Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume VII, Arms Control and Disarmament

280. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State⁰

Moscow, April 24, 1963, 7 p.m.

2719. Deptel 2244.¹ We were notified just before 3 P.M. we would be received by Khrushchev at 4 P.M. Trevelyan was accompanied by D. Murrell, I by Richard Davies, Political Counselor. Interview lasted one and half hours. Khrushchev was accompanied by Gromyko and interpreter Victor Sukhodrev.

Khrushchev looked relatively restored to health by vacation. During interview he was not unfriendly but firm in reaction which was almost entirely negative. Following short introductory remarks by me, supplemented by Trevelyan, we presented letters.² Khrushchev’s reception was almost one of disinterest. He promptly asked question as to whether letters accepted Sov proposal of three inspections. After Gromyko, who had taken copy of note, said “no”, Khrushchev promptly launched into long negative discourse. It became major effort on part of Trevelyan and myself to make him read the messages at all. After he did so he reiterated negative position, saying there was nothing new in letters, nothing positive or constructive and that they provided “no basis for agreement”. I argued case at considerable length, repeating points in letter and in Deptel 2190³ and Trevelyan supplemented my efforts. Khrushchev did not really budge. He commented that Foreign Ministers had already met many times. Perhaps it would be useful for three Heads of Govt to meet but not under such conditions as those contained in these letters. At one point he reiterated that Germany was key to everything and that the nuclear test ban really had no importance. It would not be helpful to US and USSR who had tested sufficiently, would not deter others from testing and developing nuclear capabilities and would not relieve tensions. He was angry with himself—and he was the one who was responsible—for having made mistake of offering three inspections. However, he finally said govt would consider letters and decide whether to stick to offer of three which they certainly could not extend or go back to position of no inspections at all which was their real position and which he personally favored. It was possible others in govt would have different views.

At end of conversation, we told him no intention publish letter for time being or mention fact of its existence and delivery. We then agreed press line containing reference to Khrushchev’s having received us at our request, naming participants and stating only: “Questions related to the banning of nuclear weapons tests were discussed”.

Full report follows.⁴

Dept repeat as desired.

Kohler

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL UK-USSR. Secret; Operational Immediate; Eyes Only.
1. Not printed. (Ibid.)
2. See Document 276.
3. See footnote 1, Document 276.
4. Telegram 2720 from Moscow, April 25. (Department of State, Central Files, POL UK-USSR) See the Supplement.