Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume VII, Arms Control and Disarmament

155. Memorandum From the Acting Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Fisher)⁰

Washington, March 14, 1962.

SUBJECT

• U.S. Position on Disarmament Measures at Geneva Negotiations

The following paper amplifies and supersedes the Memorandum for the File of March 9, 1962 from William C. Foster.¹ It consists of the basic disarmament positions of the United States, as authorized by the President and as discussed by the Committee of Principals, and the status of current work regarding the further development of these positions.

1. The United States will propose an across-the-board cut of 30 per cent in both strategic and conventional weapons in increments of 10 per cent a year over a three-year period. In presenting this position there should be no indication, without further specific authorization by the President, that the reduction of strategic delivery vehicles can be separated from other disarmament measures for the purpose of being negotiated as a separate measure.

2. With respect to strategic weapons this cut is to be both in numbers and in total destructive capability, of which total full loaded weight is a possible yardstick. The cuts in strategic delivery vehicles are to be in two categories: the present thinking is to divide them between intercontinental systems and less than intercontinental systems. However, since this distinction is still under study, the U.S. delegation at Geneva has been instructed to use a more general formulation such as: the strategic delivery vehicles “will be divided into categories which reflect the realities of the military situation.” To develop the above a paper is in preparation which deals with the definitions of the intercontinental systems and the less than intercontinental systems, including what weapons come under each category.² The paper also deals with the use of gross weight as a measure of the destructive carrying capacity of each United States and Soviet vehicle to be included in the above two categories. Included in this paper will be tables of what reductions might look like when the double 30 per cent is applied to all vehicles in the above two categories.

3. Production of strategic delivery vehicles and other armaments would be limited in Stage I to some percentage of the number of vehicles and armaments in the inventories of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. at the beginning date of Stage I. In preparation is a paper on the limitation on production using (a) 5, 10, 15, and 20 as possible percentages of inventory in the category, and (b) numbers of systems in the category.³ Some data on DOD planned production rates has been obtained, but its completeness and long-term validity is doubtful. Also, NASA is being asked to furnish ACDA with planned rates for use of vehicles for peaceful uses and exploration of outer space. The Federal Aviation Agency will be asked to supply certain information in the event we need to make statements regarding the production of aircraft for peaceful purposes. Finally, ACDA is preparing a paper on the extent to which the testing of missiles, aircraft, and other armaments would be permitted in connection with the various schemes for limiting and halting production.⁴ With respect to all of the above, the present U.S. position is that all production of new and improved armaments and testing of new and improved armaments would be halted in Stage II. Included in the production study by ACDA will be recommendations regarding the extent to which the same percentage formulas for limiting strategic delivery vehicle production can be applied to limitations on the production of other armaments.

4. On armaments other than strategic delivery vehicles reductions will be according to categories specified in the March 3 Memorandum to the President.⁵ Reductions within certain of these categories will be by numbers and may be by total weight and any description of the proposal should leave room for either or both of these methods of reduction being applicable. ACDA is preparing a paper in elaboration of the reductions in these categories of armaments.⁶

5. Because inspection for the stockpiles of nuclear warheads and weapons of chemical and biological warfare are now considered so difficult these weapons are not included in the proposed reductions of 30 per cent. To deal with these two groups the U.S. will propose that two international experts commissions be established along the lines indicated in the March 3 Memorandum to the President. ACDA is now preparing papers regarding each of these proposed experts commissions and also ways in which stockpiles of such weapons might be reduced under effective verification.⁷

6. The U.S. should continue to press the proposal of 2.1 million force levels. The U.S. would be prepared to proceed at least through the first stage in the absence of the Chinese Communists although the possibility of a defeasance procedure (comparable to that in the test ban) should be examined. ACDA is completing for government clearance its position paper on the relationship of Communist China to disarmament and the Geneva disarmament negotiations.⁸

7. The U.S. disarmament delegation has been authorized to present to the Conference the concept of an inspection system based on sampling techniques accompanied by progressive zonal techniques. With respect to the entire matter of inspection ACDA is preparing a paper with details, given current knowledge, on the type of inspection which would probably be required for the various disarmament measures in the U.S. plan.⁷ These include inspection for remaining agreed levels of strategic delivery vehicles, remaining agreed levels for other armaments, production facilities (declared and any clandestine) for strategic delivery vehicles and other armaments, production facilities (declared and any clandestine) for fissionable material production, reductions in armed forces, monitoring the testing of missiles, and the establishment of internationally supervised depots for inspection of the destruction of vehicles taken from inventories. Attached to this memorandum is an outline of a verification system based on the progressive zonal concept, which the U.S. delegation may draw as needed.

8. The U.S. will propose that, contingent on agreement on the cut-off of fissionable material for use in weapons, the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. each transfer 50,000 kgs. of U-235 to peaceful purposes. ACDA is preparing a paper to determine whether we could agree to a proportional transfer of U.S. 60,000 kgs. to U.S.S.R. 40,000 kgs. of U-235 and what would be the effects of transfers of various sizes and in various other proportions.⁹

9. The U.S. will propose that the reduction of armaments proposed for Stage I be applied in the same general ratio for Stages II and III.

10. ACDA is preparing additional details on other features of the U.S. disarmament plan including: relationship of military bases and missile sites to reductions in strategic delivery vehicles; means by which reductions can be made in weapons of other NATO and Warsaw Pact countries; and extent to which research and development can be monitored.¹⁰

Attachment

OUTLINE OF A VERIFICATION SYSTEM BASED ON THEPROGRESSIVE ZONAL CONCEPT

A basic position of the U.S. is that whatever measures are agreed to must be subject to verification in order to determine whether the agreed measures are in fact being carried out. It will be apparent that this is the only manner in which disarmament can proceed with the certainty that no state will obtain military advantage during the disarmament process.

A major problem of past general disarmament negotiations has been that there has been no opportunity to explore the key question of verification thoroughly, objectively, and constructively. This Conference provides such an opportunity, and, for its own part, the U.S. is willing to consider seriously any proposed verification system in the light of the degree of assurance of compliance that it would provide and in the light of the significance of possible violations.

For its own part, the U.S. would be prepared to accept from the outset, if others also agreed, a verification system involving total access to all parts of its territory. However, the U.S. has concluded that it may be possible to design an adequate verification system based on the concept that although all parts of the territory of a state should be subject to possible verification from the outset, the extent of the territory actually inspected in any step or stage would bear a relationship to the amount of disarmament and to the degree of risk involved in particular disarmament measures. Under such a system, a program of disarmament might be initiated with limited actual territorial access for verification purposes as long as retained armaments were adequate to provide security against the effects of possible violations. However, assurance that violations were not being committed would have to increase as retained armaments were reduced. Consequently, as disarmament proceeds, actual territorial access would necessarily have to increase.

The U.S. believes that this concept could be implemented by a system of zonal inspection which would be generally applicable to measures limiting or reducing armaments and forces. Such a system might incorporate the following principal features:

1. At the outset of disarmament, each state would declare existing levels of armaments, forces, and activities covered by agreed Stage I measures.

2. Verification of reductions would be conducted at agreed depots. The U.S. contemplates, as a general matter, that the location of such depots might be selected by the host state.

3. Verification of limitations on certain types of activities (such as production) would be carried out at the declared locations of such activities wherever they may be located within the territory of a state.

4. Verification of retained armaments and the search for undeclared armaments or clandestine activities would be accomplished on the following basis:

a. Each state would divide itself into an agreed number of appropriate internal zones and during each step of disarmament would declare the total level of armaments, forces, and specified types of activities subject to verification within each zone. The exact location of armaments and forces within each zone would not need to be revealed.

b. One or more of these internal zones would be subject to unannounced complete inspection in an agreed period of time. During the verification process, arrangements would have to be made to provide assurance against undeclared movements of the objects of verification to or from the zone or zones being inspected. Both aerial and mobile ground inspection would be employed within the zone being inspected. In so far as agreed measures being verified are concerned, access within the zone would have to be free and unimpeded, and verification would have to be carried out with the full cooperation of and without harassment from the state being inspected.

c. Once a zone had been inspected it would remain open for further inspection while verification was being extended to additional zones.

The U.S. believes that if agreement could be reached on a verification system incorporating the features such as the foregoing, such a system should satisfy the interests of all concerned:

• First, from the standpoint of the state being inspected, the extent of its territory actually inspected during the early phases of disarmament would be limited. Moreover, although a number of inspectors would be required in the zone or zones being inspected, the total number of inspectors stationed on the territory of the inspected state would, throughout the disarmament process, be far less than the number that would be required to verify the implementation of disarmament simultaneously in all parts of its territory from the outset.
• Second, at the same time, from the standpoint of effective verification, such an approach would make possible full verification of reductions, full verification of limitations on declared activities (such as production), and, as disarmament proceeds, increasing assurance that no undeclared armaments or forces were retained and that no clandestine activities were being pursued.

The U.S. is prepared to explore at this conference the possibility of designing along the foregoing lines a verification system applicable to an agreed program of disarmament.

0. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Kaysen Series, Disarmament, Basic Memoranda, 2/62-4/62. Confidential. The source text does not indicate to whom this memorandum was sent. An earlier March 13 draft, identical in most points to the text printed here, was sent to Kaysen. (Ibid., Kaysen Series, Disarmament, Position Papers, 2/62-4/62) See the Supplement.
1. Foster’s memorandum for the file, March 9, summarizes decisions on disarmament made at the meeting with the President that day. Several of the points contain handwritten question marks in the margins. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Kaysen Series, Disarmament, Position Papers, 2/62-4/62)
2. See Document 164.
3. See Document 164.
4. See Document 164.
5. See footnote 3, Document 146.
6. Not further identified.
7. Not further identified.
8. Not further identified.
7. Not further identified.
9. Not further identified.
10. The papers have not been found.