271. Message From Prime Minister Macmillan to President Kennedy0
Dear Friend, Thank you for your message of March
281 about Nuclear Tests, which I have carefully
studied.
I quite agree that we are in a period of some uncertainty and that Khrushchev is preoccupied with his Chinese
problem. This may make him unwilling to move unless he can see the
possibility of substantial progress in the policy of peaceful co-existence
with the West to which he is committed. At the same time, if he is convinced
that we are making a serious attempt at least to solve the nuclear test
question, he may be attracted by the idea of making a start here. He might
hope that an agreement on one subject might lead on to the solution of
others, thereby leaving him a freer hand inside the Sino-Soviet bloc. At any
rate I do not see how we can be sure what his reactions will be unless we
make an approach to him; even if he turns it down we shall be in a better
position than if we just do nothing. I agree, therefore, that it would be
worth now trying the effect of a joint letter from us to Khrushchev on the nuclear tests issue. At
the same time I doubt if an approach on the lines which you suggested will
be sufficiently attractive to move Khrushchev, and if our
[Page 664]
initiative is to have any chance of success we must,
in my view, phrase our letter somewhat differently. I have tried my hand at
the sort of letter which might be sent and I enclose my draft for your
consideration.
There are various considerations which I have taken into account in my
re-draft of the message to Khrushchev. First of all, I feel that if we are to attract him
at all we ought not to write a letter of a character which Khrushchev might interpret as an attempt to
involve him in technical arguments; in other words, we should not give the
impression that we are trying to get him to concede to us in advance points
which his negotiators have not agreed. I do not, therefore, think that it is
wise to concentrate on the content of the test ban treaty; it seems better
to speak in more general terms. Secondly, I doubt if Khrushchev regards the Geneva 18-nation
conference with much more reverence than de
Gaulle has shown, and I do not think that he will take our
joint letter seriously if we propose in it that the 18-nation meeting should
be the forum for discussion between us. Finally, I am afraid that Khrushchev does not have the same respect
as we do for Foreign Ministers. You will remember that last year Khrushchev seemed to lose interest in the
Geneva conference when we suggested meeting at Foreign Ministers’ level, and
we know how little importance he attaches to Gromyko. So I do not think that he will be intrinsically
attracted to the idea of a Foreign Ministers’ meeting. In addition, it seems
to me that in present circumstances a Foreign Ministers’ meeting has all the
disadvantages of arousing publicity and expectations, so that, in fact, it
would be almost impossible to keep discussions at such a meeting really
confidential for long. So it seems likely to fall between two stools; it
would neither be secret nor decisive. I think, therefore, that it is better
not to mention it at all.
I have thought a great deal about your point of not mixing up two ideas. Of
course to speak of nuclear tests and non-dissemination agreement in the same
breath is not quite the same, for example, as bargaining Cuba against
Berlin, for after all tests and non-dissemination are closely related
aspects of the same subject which is the control of nuclear power in the
world. At the same time I quite see that a non-dissemination agreement at
the moment may present great difficulties with the French as well as with
the Chinese. I do believe, however, that it must have considerable
attractions for Khrushchev as well as
for ourselves. So as you will see, I have inserted the idea in my draft of
keeping a link between the two subjects, but without giving any very precise
formula.
If you are able to agree something on the lines of my suggestions, two other
points arise; the timing of the letter and the method of its delivery. As
regards timing, the position may be complicated by the proposed Memorandum
which the eight neutral nations in Geneva have been thinking of putting
forward. It may be that they will agree on their proposal by about the end
of this week, and in that case I think that we
[Page 665]
should time our letter to arrive a day or two after
the neutrals have made their move. I understand, however, that there is some
disagreement among the neutrals and that they may after all either not put
in a Memorandum at all or delay it until after Easter. If by about April 8
or 9 we know that the neutral Memorandum will be delayed, then I think that
we should put in our letter anyway.
The method of presentation also needs careful thought. I must say that I am
still attracted by the idea of our sending some personal emissary or
emissaries to Khrushchev to explain
our joint position and to emphasize the genuine seriousness with which we
are approaching this question. If you thought this a good idea the best
course might perhaps be to mention at the end of our letter, or in a
separate oral communication to be made at the time of its delivery by our
Ambassadors that a named individual or individuals will be in Moscow in a
few days’ time and would be able to discuss and elaborate on the letter if
Khrushchev would be
available.
I await your thoughts with keen anticipation.
With warm regards,
Enclosure
Draft Message to Mr. Khrushchev
Dear Mr. Chairman, You will recall that in February and March 1962, we
had some correspondence about the Geneva disarmament conference, and in
particular about the possibility of reaching agreement on the text of a
treaty to ban nuclear tests. Both President Kennedy/Mr. Macmillan and I pledged ourselves to take a personal
interest in the progress of this conference on which so many of the
hopes of mankind have been fixed. Last October we both indicated in
messages to you our intention to devote renewed efforts to the problem
of disarmament with particular reference to the proliferation of nuclear
weapons and the banning of nuclear tests.
Since then the Geneva meeting has continued but it has not reached the
point of definite agreement. Nevertheless, some encouraging
[Page 666]
advance has been made. For
example, your acceptance of the principle of on-the-spot verification of
unidentified events has been of great value. Equally, the Western
countries have been able to reduce the number of annual inspections for
which they felt it essential to ask, from about twenty down to seven.
The difference remaining is of course real and substantial, if only
because it presents in practical form the effects of two different lines
of reasoning. At the same time the actual difference between the three
inspections which you have proposed and the seven for which we are
asking, important though this is, should not be impossible to resolve.
As regards the automatic seismic stations, the difference between us
appears to be fairly narrow.
We all have a duty to consider what are the needs of security; but we
also have a duty to humanity. President Kennedy/Mr. Macmillan and I therefore believe that we ought to make
a further serious attempt by the best available means to see if we
cannot bring this matter to a conclusion with your help.
We know that it is argued that a nuclear tests agreement, although
valuable and welcome especially in respect of atmospheric tests, will
not by itself make a decisive contribution to the peace and security of
the world. There are, of course, other questions between us which are
also of great importance; but the question of nuclear tests does seem to
be one on which agreement might now be reached. The mere fact of an
agreement on one question will inevitably help to create confidence and
so facilitate other settlements. In addition, it is surely possible that
from agreement on a treaty to end nuclear tests we might be able to
proceed rapidly to specific and fruitful discussions about the
non-dissemination of nuclear weapons. This would involve an undertaking
from non-nuclear countries not to accept nuclear weapons from others for
their independent use, and from nuclear powers not to give nuclear
weapons or information for the independent use of non-nuclear countries.
Such an agreement, if it was reasonably well supported by other
countries, would seem to us likely to have a profound effect upon the
present state of tension in the world. If it proved possible these two
matters might even, if desired, be brought to a conclusion
simultaneously. Thereafter an advance to broader agreements might open
up.
The practical question is how best to proceed. It may be that further
discussions would reveal new possibilities from both sides as regards
the arrangements for the quota of inspections. But if we attempted to
reach this point by the present methods both sides may feel unable to
make an advance because this would appear to be surrendering some point
of substance without obtaining a final agreement on a definite treaty in
exchange. At the moment it is not only the question of numbers which
holds us up, but we also have to agree on the final content of the draft
treaty and in particular to decide certain important questions as to
[Page 667]
how inspection is to be
carried out. You have taken the view that once the quota is agreed the
other matters can easily be settled, whereas we feel that the final
agreement about the number of inspections is unlikely to be possible
unless most of the other matters have been first disposed of. Thus we
have reached an impasse.
We should be interested to hear your suggestions as to how we are to
break out of this. For our part we would be quite prepared now to
arrange a private tripartite discussion. In order to emphasize the
serious spirit in which we wish to talk and to facilitate agreement we
suggest that this discussion should be held in secret. It might perhaps
best be conducted at Geneva by our chief representatives. Could not the
questions which remain to be settled be further examined so that we who
bear the ultimate responsibility for decisions on this matter will have
clearly before us all the major problems which remain to be settled? If
we could make progress here we might then be able to envisage a meeting
of the three of us in order to try to settle finally any outstanding
points of a general kind dealing with the way in which a test ban
verification system would operate as well as to determine the numbers of
inspections which would be permitted. This seems to us to be the most
practical method of proceeding. It is certainly likely, indeed probable,
that a meeting of the three of us would be necessary in order to reach a
final decision; but for obvious reasons it would be wise first to
advance the preliminary work which would ensure that there would be no
purely technical reasons why we should not be able to decide the final
points in a meeting together. It is of course obvious that a meeting
which resulted in a test ban treaty would open a new chapter in our
relations, as well as providing an opportunity for wider
discussions.
We sincerely trust that you will give serious consideration to this
proposal. We believe that the nuclear tests agreement and what may
follow from it is the most hopeful area in which to try for agreement
between us. The procedure which we have suggested seems to us the most
practical way of achieving a result which would be welcomed all over the
world.
