Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume VII, Arms Control and Disarmament

274. Message From President Kennedy to Chairman Khrushchev⁰

Washington, April 11, 1963.

Dear Mr. Chairman: It has been some time since I have written you directly, and I think it may be helpful to have some exchange of views in this private channel. As we have both earlier agreed, it is of great importance that we should try to understand each other clearly, so that we can avoid unnecessary dangers or obstacles to progress in the effort for peaceful agreements.

On the negotiations for a nuclear test ban, I fear that there may have been an honest misunderstanding between us. You and your representatives, on a number of occasions, have made clear your belief that on our side there had been some indication last year of a readiness to accept the number of inspections which you proposed in your message of December 19.¹ I know that the United States Government never adopted any such position, and I have the most direct assurances from all my senior representatives that no such American position was ever indicated by them. But I have respect for your representatives, too, and so believe that there was an honest misunderstanding on this point. I can assure you that we are not engaged in any effort to impose a one-sided or arbitrary view on this matter. We continue to believe that an agreement to end nuclear testing is deeply in the interest of our two countries. Prime Minister Macmillan and I hope to be able to make new suggestions to you on this matter very soon.

A closely connected question is the spread of nuclear weapons, and on this question the American position remains as it has been. We are strongly against the development of additional national nuclear capabilities, and the plans and proposals which we are considering for the future management of the nuclear forces of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization are all based upon this principle. I regret that the formal communication which Mr. Gromyko passed to Ambassador Kohler a few days ago² reaches quite different conclusions as to the meaning of these events. I shall not reply to that paper here, but let me say clearly that you can rely upon our continued and determined opposition to the spread of national nuclear forces.

Neither the multinational nor the multilateral forces we are considering will increase the dangers of diffusion. Both are intended to reduce those dangers. The plan for a multinational nuclear force implies no change in present arrangements for the ultimate political control of existing nuclear weapons systems, and it is a fundamental principle in our support for a new multilateral force that no such force could ever be used without the consent of the United States. The concept of this force is therefore exactly opposite to that of independent national nuclear forces, and the opposition to it in the West comes precisely from those who would prefer the expansion of independent nuclear forces.³

[Here follows discussion of Cuba and Laos.]

There are other issues and problems before us, but perhaps I have said enough to give you a sense of my own current thinking on these matters. Let me now also offer the suggestion that it might be helpful if sometime in May I should send a senior personal representative to discuss these and other matters informally with you. The object would not be formal negotiations, but a fully frank, informal exchange of views, arranged in such a way as to receive as little attention as possible.⁴ If this thought is appealing to you, please let me know your views on the most convenient time.⁵

In closing, I want again to send my warm personal wishes to you and all your family. These are difficult and dangerous times in which we live, and both you and I have grave responsibilities to our families and to all of mankind. The pressures from those who have a less patient and peaceful outlook are very great—but I assure you of my own determination to work at all times to strengthen world peace.⁶

0. Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 77 D 163, Kennedy-Khrushchev 1963. Top Secret. Attached to an April 11 memorandum from Thompson to Rusk, Ball, and McGeorge Bundy, in which Thompson wrote that he had delivered the note to Dobrynin that afternoon and had told Dobrynin that no decision had been made as to who the “senior personal representative” mentioned in the message might be. Dobrynin replied that the Soviets would therefore probably make no comment other than on the timing of the visit until they learned more. For the full text of this letter, see vol. VI, Document 92.
1. See Document 251.
2. This note, dated April 8, was transmitted in telegram 2527 from Moscow, April 8. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF MLF 6)
3. Documentation on the U.S. proposal for a multilateral force is in volume XIII.
4. Thompson had raised this idea with Dobrynin in a conversation on April 6. “Dobrynin said, without hesitation, that he thought it would be a very good idea.” Pressed by Dobrynin, Thompson had mentioned Rusk, Robert Kennedy, and Harriman as possible emissaries and stated that he “understood” that the President would send Chairman Khrushchev a letter the following week. (Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 77 D 163, Kennedy-Khrushchev 1963)
5. Khrushchev replied on April 30. Since by this time he had received the joint Kennedy/Macmillan letter (see Document 276), he stated that he would defer discussion of test ban issues to his reply to that letter. In his April 30 message, Khrushchev argued against deployment of nuclear weapons to the territory of NATO countries and discussed Cuba and Laos. He accepted the proposal for a personal representative to come to Moscow and suggested the dates of June 10-12. (Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 77 D 163, Kennedy-Khrushchev 1963) This message is printed in volume VI, Document 95.

   In a May 1 memorandum to Rusk, Ball stated that when Dobrynin delivered the April 30 letter to Thompson, he “made it clear that you were the preferred nominee for the task.” (Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 77 D 163, Kennedy-Khrushchev 1963) After further exchanges between Kennedy and Khrushchev, the date of Rusk’s arrival in Moscow was fixed for July 28. (Messages from Kennedy to Khrushchev, May 13 and 29; message from Khrushchev to Kennedy, May 15; all ibid.) These messages are all printed in vol. VI, Documents 97, 98, and 101.

6. Printed from an unsigned copy.