176. Editorial Note

Glenn Seaborg sent a letter to President Kennedy on April 12, 1962, requesting the President’s approval of the proposed atmospheric testing program of 26 shots, plus 2 contingency shots. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Nuclear Weapons Testing, 4/5/62-7/30/62) See the Supplement. The National Security Council met on April 18 from 12:15 to 12:45 p.m. in the Cabinet Room of the White House to review this proposal. A memorandum from McGeorge Bundy to the President, April 18, presented the agenda for this NSC meeting and reviewed the issues for decision and the options available to the President. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSC Meetings, 1962, No. 499)

Seaborg summarized the NSC meeting as follows:

“The President opened the meeting by asking Secretary McNamara to discuss the proposed Polaris and Atlas systems proof tests. The Secretary described the need for the Polaris test and the nature of the test, and said he recommended its inclusion. He said that the Atlas test presented some problems with respect to the possibilities of an abort and the effect that this would have on the public confidence in it as a system. He also said that there could be a small, but negligible, health hazard in connection with such a test. In view of this and other factors, he said that he would like more time to study the matter.

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Lemnitzer spoke in favor of the inclusion of both tests. He showed a number of charts which pictured the locale and described in some detail the nature of the Atlas and Polaris tests.

“I described briefly the safety considerations with respect to the Atlas test, indicating that it probably did not present a real health hazard but that there certainly were public relations problems involved.

“The President then asked me to discuss the proposed surface shot in Nevada. I said that this is a shot in which both DOD and AEC have an interest, that it is an effects test that has to be conducted in the atmosphere and has to be conducted over dry land because its aim is to meas-ure the effects of electromagnetic radiation on electronic instrumentation under possible operating conditions. I said that, in addition, the AEC has the aim of measuring the effect of weapons on weapon component parts.

“The President inquired as to the possibility of a photographer taking a photograph of a mushroom-like cloud and publishing it. He asked whether the cloud would be of that type. I said that it is difficult to describe it accurately in those terms; that some might call it a mushroom and others not. In answer to his further question, I said that it would rise to about 20,000 feet.

Bundy and I indicated that there would have to be at least 24 hours’ notice to the airlines and, hence, it would become publicly known so that possibly photographs could be taken. The President indicated that the shot should be placed at the end of the series, in view of these complicating factors.

“There was then a discussion of the starting date and proposed timing of the announcement. Foster felt that the starting date should not be next Monday (April 23rd) because this is the day of reconvening the group in Geneva, and it seems that Tuesday or Wednesday would, therefore, be indicated.

Rusk suggested, and the President concurred, that the announcement should be by the AEC, and just at the time, without much lead time. I indicated that a definite time has to be set pretty soon, and Haworth added that 5 days lead time is needed, to which the President replied that we will be given a starting date with that much lead time.” (Seaborg, Journal, volume 3, pages 421, 425)

NSC Action No. 2450, April 18, recorded the following decisions reached at this meeting;

  • “a. Discussed the spring 1962 nuclear atmospheric test series proposed by the Department of Defense and the Atomic Energy Commission.
  • “b. Noted the President’s approval of the tests in the attached list with the exception of the Atlas D (MK-49) weapons system test, which is not to be fired pending further study in the Department of Defense.
  • “c. Noted the President’s desire that the 2 KT surface test in Nevada be fired toward the end of the test series.
  • “d. Discussed the timing and announcement of the test series and agreed that announcements of tests would be made in the lowest possible key by the Atomic Energy Commission.”

The attachment cited in paragraph b listed 26 tests plus 2 contingency tests. (Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

In a memorandum for the record of the White House staff meeting on April 19, Colonel Ewell noted:

“i. Bundy laughingly referred to the NSC meeting, and said that it was rather pro forma, that the actual decision had been made five minutes before the meeting in a talk between the President and Mr. McNamara. The meeting itself just went through a ritual discussion of the problem, and I gather that the President made the decision that had already been agreed on. Bundy also said that Secretary Rusk expressed dismay at discussing such a sensitive subject in front of 30 or 40 people. Evidently Ambassador Stevenson had felt that this meeting would afford him a vehicle in which to sound off at length about atmospheric testing, and when it was cut off rather short Bromley Smith was left holding the sack of placating Ambassador Stevenson. This brings to mind the increasing tendency of late to obtain early decisions in the back rooms and corridors of the White House rather than on the floor in formal debate.” (National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Daily Staff Meetings Jan-Apr 62)

The nuclear test series, called Dominic I, consisted of 36 detonations held in the Pacific Ocean area from April 25 to November 3, 1962. The first 27 were held in the vicinity of Christmas Island in the spring and summer. The remaining nine tests were conducted in the Johnston Island area during the fall. (Regarding the last nine shots, see Document 218.) These tests complemented other nuclear test shots, which had been resumed in the continental United States in September 1961. President Kennedy approved additional nuclear tests in the Pacific Ocean area and Nevada on May 8 (memorandum of decision, May 9; Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Nuclear Weapons, Testing, 4/5/62-7/30/62) and June 20 (see Document 189).

On May 10, President Kennedy requested Prime Minister Macmillan’s approval of two of the proposed tests in the Christmas Island area (memorandum from Bundy to Ormsby Gore, May 10; Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Nuclear Weapons, Testing, 5/62), and Ambassador Ormsby Gore conveyed the Prime Minister’s oral approval to Bundy on May 16. (Memorandum for the record, May 18; ibid., Additional Tests, 5/62) Bundy requested the Prime Minister’s assent for another Christmas Island air drop shot on July 7. (Letter from [Page 442] Bundy to Ormsby Gore, July 2; ibid., 5/6-7/30/62) The British response has not been found, but presumably approval was given because the shot took place on July 11.

President Kennedy was also sensitive to world reactions to the U.S. test series. On June 13, for example, “The President urged Mr. Bundy to see what he could do about getting the nuclear tests outside the atmosphere speeded up and accomplished as fast as possible. He feels that there is too long a delay.” (Memorandum for the record by Clifton, June 13; Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Nuclear Weapons, Testing, Dominic, 2/62-4/62) In a telephone call to Seaborg a day later to put a hold on an above-surface Nevada shot scheduled for June 26, Bundy remarked that “the President would like to have the other high altitude shots over with as soon as possible.” (Seaborg, Journal, volume 3, page 605) And shortly before the June 20 meeting, “Bundy observed that the President is quite keen to end the series and would probably resist stretching it in order to get another high altitude shot.” He added that “everyone but the President seemed to feel that radiation in milk was no real problem. However, the President, like Lincoln, constituted a majority of one in this case.” (Memorandum for the record by Ewell, June 20; National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Daily Staff Meetings, May-Sep 62)

Most of the shots were airdrops, but two were conducted in the open ocean and five were high-altitude bursts launched by rockets. A history of the Pacific series, with emphasis on the participation of Department of Defense personnel, is Operation Dominic I—1962, DNA-6040F (Defense Nuclear Agency, 1983). The dates, location, type, purpose, and yield range of each shot are summarized in Announced United States Nuclear Tests, June 1945 Through December 1990, DOE/NV-209 (Rev. 11) (U.S. Department of Energy, Nevada Operations Office).

The Soviet Union resumed atmospheric nuclear testing in early August 1962.