Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume VII, Arms Control and Disarmament

187. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

Washington, May 30, 1962, 10 a.m.

SUBJECT

• Disarmament

PARTICIPANTS

• Anatoli Dobrynin, Ambassador of the USSR
• Georgi M. Kornienko, Counsellor of Soviet Embassy
• The Secretary
• Foy D. Kohler, Assistant Secretary
• Martin J. Hillenbrand, Director, Office of German Affairs

The Secretary said he would like to add some comments on one or two other problems affecting the general situation.¹ We did not fully understand why there seems to have been a tightening up of the situation. From our point of view, this seems to have been coming from the East, not from the attitudes or hopes of the West in these matters. Organically, there was no connection between Berlin and disarmament negotiations, but in the broadest political sense it was inevitable that these matters should influence each other. A crisis over Berlin would obviously have the gravest implications for disarmament. If there were movement on the one, there could be movement on the other in the sense that there would be mutual reinforcement for the effort to bring about normalization and reduction of tensions.

We have made, the Secretary continued, what we consider important disarmament proposals. The Soviets have also made certain proposals. These present many points of difference but they also contain some important points of agreement. We would hope that we could move towards actual disarmament. It was not clear how the Soviet Government planned to proceed in this matter if its idea was all or nothing. We still have the problem of how we move from where we are to general and complete disarmament. This was a highly complex question involving the factor of safety for both sides.

At a later point in the conversation, Dobrynin stated that his Government likewise felt the seriousness of developments in other areas. The Secretary was aware of how the disarmament situation stood. The two countries agreed on one thing, namely that the security of both countries had to be respected. The basic concept was that when the first stage of disarmament had been completed, there would be no relationship of advantage or disadvantage and both sides would have the same amount of security. He could agree that there was no direct connection between disarmament and the Berlin problem, but that they were related. The settlement of the Berlin question would obviously have an effect on disarmament in the situation. If the Secretary wished to discuss any matters arising out of the Zorin-Dean talks, or if the Secretary had any concrete proposals how these matters could be handled better, he would be prepared to engage in such discussions.

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.6112/5-3062. Secret. Drafted by Hillenbrand and approved in S on May 31. The meeting was held in the Secretary’s office.
1. A memorandum of the Secretary’s conversation with Dobrynin on Germany and Berlin on this occasion is printed in vol. XV, pp. 161–172. A memorandum of their conversation on Laos is in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, USSR, Dobrynin Talks, Vol. I.