Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume VII, Arms Control and Disarmament

215. Telegram From the Delegation to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee to the Department of State⁰

Geneva, August 7, 1962, 7 p.m.

Disto 716. For Secretary and Foster from Dean. Re: Todis 469.¹ As indicated in recent delegation telegrams, my presentation of new US test ban position to Zorin has stressed that Soviet acceptance in principle of obligatory on-site inspections is key to successful negotiation on other outstanding questions. Following instructions reftel, I have also avoided details. To extent possible, regarding arrangements for control posts and for international supervision thereof which the United States might be prepared to accept. I have, of course, confirmed to Zorin that “US believed that as practical matter there would have to be international officials at control posts” (Disto 709)² and I will not hesitate to repeat this if point is again directly raised. However, the main focus has been on the scientific necessity for firm commitments regarding on-site inspection.

We had assumed that for this phase of work on test ban Zorin would not only marshal arguments against obligatory inspection, but would also zero in on US insistence that there be international resident supervisors at control posts on Soviet territory to support Soviet allegation that US position has not substantially changed. However, initial informal comments by Zorin (though this line could be greatly changed at formal meetings) have not paid much attention to matter of resident supervisors, but have attacked entire US proposal that nationally manned control posts be subject to international integration, coordination, and supervision. He has, in informal session, attacked idea that international scientific commission could give directives to host country nationals operating control posts regarding procedures of work, training, use of instrumentation, etc.

We believe that if Zorin persists on this tack, we will find it very useful to focus on broad principle of integrated international control network as well as on broad principle of obligatory inspection. If eight-nation April 6 memo is clear on anything, it states that the international commission is to get data from national stations and to arrange for their equipping in modern fashion when necessary. Moreover, agreements are to be made to cover the use of existing stations in the worldwide system. Soviet position which denies any shadow of authority to international commission to coordinate and standardize operations of numerous national posts will be vulnerable and we believe it would be tactically advantageous to capitalize on this aspect of Soviet inflexibility just as much as on Soviet rejection of obligatory inspection. Moreover, such course would minimize divergences with UK and make it easier for them to give full support to our general position. If question is specifically raised by others, we will, of course, repeat our position that international supervisors will have to be in residence at control posts, but Godber advises that if this is done at subcommittee on Thursday,³UKDel will have to say their scientists disagree both as to necessity Soviet control posts and necessity resident inspectors for improving quality scientific data. Therefore, we have agreed play specifics on international scientists in residence in very low key unless Zorin’s tactics require otherwise.

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.12-GE/8-762. Secret; Limit Distribution.
1. Document 211.
2. Dean held private meetings with Zorin on August 5 and 6. A summary of their August 5 meeting was transmitted in Disto 702, August 5. (Department of State, Central Files, 700.5611/8-562) A summary of the August 6 meeting is Disto 709, August 6. (Ibid.)
3. August 9.