soviet proposal on moratorium on underground testing.

5. He agreed that since subject of Red China is so sensitive, I should raise it with Khrushchev alone. He also volunteered that it would be better for me to discuss Laos and Cuba without Hailsham.

6. We discussed press arrangements covered by exchange of letters with the President, and indicated that he personally would see that understandings would be carried out on British side.³

Bruce

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 US/Harriman. Secret.
1. Harriman and his party left Washington on July 11. He was accompanied by Fisher; Kaysen; Tyler; McNaughton; Long; Frank E. Cash, Officer in Charge of German Political Affairs; Alexander Akalovsky, Political Affairs Divison, International Relations Bureau, ACDA; Neville E. Nordness, Public Affairs Adviser, ACDA; and Frank Press, a consultant with ACDA.
2. The meeting with British officials the morning of July 12 is reported in telegrams 233 and 234 from London, July 12, marked “Eyes Only—Ban from Harriman.” Hailsham raised questions about the draft limited test ban treaty of August 27, 1962, which Harriman insisted on presenting to Khrushchev. Hailsham acknowledged, however, that his instruction was to agree to whatever the United States and the Soviet Union agreed on a three-element ban. In a separate talk among Harriman, Bruce, and Home, it was agreed that every effort should be made to obtain a test ban untied to a non-aggression arrangement and that the United States and the United Kingdom would in Moscow make the test ban the first order of business, followed by nuclear non-dissemination and a non-aggression pact, in that order. (Both in Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 US/Harriman) See the Supplement. “Ban” was a handling indicator for the test ban talks and denoted special restricted handling and distribution procedures.
3. At the afternoon meeting between the U.S. and British groups, the United States obtained British agreement that any non-aggression arrangement would have to include a guarantee of Western access to Berlin. The groups also considered measures ensuring against a surprise attack, a cut-off of fissionable materials production, and a ban on bombs in orbit as possible items for discussion in Moscow. (Telegram 236 from London, July 12, marked “Eyes Only—Ban from Harriman”; Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 US/Harriman) See the Supplement.