Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume VII, Arms Control and Disarmament

205. Memorandum From the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Foster) to President Kennedy⁰

Washington, July 30, 1962.

SUBJECT

• U.S. Program Regarding a Treaty to Ban Nuclear Weapons Tests and Other Disarmament Proposals (as revised)¹

The Committee of Principals met on July 26, 1962, and with you on July 27, 1962,² to consider issues which are outstanding in the disarmament negotiations now going on in Geneva. At that meeting, we considered various lines of approach with respect to negotiations for a ban on nuclear weapons tests in the light of recent developments of a technical and political nature.

The principal political development has been the tabling, on April 16, 1962, of a memorandum by the eight non-NATO, non-Warsaw Pact, delegations. This memorandum suggests that nationally operated seismic stations should be the basis of any test ban agreement and contains a statement on on-site inspections which can be interpreted as either obligatory or invitational.

There have been two technical developments. The first was the achievement of a long-range seismic detection capability which will make it possible to detect events in the USSR from stations outside the country. The second was the determination that the number of earthquakes which might produce unidentified events comparable to an underground nuclear test of a given magnitude had been substantially reduced above the previous estimate—by a factor between 4 and 5.

These developments are significant in three respects. First, the increase in the long-range detection capability makes it possible to develop a system of some twenty-five stations, internationally monitored and coordinated but nationally manned and controlled, which would have a detection capability not significantly different from that originally contemplated for the 180 internationally operated stations planned for the “Geneva” system. Second, the decrease in the number of unidentified events with which a detection system will have to cope will make it possible to decrease the number of on-site inspections required for verification. Third, these developments do not provide a way of determining from seismic data that a particular suspicious event was an underground explosion and therefore do not eliminate the requirement of some on-site inspections as an essential element of any system of verification.

On balance, it is my judgment that the over-all risks to the security of the United States would be less under a comprehensive test ban treaty based on the twenty-five detection stations described above and with a number of on-site inspections lower than that we have been discussing in the past than they would be under the indefinite continuation of nuclear testing by the U.S., the U.S.S.R. and other countries. I believe that this conclusion is reinforced by the material submitted to you by the Department of Defense. On balance, however, I would not recommend the ta-bling of such a treaty at the present time. I have three reasons for this latter conclusion.

• First, our thinking on the number of on-site inspections has not progressed to a point where there is any particular number lower than the figure of 12-20, which is now on the table, which we could defend against both the neutrals who would want it lower and the congressional critics who would say it is too low already.
• Second, as long as the Soviet Government holds to its present position that there should be no on-site inspections, there are disadvantages to talking specific numbers lower than those discussed before.
• Third, domestic opinion, particularly Congressional opinion, is not prepared for such a move. A treaty based on a reduced number of nationally-operated, internationally-monitored seismic stations with a reduced number of on-site inspections represents a substantial scaling down of safeguards that this administration and the prior administration have been insisting was the minimum necessary for national security. It is based on information which has only been available outside of the Department of Defense since July 3 of this year, and this information has been very skeptically received in the legislative branch of the Government. Our best information is that if a modified comprehensive treaty were to be tabled at this time, Congressional leaders, whose support would be essential at the time of ratification if agreement were to be reached, would take public positions adverse to the proposals. Similarly, the tabling of a modified comprehensive treaty now without further domestic political preparations might result in their becoming an issue in the fall Congressional elections.

On the basis of these considerations, I recommend the following course of action:

a. Atmospheric test ban. The United States should table an atmospheric-outer space-underwater test ban treaty.

b. Comprehensive Test Ban. At the time of tabling an atmospheric-outer space-underwater test ban treaty the United States should declare its willingness to accept a comprehensive test ban treaty involving internationally-monitored national control posts on Soviet soil and involving a possible reduction in the number of on-site inspections. We should be prepared to provide the Conference³ with as much recent data as we can relating to detection, location and identification capabilities of internationally-monitored and coordinated “national” systems while making the point that this data does not eliminate the need for on-site inspections. We should avoid proposing specific numbers either of stations or of on-site inspections on the ground that we see no point in suggesting or debating details or numbers until the Soviet Union accepts the principle of on-site inspections.

c. Soviet testing. In the event the Soviet commences an atmospheric series we should continue to indicate willingness to negotiate in both areas (a) and (b) above but should indicate that we might wish to conduct further tests ourselves if the Soviet series produced extraordinary results.

d. Domestic political preparation. The decision to table a revised comprehensive treaty should await the developments both at Geneva and in this country. A major campaign of domestic information and political preparation should be begun as to the new data and its significance.

e. No-transfer agreement. The United States should press for a world-wide agreement banning the transfer or acquisition of nuclear weapons or nuclear technology. This course of action would be related practically, but not organically, to the other courses of action.

f. Underground testing. We should continue our underground testing program until a comprehensive treaty has been achieved.

g. Readiness to test in the atmosphere. We should, to the extent feasible, maintain readiness to test in the atmosphere. This will involve discussions with the U.K. as to the continuing readiness of Christmas Island as a test site.

William C. Foster⁴

0. Source: Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 69 D 121, Atomic Energy—Armaments 62. Confidential. Copies were distributed to the Principals under cover of a July 30 memorandum from Foster, which is attached to the source text.
1. Regarding the revised version, see footnote 4 below.
2. See Documents 201 and 203.
3. The only change in the revised version was the substitution in this paragraph of the words, “We should be prepared to provide the Conference” for “We should, at the same time, provide the Conference”. A copy of the earlier draft, also dated July 30, is in Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/7-3062. According to a July 30 memorandum from Foster to the President, attached to another copy of the revised version, “The revision is one of emphasis in playing down the significance of the presentation of scientific data made by technical people. It has been made after consultation with the Secretary of State and Ambassador Dean.” (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Kaysen Series, Disarmament, Nuclear Testing, Vol. II, 7/62-2/63)
4. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.