Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume VII, Arms Control and Disarmament

178. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

Washington, April 27, 1962.

SUBJECT

• Nuclear Testing

PARTICIPANTS

• Anatoli Dobrynin, Ambassador of the USSR
• Georgi M. Kornienko, Counselor of the Soviet Embassy
• The Secretary
• Foy D. Kohler, Assistant Secretary

The Secretary reviewed the vital interests of the West in the Berlin situation: the presence of our forces and of access to West Berlin and the freedom of West Berlin to have whatever arrangements with others which were important to its continued free life and viability.¹ These were the more immediate questions and then there were broader ones. He referred to Gromyko’s comment on the fact that there is some interdependence between progress on disarmament and progress on Berlin. In this connection he wanted Mr. Dobrynin to know that the United States was very serious in its approach to the disarmament question; this was equally true as regards nuclear testing and the United States would be happy to sign a satisfactory agreement on this subject, for example, this afternoon. Other broader questions about which he had talked with Mr. Gromyko in Geneva included the questions of diffusion of nuclear weapons, of boundaries and of non-aggression. The American side had repeatedly said that if the question of the vital interests could be disposed of, we considered that the others would easily fall into place. He observed, however, that Mr. Gromyko had repeated a demand for an end to the Occupation as an essential condition and if this were so, then Mr. Gromyko’s reference to obstacles in the way of an agreement was an understatement. On the question of access, both sides had put up proposals for an International Access Authority. Perhaps some progress could be made if these were discussed on the basis of the essential needs on both sides. He pointed out that the United States had tried to take into account the fact that the USSR had put forward over several years public positions with respect to Germany and Berlin. He pointed out that the United States had also made proposals. It was clear that these proposals on both sides were unacceptable and he had discussed with Mr. Gromyko in Geneva the question of how we manage a state of disagreement. This was why the United States had put forward its working paper on “Draft Principles” which had deliberately omitted certain points of interest to both sides but provided a means for continuing to try to talk out these disagreed matters.² The Secretary said frankly he did not see how we could be expected to go much further without knowing where we stand on the central issues. As he had told Mr. Gromyko, the matter of diffusion of nuclear weapons was a US national policy which we applied even to our own allies, with the single exception of the UK which had been an original partner with us in atomic development. In general, therefore, we found ourselves in a situation where the broader range of questions was subject to some movement and improvement. This brought us down to essential elements which were really, in the case of Berlin, the matter of our presence there and, in the case of disarmament, the question of verification. These were the keys which would unlock a whole series of possibilities. For the moment he would leave aside the disarmament aspect. He could, of course, repeat all that we had said in many conversations about our presence in West Berlin, but the Ambassador already knew our position. After the Ambassador confirmed that he did, the Secretary commented that since Mr. Dobrynin was a new participant in these talks perhaps he could bring some fresh air into them. Laughing, Mr. Dobrynin observed that he had his instructions. He then went on to say that he understood the Secretary was not directly linking the problems of Berlin and of disarmament. The Secretary confirmed this was the case and Dobrynin said that similarly the USSR was not linking the two. He said he thought the relationship between them had been made very clear in Mr. Khrushchev’s statement. The Secretary agreed that this was essentially our own interpretation.

The Secretary said he wanted to call Ambassador Dobrynin’s attention to his statement at his press conference yesterday³ and to Ambassador Dean’s statement in Geneva on nuclear testing.⁴ He hoped that the Soviet side understood that this question is discussable every day and not just after the completion of the present series of United States tests. There must be some point at which the two sides could agree to acceptable terms on nuclear testing since he could see no interest to either of them in spending billions in a continuing nuclear race.

Ambassador Dobrynin said that the question was on what basis agreement could be reached. He referred to the Secretary’s statement in reply to a question at his press conference about the possibility of an agreement to stop atmospheric testing. He said that the press had discussed this possibility and he had been asked to clarify whether this meant that the United States is disposed to conclude such an agreement limited to atmospheric tests.

The Secretary replied in the negative. He said that in replying to this question he had just not wanted to foreclose the possibility of future developments and to emphasize the importance that we should continue talking on this subject. For example, he said, Mr. Gromyko had told him that the Soviet scientists have improved the instrumentation capable of distinguishing between an underground explosion and an earthquake. Perhaps the Soviet scientists had something that we did not have and maybe it would be a good idea if our scientists could be brought together with them in this connection.

Ambassador Dobrynin said that he understood the Secretary’s position. He had simply wanted to clarify the matter. As he understood it, both sides are ready today only to sign their own treaty proposals.

After indicating his acceptance of the Ambassador’s formulation the Secretary said he wanted to add that we could not accept the Soviet charge that the minimal amount of verification in the US proposals amounted to “espionage.” However, he concluded, if we continue talking all aspects of the matter can be further discussed.

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 711.5611/4-2762. Secret. Drafted by Kohler and approved in S on May 11.
1. A 7-page memorandum of the conversation on Berlin is ibid., 762.00/4-2762. A telegraphic summary is printed in vol. XV, pp. 121–122.
2. Reference is to a paper handed to Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko at Geneva on March 22; for text, see ibid., pp. 69–71.
3. For extracts of Rusk’s remarks, see Documents on Disarmament, 1962, vol. I, pp. 462-464.
4. In his statement to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee on April 26, Dean explained the U.S. reasons for resuming nuclear testing in the atmosphere. For text, see ibid., pp. 456-457.