Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume VII, Arms Control and Disarmament

315. Memorandum for the Record⁰

Washington, July 8, 1963.

SUBJECT

• Meeting of the Committee of Principals, 8 July 1963

1. Mr. Foster opened the meeting by explaining that its purpose was to consider two measures prepared in response to NSAM 239.¹ The first, a separable first stage measure, proposed 50% or 75% destruction of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles and limitations on production, but included inspection of residuals only with the 75% cut and not with the 50% cut. The other, a gradual approach measure, stretched out the steps contained in Stage I of the present US proposal for GCD.² Mr. Foster said that he was not seeking a decision on these specific proposals today, but wanted to focus on the direction in which they led.

2. Secretary McNamara said that he favored the gradual approach because the more extreme separable measure was unlikely to lead to agreement and had the following disadvantages: 1) It destroyed the West’s nuclear deterrent against conventional aggression. 2) It gave up the West’s superior nuclear power without reductions in Soviet conventional forces. 3) The inspection procedures were too loose, particularly for the 50% cut, but even for the 75% cut. 4) It had no advantage to the West as compared with the present US Stage I—it would not reduce the risk of strategic nuclear war and could increase it. Mr. McNamara preferred gradual steps to develop confidence which, in turn, might produce more substantial agreements.

3. Mr. McCone said that the separable first stage plan concerned him because of its reliance on intelligence as a substitute for inspection of residuals.³ (50% cut) He noted that our intelligence inventory is made up principally of photographic intelligence, SIGINT, and, to a small degree, clandestine intelligence. These have improved over a few years ago but are not sufficient for us to determine residuals. Photography can be deceived by camouflage, satellites can be intercepted, SIGINT is perishable, and clandestine sources are not dependable. Furthermore, photography can tell us nothing about the number of missiles or reload capabilities, and we know very little about manufacturing complexes for missiles. In Mr. McCone’s view, in brief, there was very serious danger in depending on intelligence to verify residuals because intelligence was 1) perishable, and 2) capable of being deceived. He noted, moreover, that differences would arise between the US and the Soviets over the number of arms in existence and the US could prove its case only by revealing intelligence. Furthermore, Congress and the public would want to know how good our intelligence was and it would have to be revealed. Mr. McCone felt that it was hard to overestimate the consequences of exposing our intelligence. Finally, he noted that dependence on intelligence would leave us in an uneasy position as we are now in Cuba, where the photography is of better quality. Mr. McCone concluded that we could not safely proceed on the basis of using intelligence to determine the quantity of residual arms. He felt that we would have to inspect residuals as well as the quantities destroyed. We had always taken this approach, and he felt that we should continue to do so.

4. In response to a question from Secretary Rusk, Mr. McCone said we had no evidence of camouflage, but pointed out that Khrushchev had said in 1959 at Camp David that he could hide missiles in canyons. The difficulty regarding camouflage was that one could not prove a negative.

5. General Taylor said that he agreed with Secretary McNamara and could add nothing; he said that he preferred the gradual approach. Mr. McCone said that this was his preference too.

6. Dr. Wiesner said that many comments might be made similar to those of Secretary McNamara. There was no need to abandon our present treaty without good reason; however, we now know things about intelligence capabilities that we did not know when the present treaty was tabled, so we might consider changes in the inspection provisions of Stage I. He said that our intelligence was good enough for this but agreed with Mr. McCone that we should be very careful about larger cuts—30% might be supported and maybe 50%. He added that it might be better to negotiate absolute numbers rather than percentages.

7. Dr. Seaborg said that he had nothing to add to the discussion.

8. After these statements of basic position by the key Principals, there was discussion of details and of related matters. Secretary McNamara reported that the Department of Defense was looking ahead for 10 years, that it might be possible to stabilize nuclear stockpiles, and if so, there could be some reduction in AEC production of weapons (perhaps $800 million per year). Secretary Rusk suggested that instead of formal agreements, it might be possible for the U.S. and USSR to report to each other what they plan to do unilaterally, e.g. the U.S. weapons production cut, with the hope that the other side would react to this news by cuts of its own. Mr. McNamara doubted, however, that the other side would react similarly, but instead would try to maximize its own program.

9. Mr. McCone confirmed that it was true that as of July 1st, 1963, the Soviets were at the lower end of the range of ICBMs which had been estimated by the intelligence community. He added that there was another problem which disturbed him. The Soviets had three types of long range surface-to-surface missiles—the SS-6, the SS-7 and the SS-8. There was a sharp difference as to whether the SS-8 is large—some believe it will lift 50-100 megatons. So when cutting by categories, the Soviets could retain a few missiles with enormous destructive power greater than that of the U.S. with its larger number of missiles retained. This should be kept in mind.

10. Mr. Foster said that he could not agree that the 50% or 75% cuts would not reduce the risk or destructiveness of war. He was also astonished because he thought we had enjoyed greater success than Secretary McNamara had indicated in balancing off our own conventional forces vis-à-vis those of the Soviet Union. He was also puzzled by Mr. McCone’s lack of confidence in intelligence. He said that we build our forces based on intelligence so why could we not disarm on this basis? Before Mr. McCone could answer, Secretary McNamara supplied the answer—in our planning we put in a 100% safety factor.

11. Mr. McCone asked why we followed one procedure for inspection with 50% cuts and another for 75% cuts. Mr. Foster said that ACDA felt that the Soviets would accept more inspection if the cuts were deeper. Secretary McNamara reiterated his concern that we were cutting in the strategic delivery area and not in the conventional area. He wanted to retain a balance, roughly like the present balance. Mr. Fisher said that at the meetings of the Deputies, the Defense representatives had seemingly wanted to focus on strategic vehicles.

12. Secretary Rusk said there were two great obstacles to disarmament. One, the Soviets could not or would not back off regarding South Vietnam, Laos, Berlin, and military personnel in Cuba. Two, they refused to accept inspection. He felt that if the Soviets were seriously interested in disarmament, these things were not a great deal to ask.

13. There was then some conversation about the possibility of combining Stages I and II of the U.S. GCD proposal, which was inconclusive. General Taylor suggested the possibility of NATO vs. Warsaw Pact rather than U.S. vs. USSR, and Mr. Foster said that this was open. In response to Secretary Rusk’s question, Mr. Foster said we were already authorized to discuss medium bomber bonfires, cessation of fissionable materials production, transfer of fissionable material to peaceful uses, exchange of military missions, notification of major maneuvers, controls over military expenditures, no bombs in orbit, and certain nuclear free zones. Secretary Rusk commented that Governor Harriman had plenty to discuss. He asked if we could conceivably go to 50% across the board (including conventional). Secretary McNamara said yes, but did not answer when asked if we could do so without Communist China. Mr. Kaysen asked whether Secretary McNamara would still be concerned if there were 50% cuts in strategic delivery vehicles and 30% elsewhere. Secretary McNamara answered yes, and then made a plea for practical as against propagandistic proposals.

14. Mr. McCone expressed his concern about the continuing long-term plans of the Soviets for further increases in their arms. He referred specifically to the continuing buildup of facilities for producing fissionable materials. Secretary Rusk asked if there could be a study of damage to the U.S. from 15-20 large nuclear warheads. Secretary McNamara said this was being done.⁴

15. Secretary Rusk concluded the meeting by saying that some instructions would be drafted for Governor Harriman.⁵ The idea of the separable measure would be kept in play, but not specific large cuts such as 75%. Governor Harriman would be authorized to explore this idea with the Soviets, and to find out, for example, how they would propose to relate strategic cuts to conventional cuts.⁶

Louis Marengo

0. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Special Group (5412) (1963). Top Secret. Drafted by Louis Marengo on July 9. An attached list of the 24 participants is not printed. Among those attending but not reported as speaking were Harriman, Nitze, and McGeorge Bundy. Another, lengthier memorandum of this meeting prepared by George Rathjens of ACDA is in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, ACDA, Disarmament, Committee of Principals 5/63-7/63. See the Supplement.
1. Document 284. The proposals have not been found.
2. Reference is to the Outline of Basic Provisions of a Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World, presented at Geneva on April 18, 1962. For text, see Documents on Disarmament, 1962, vol. I, pp. 351-382.
3. McCone commented at greater length on intelligence implications of the separable first stage plan in two memoranda dated July 8. (Both in Central Intelligence Agency, Special Group (5412)(1963))
4. The study has not been found.
5. Document 319.
6. A memorandum by Rathjens, also dated July 8, of action taken at this meeting indicates that McNamara, Taylor, and McCone preferred the gradual approach as compared with the separable first-stage proposal, but that no action was recommended even on the gradual approach. The memorandum also noted “a consensus that Mr. Harriman had enough other items to discuss” in Moscow “so that there should be no US initiative relating to changes in our position relating to strategic delivery vehicles.” (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Kaysen Series, Disarmament, Basic Documents, Volume I)