152. Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State Rusk, in Geneva0
Washington, March 13,
1962, 8:06 p.m.
Tosec 26. For Sec and Foster. At White House suggestion this telegram is to set forth armament decisions of March 9, 1962 as supplemented by further discussion. It has been approved by the President.
[Page 377]- 1.
- The United States will propose an across-the-board cut of 30 per cent in both strategic and conventional weapons in increments of 10 per cent a year over a three-year period. In presenting this position there should be no indication, without further specific authorization by the President, that the reduction of strategic delivery vehicles can be separated from other disarmament measures for the purpose of being negotiated as a separate measure.
- 2.
- With respect to strategic weapons this cut is to be both in numbers and in total destructive capability, of which total full loaded weight is a possible yardstick. Since the distinction between intercontinental and less than intercontinental is still under study, some more general formulation should be used such as that strategic weapons will be divided into categories which reflect the realities of the military situation.
- 3.
- Production of strategic delivery vehicles and other armaments would be limited in Stage I to some percentage of the number of vehicles and armaments in the inventories of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. at the beginning date of Stage I. Begin FYI. In preparation is a paper on the limitation on production using 5, 10, 15 and 20 as possible percentages for permitting production of new vehicles. End FYI. The percentage should be in addition to production needed for replacement, training and peaceful purposes. With respect to all of the above, Delegation is authorized to propose that all production of new and improved armaments and testing of new and improved armaments would be halted in Stage II.
- 4.
- On armaments other than strategic delivery vehicles reductions will be according to categories specified in the March 3 memorandum to the President.1 Reductions within certain of these categories will be by numbers and by total weight and any description of the proposal should leave room for either or both of these methods of reduction being applicable as later decided to be appropriate.
- 5.
- Because inspection for the stockpiles of nuclear warheads and weapons of chemical and biological warfare are now considered so difficult these weapons are not included in the proposed reductions of 30 per cent. To deal with these two groups of weapons the U.S. will propose at an appropriate time that two international experts commissions be established along the lines indicated in the March 3 memorandum to the President.
- 6.
- The United States should continue to press the proposal of 2.1 million force levels. The United States would be prepared to proceed at least through the first stage in the absence of the Chinese Communists [Page 378] although the possibility of a defeasance procedure (comparable to that in the test ban) should be examined.
- 7.
- Inspection is the subject of a separate detailed telegram, Todis 44.2
- 8.
- The United States will propose that, contingent on agreement on the cut-off of fissionable material for use in weapons, the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. each transfer 50,000 kg. of U-235 to peaceful purposes. FYI. Study is being given to whether we should propose a proportional transfer of U.S. 60,000 kgs. to U.S.S.R. 40,000 kgs. of U-235 and what would be the effects of transfers of various sizes and in various other proportions. End FYI.
- 9.
- The United States will propose that the reduction of armaments proposed for Stage I be applied in the same general ratio for Stages II and III.
Ball
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/3-1362. Confidential; Priority. Drafted and initialed by Fisher (ACDA) and cleared by Kaysen (White House), Nitze (Defense) (by Fisher), and Navez (S/S).↩
- See footnote 3, Document 146.↩
- Todis 44 to Geneva, March 13, transmitted a suggested text for Secretary Rusk’s statement on verification to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee. (Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/3-1262) Rusk’s statement to the committee on March 15, however, touched on the verification issue only in general terms. For text, see Documents on Disarmament, 1962, vol. I, pp. 142-149.↩