Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume VII, Arms Control and Disarmament

277. Memorandum for the Record⁰

Washington, April 17, 1963.

SUBJECT

• Meeting of Principals—4:00 p.m.—17 April, 1963¹
• Sec/State Conference Room

ATTENDING

• Secretaries Rusk, McNamara, Mr. Nitze, General Taylor, Mr. Wiesner, Mr. Kaysen, Mr. McCone and others

[Here follows a brief discussion of East Germany.]

2. Foster opened discussion of the new treaty.² He explained that no important modifications had been made.

3. Rusk reported the following policy questions:

1. Is a satisfactory test ban treaty in the best interests of the United States from a security and political point of view?

2. Is it true that there is no reason to believe that the Soviets really want a treaty? There is no evidence of Soviet flexibility nor are the Soviets keenly interested in the test ban treaty negotiations.

4. McNamara answered he believes a test ban is in our interests. He stated however there is too much discussion of the subject and urged we avoid public statements and not engage in controversial discussions. Foster said these could not be avoided.

5. General Taylor, speaking for the Chiefs, stated that a test ban was not in our national interests and they opposed the test ban. The fact there was no threshold was a bad feature in the Chiefs’ view. Also there was not adequate safeguard provisions.³

6. There followed a long exchange of views regarding publicity. Rusk insisted that we stand on our present position and stop making changes and giving the appearance that we are trying hard to reach an agreement. McNamara stated that recent publicity had hardened opposition on the Hill but he felt it was not very strong.

7. There was an exchange of views on who was appearing before the Stennis Committee.⁴ Apparently several representatives from ACDA and DOD have been called up and had discussed the test suspension with the staff in preparations to the Committee hearings. It was agreed these appearances should be carefully coordinated. Bundy undertook this task.

8. Throughout the discussions Bundy, Seaborg and McCone did not express themselves, either for or against the test ban treaty. Neither did anyone else. The only ones who stated their positions were McNamara and Taylor and Rusk, who was less positive than McNamara, and appeared somewhat lukewarm to the treaty.

9. McCone asked if the 205 report⁵ could be sanitized and released. The answer was “no”. Kaysen then asked if I would discuss with the 205 Committee the possibility of their preparing a declassified memorandum and also a confidential memorandum to set forth the relative positions of the U.S. and the USSR in the field of nuclear weaponry. I agreed to examine this but stated I was afraid any such memorandum would lead to probing questions which would necessitate further disclosures of military Secret or Restricted Data information.

10. There followed a detailed discussion of the treaty Annex having to do with Plowshare.

11. Dr. Seaborg stated that Plowshare was more important than formerly thought in that great progress had been made in the last two years and there were a vast number of active projects under study. He stated that the treaty provided revelation and that this was not possible because it would involve revealing advanced weapon technology and therefore urged modification to the treaty Annex by elimination of the revelation plan. He suggested that each signator of the treaty be given authority for 5 or 6 peaceful shots per year to prove out methods but that there be no revelation of these devices, which would run about 50 kilotons, and about 5 years hence when we are ready to proceed with an active project, treaty terms could be reconsidered. There was great objection to this and a long discussion ensued.

12. McCone observed that this was an old argument [text obscured—and should?] be resolved. I stated that we must choose between a test ban or our Plowshare program and that we cannot have both. This was agreed by most present although Seaborg took some exception.

13. Secretary Rusk then stated that we either are in a race or we are to have a treaty. He seemed to feel, although he did not express it, that a treaty was unobtainable and that we are probably in a race. He said he felt our last series of tests were mediocre and furthermore that we are now inhibited by a feeling that we are approaching a test ban agreement and therefore we were not aggressively pursuing the new and expanding scientific horizons to be developed in further testing. He urged Defense and AEC to pursue this more energetically. McNamara agreed and said he thought we should develop a program, establish a date, and apply all possible energy and imagination to a future test program. He seemed to agree with Rusk that this had not been done in the past. At this point I explained that most recent intelligence indicated the Soviets were expanding their nuclear capability and stated that CIA was to put out a report on this subject in the next few days.

0. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI Memos for Record, 4/15-6/4/63. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by McCone on April 18.
1. For Seaborg’s account of this meeting, see Document 278. Goodby’s memorandum of this meeting and a summary of actions taken are in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, ACDA, Committee of Principals 3/61-11/63. Both are in the Supplement.
2. Reference is to the draft comprehensive test ban treaty dated March 23; see footnote 1, Document 272.
3. According to Goodby’s memorandum, Taylor stated that the Chiefs “believed that a treaty without a seismic threshhold would be unsatisfactory and would not be conducive to the promotion of the national interest. He was not certain whether the President had taken a final decision on these matters and, of course, did not intend to take issue with decisions already made.”
4. The Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee, whose Chairman was John Stennis of Mississippi.
5. See Document 250. The final report has not been found.