Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume VII, Arms Control and Disarmament

300. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State⁰

London, June 27, 1963, 10 p.m.

Secto 15. Eyes only for Harriman and Foster. Secretary reviewed position on test ban and forthcoming mission to Moscow with Foreign Secretary June 27. Home was attended by Heath, Caccia, Godber, Trevelyan and others; Secretary by Franklin Long and Raymond Courtney.¹ Uncleared memcon, subject to revision, follows:

Secretary stressed importance of making strongest effort to obtain agreement with Soviets on comprehensive test ban even though Soviets have given us no reason for encouragement. He noted discussions with Soviets might be initiated by focusing on two points which Soviets alleged are technical but which in fact involve important points of policy—namely, whether existing national detection systems are adequate to detect and identify all significant seismic events and whether inspection would constitute espionage. We hoped to open up a thorough examination of Soviet claims. Possibly we might enter some new terrain if we introduced (1) distinction between seismic and aseismic areas and (2) spreading inspection quota over period of years. Home agreed to importance of making real try to get comprehensive ban. It was agreed that tactically it would be best to avoid debate on numbers of inspection until last and try first to find where understanding on modalities might be possible.

British raised number of points which, although not new nor seeming seriously to question key aspects of Western position, suggested re-examination. Secretary assured him that US had none at all and that it was essential there be a reasonable relation between number of suspicious events and inspections. It was pointed out that small underground tests could have military significance for Soviets. British asked if there were any real risk in some technical advances being made by underground tests since really significant weapons developments would eventually have to be tested in atmosphere before being put into production. Secretary and Dr. Long pointed out this was not necessarily true. Godber suggested we should look again very carefully at size of inspection areas, number of inspectors, composition of teams, number of automatic recording boxes, etc. It was agreed that US and UK experts should make further thorough examination of modalities; Home suggested that Lord Hailsham probably would like to join in such preparatory effort.

Secretary said if it became clear that agreement on comprehensive ban was not possible we might proceed to several alternatives which have been considered, including three environments ban with continued effort on underground ban. Variation of this might include some kind of limitation on underground tests. There was some reason to hope we might be able to get somewhere in this way. British spokesmen expressed doubt. Secretary reaffirmed US could not accept unpoliced moratorium: any agreement to cessation of underground testing for extended period must be accompanied with adequate assurances.

With respect non-proliferation agreement, Secretary pointed out we should be fully prepared to discuss this (and present some comprehensive papers to Soviets both on this and on the test ban) but not try to go too far toward non-proliferation agreement without bringing French in. He also noted we questioned whether Russian assertion that MLF would be obstacle to non-proliferation was as genuine as they made out; probably, rather, their Chinese problem was more important. He also pointed out Soviets probably don’t really understand German unilateral control would be impossible in MLF and that MLF would be measure inhibiting development of further independent nuclear capabilities. With respect non-aggression arrangement or NATO-Warsaw declaration, US felt if we got in sight of test ban or no-transfer arrangement French and German attitudes might change and their veto need not be considered certain.

In summary, it was agreed that although we could not expect to come away from Moscow with anything finished and signed, it was of greatest importance to make most serious try to find whether there could be basis for agreement. If Khrushchev really did not want agreement (and there were indications that this might be the case and that Soviets were intending to resume atmospheric testing) that might come clear. If he did want agreement, the outstanding points of difference probably were not insuperable. In any event, US and UK points of view were very close together. By way of further preparation for mission, experts would proceed with further examination of modalities, and secretaries would prepare joint paper for their principals.²

Bruce

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL/7 US/Harriman. Top Secret; Priority. Repeated to Moscow.
1. First Secretary of the Embassy in the Political Section.
2. In Secto 19 from London, June 28, marked “Eyes Only for President from Secretary,” Rusk stated that because of the “wide range of agreement” reached on the Hailsham-Harriman mission and because further discussions were needed “only on deep technical details of modes of inspection,” he had told Harriman and Foster that they would not need to attend Kennedy’s forthcoming meeting with Macmillan. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 US/Kennedy)