Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume VII, Arms Control and Disarmament

321. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

Washington, July 10, 1963, 3:45–4:15 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Harriman Talks in Moscow

PARTICIPANTS

• The Secretary
• Ambassador Herve Alphand, French Embassy
• Mr. Pierre Pelen, Counselor, French Embassy
• Mr. William R. Tyler, Assistant Secretary, EUR
• Mr. Edgar J. Beigel, WE

Ambassador Alphand called at his request to say that the personal views he had given to Under Secretary B all on this subject had now been confirmed as the views of the French Government. He summarized these views as follows:

1. The French position is well known that a nuclear test ban agreement is not a disarmament measure and in fact would consolidate the position of countries that have already developed nuclear arsenals. The agreement would not be of interest to France, which must consider its own requirements, although it would not object to the agreement reached by others.

2. A further non-aggression agreement that Khrushchev suggested would seem to be useless and to be merely one element out of the general program presented at Geneva in 1959. The French Government believes that such an agreement: (a) would merely reiterate commitments under the U.N. Charter; (b) is dangerous because one way or another it would constitute recognition of the GDR; and (c) would bless the political status quo in Europe. Ambassador Alphand said that France fears the political and psychological effects of such an agreement. He said that the French Government understands that Khrushchev would want such an agreement in order to represent it as a victory to the Soviet people as well as to the satellites, to gain the “legalization” of the satellites.

3. Any future moves by the West to counter Soviet moves in Berlin or elsewhere might be considered as violating the non-aggression agreement.

4. A non-aggression agreement would give rise to a false illusion in France as well as serious problems were the French Government later to ask for greater sacrifices from the French Parliament and people.

Ambassador Alphand said that France has always wanted something fundamental from the Soviets, something that would contribute to a real détente.

Ambassador Alphand then referred to a telegram from the French Embassy in London summarizing a UPI dispatch of July 8 which quoted a Foreign Office spokesman as saying that the Western delegations in Moscow will be authorized to discuss a number of questions: a non-proliferation plan, measures to avoid war by accident, and general problems of disarmament including a non-aggression agreement. He said that he did not know whether this was also U.S. policy for these talks. He thought that the discussions should be limited to the nuclear test ban agreement, and that no gestures should be made toward Khrushchev.

The Secretary said that we do not know the real Soviet attitude on the test ban question, and that we have no information beyond the Khrushchev speech in East Germany. The Ambassador interjected that Khrushchev did not speak of a moratorium on underground testing although this had indeed been part of the earlier Soviet proposal. The Secretary went on to say that we are prepared to discover that the Khrushchev speech is not the entire Soviet position. He said that we could accept an agreement to end tests in all three environments. He said that unless the Soviets are willing to accept considerable inspection arrangements we would not agree to stop underground testing, and we would certainly not accept an uninspected underground test moratorium. He said that we do not know what the fine print will say on the Soviet side.

The Secretary said that on other disarmament questions there will be no change from the positions we have been taking at Geneva. He said that if the Soviets raise these issues, Mr. Harriman would stick to the Geneva positions.

The Secretary said that we do not know whether the test ban question will be linked to a non-aggression agreement,¹ that this has been obscure in the Soviet public statements, although it is likely that the Soviets will raise the subject. He said that in this event Mr. Harriman will listen, and will point out that this is a matter for the NATO Alliance to consider. The Secretary said that we have already expressed our own concern about a non-aggression agreement along much the same lines as outlined by Alphand. He said that any suggestion of recognition of the GDR is important to us and we must be extremely careful about this. He noted that Ambassador Dobrynin had in conversation said that the Soviet Union would be flexible with regard to the form of such an arrangement, but may have been speaking only personally on this point. He said that we are also concerned about illusions should any non-aggression agreement be followed by a Berlin crisis, and he had emphasized this to Dobrynin.

The Secretary felt that the Alliance should not close the door on this question until we can see more clearly what develops within the Sino-Soviet bloc. He noted that there are those in Paris who have said that the Soviet position may change due to relations with China. He believed we should keep things open to see how the situation develops as well within the satellites and between the satellites and the Soviet Union. He noted that Kadar may ask for withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary and that difficulties are developing with Rumania.

The Secretary reiterated that Mr. Harriman is only going to hold a “listening brief” at Moscow. He noted that M. Spaak would be reporting to the NAC on July 12² and said that we will report the Harriman discussions promptly to the Alliance.

Ambassador Alphand said that there are many ways to conduct a listening brief. The Secretary responded that Mr. Harriman will only want to find out what the Soviets are talking about. Ambassador Alphand went on to illustrate his remark by saying that we might ask about unilateral declarations in lieu of a non-aggression agreement. The Secretary said that Mr. Harriman may probe on the question of form, that we are already studying questions of substance. He pointed out that it would be very difficult to expect U.S. ratification of any agreement with members of the Warsaw Pact.

The Secretary repeated that he had warned the Soviet Ambassador regarding any Berlin crisis that might follow any kind of non-aggression agreement.

Ambassador Alphand said that in the French view they prefer not to link the test ban and non-aggression agreement, that it would in fact be impossible to link the two subjects.

The Secretary said that we must consider this subject against the context of the Berlin situation, and that an illusory non-aggression agreement would be both wrong and dangerous. He went on to say that if a significant change in the situation is in the offing, if the captive nations turn out not to be so captive, then the entire context would be reviewed.

Ambassador Alphand said that in his view a Soviet commitment not to make a Berlin crisis would not be a very worthwhile exchange for a non-aggression agreement.

The Secretary then turned to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and said that our question in Moscow will be whether the Soviets accept the U.S. proposals as a basis for negotiation. He said that if they do, we will report this development to the Alliance. He recalled that Couve de Murville had indicated that France would have to study this carefully if the Soviets accept our proposals. He noted that we are not in an apologetic mood on this since the Soviets have already assisted the Chinese in this field.

The Secretary said that Mr. Harriman would also be prepared to take up again with the Soviets the situation in Laos.

Ambassador Alphand said that he had further word from Paris on this subject, indicating that France would agree to reinforcement if Phoumi would be more cooperative with them.

The Secretary said that there were no other subjects that Mr. Harriman intended to raise in Moscow.

Mr. Tyler noted that we expect a member of the Belgian delegation to Moscow will go to London to brief Mr. Harriman on the Spaak-Khrushchev talks.

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-3 USSR(MO). Confidential. Drafted by Beigel and approved in S on August 6. The meeting was held in Secretary Rusk’s office.
1. According to a memorandum by John C. Guthrie, Director of EUR/SOV, of his conversation on July 5 with Alexander J. Zinchuk, Counselor of the Soviet Embassy, the latter stated that the linkage “had not been explicit but in view of the fact that there would be no moratorium on underground testing under the partial test ban agreement, a non-aggression pact was necessary to add ‘reassurance’ to those concerned by continued testing underground.” Zinchuck “indicated that his reading of the Khrushchev speech was that the linkage was clear.” (Ibid., POL 7 US/Harriman)
2. Paul-Henri Spaak, Belgian Foreign Minister, was in the Soviet Union part of the second week of July. In a letter to Kennedy dated July 11, Spaak described a conversation, apparently on July 9, in which Khrushchev stated that he thought an accord on a partial test ban treaty could be reached. While Khrushchev did not link such an agreement with a non-aggression pact, “it seemed” to Spaak that “he considered that no accord on disarmament was possible if the German situation was not clarified.” (Text in telegram 58 from Brussels, July 11; ibid.)