Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume VII, Arms Control and Disarmament

311. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany⁰

Washington, July 3, 1963, 7:10 p.m.

31. Eyes only for Ambassadors. Deliver following message from Secretary to Foreign Minister Schroeder as soon as possible, hopefully before start of Adenauer-deGaulle talks.

“Dear Gerhard:

Since returning to Washington last night the President and I have had a first look at the text of Chairman Khrushchev’s speech delivered yesterday in East Berlin. We had no previous intimation of this Soviet proposal. It seems interesting particularly in view of its timing, coming just before the meeting with the Chinese on Friday¹ and the Harriman-Hailsham mission on July 15.

While, as you know, we have always preferred a comprehensive test ban with adequate inspection, we could nevertheless foresee real advantages to the West in even a three-environment test ban particularly as it might affect the Chinese nuclear development.

It is too early to say whether Chairman Khrushchev’s speech can lead to an agreement on any form of test ban. But if such agreement appears possible and if the Soviet Union is to be put in position to make a maximum effort to obtain Chinese compliance, then it seems essential that the French Government join in the agreement. We have been giving some thought as to what President de Gaulle might feel he would need if he is to participate in a test ban. In fact, Ambassador Bohlen has indicated to Couve de Murville that this is an area which we might be prepared to explore.² We recognize, of course, the many complications of this question and we shall wish to keep in close touch with you about it.

We are not clear from Khrushchev’s speech regarding the extent to which he is linking the conclusion of a test ban agreement with a nonaggression pact. This will probably emerge only during the course of the Harriman-Hailsham talks. However, as we are informing the quadripartite ambassadorial group this afternoon, we could not of course make any commitments in a matter on which the NATO Alliance as a whole must move together. As it now seems certain that Khrushchev will raise the question, Harriman will plan to listen and ascertain the Soviet intentions in this regard.

Our own views on this remain the same as I discussed at Ottawa. We believe that a nonaggression pact is worth exploring if, in fact, it could be so designed as to give greater security to Berlin. Pending whatever we may learn as the result of Harriman’s talks, the President and I feel that we should not foreclose full exploration of these possibilities and am hopeful that our governments will keep the question open and not take public positions until this can be done.³

[Here follows discussion of the MLF.]

With every good wish.”⁴

Rusk

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, ORG 7 S. Secret; Operational Immediate. Drafted by Ball; cleared by Rusk (in substance), Richard Davis (EUR), and McGeorge Bundy; and approved by U. Alexis Johnson. Repeated to Paris.
1. That is, the Soviet-PRC meeting on July 5.
2. Telegram 97 to Paris, July 3, instructed Bohlen to “recognize of course that primary purpose of letter to Schroeder was to inform Germans in general terms of your recent conversation with Couve de Murville re nuclear matters before French informed them.” The Department recognized that there was “little incentive for de Gaulle to go along on test ban or NAP,” and stated that while it was inclined to doubt the value of Harriman seeing de Gaulle before the Moscow visit, it wished Bohlen’s opinion in the matter. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-4) In telegram 78 from Paris, July 5, Bohlen stated that he agreed with the Department since “we in effect have nothing new to take up” with de Gaulle. (Ibid., POL 7 Harriman)
3. Circular telegram 25, July 3, indicated that many of the same points were made by Ball in a briefing of the Quadripartite Ambassadorial Group in Washington the evening of July 3, and that this material was also circulated for NATO briefing purposes. (Ibid., POL 15-1 USSR)
4. In telegram 47 from Bonn, July 4, McGhee reported that Schroeder had stated in a preliminary comment on Rusk’s letter that he would try to work discussion of a limited test ban into his talks with de Gaulle although he had “little hope de Gaulle would be responsive. He questioned whether it was realistic to expect that the Soviets would be able to obtain Chinese agreement to a test ban.” (Ibid., DEF 18-4)