Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume VII, Arms Control and Disarmament

145. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

Washington, March 6, 1962.

SUBJECT

• Nuclear Test Ban Negotiations

PARTICIPANTS

• Lord Hood, Minister, British Embassy
• Mr. Wilkinson, First Secretary, British Embassy
• Mr. Foster, ACDA/D
• Ambassador Dean
• Mr. Conger, ACDA/D
• Mr. Goodby, ACDA/IR

Lord Hood came in at his request to give London’s preliminary comments on possible modifications in the April 18, 1961, test ban treaty¹ as suggested by the United States in the paper which is attached. Lord Hood said that in general London was disappointed by the US paper, particularly since the Prime Minister and the President had taken the initiative to make a success of the Geneva conference. London felt that in the nuclear test ban field the United States and United Kingdom ought to go further to meet the Soviet position than they had hitherto done. In proposing modifications to the US-UK draft treaty, proposals of real substance should be put forward so long as basic principles of control were not sacrificed. The British felt that ideas of the kind advanced by Ambassador Ormsby-Gore ought to find their place in any proposal that we make.

Turning to the US paper Lord Hood said that the British welcomed Item No. 1 (reducing the threshold). The British hoped that we would be able to go all the way to a comprehensive treaty. Mr. Foster remarked that at this point the United States had not concluded its review of this particular idea but the more it was explored the less acceptable it seemed to be.

Continuing to refer to the US paper, Lord Hood commented that Item No. 2 (speeding up the inspection process and inspecting for preparations) seemed to be aimed at meeting the ideas the President had put out in a press conference concerning preparations.² Mr. Foster said that this was correct; the problem of inspecting for preparations was admittedly a difficult one but the United States was working on it. Lord Hood said that items 2. A. and 2. C. (speeding up on-site inspection) seemed sensible to London although the Soviets would, of course, dislike these two proposals. London felt that neither of these proposals would be likely to get anywhere unless there were other elements which would appeal to the Soviet Union. Mr. Foster said that he was personally concerned by the thought that the United States should have to make further concessions to the Soviet position. Lord Hood replied that the passage of time might have certain consequences in the sense that there might be certain concessions we could make now which might not have been feasible earlier.

Turning to Item 3 (six months delay in being relieved of treaty obligations) the British felt that this proposal would not accomplish very much and they rather disliked the idea of putting it forward.

With respect to Item 4 (a nuclear “package” to include a test ban), London felt that it would be preferable to avoid linking the test ban to other disarmament measures. London preferred to keep this as a separate item. Amb. Dean stated that the United States was inclined to agree but that Tsarapkin had always talked about a test ban as involving no real disarmament. On the other hand, it would clearly take some time to negotiate a package of measures. Mr. Foster stated that in the context of the late April deadline for signing a test ban treaty there did not appear to be too much validity in presenting a package proposal for the Soviets to accept. Lord Hood agreed and pointed out that a test ban would, of course, be one element in a broader approach.

Lord Hood then inquired whether the United States had arrived at any views on ideas advanced by (see attachment B)³ the British. Mr. Goodby said that we had looked into the question of arrangements under which the UN Secretary General had been appointed and exercised his office and had been informed that the Soviets seemed to have more of their position already written into the test ban treaty than we could give them by offering this kind of a suggestion. In the first place, U Thant had been appointed with no prior understandings about deputies. After being appointed, he had stated that he would consult with the Soviet and US under secretaries. We had already provided in our treaty that there would be two deputy administrators appointed from each of the two nuclear sides. Amb. Dean pointed out that offering the Soviet Union the proposal mentioned by Ambassador Ormsby-Gore might be considered a retreat. As a talking point it might have some value, however. On the question of the quota and the number of control posts, Mr. Foster stated that his personal belief was that the United States should not make concessions in these areas. In particular, Mr. Foster stated, the way the British proposal on quota was drafted looked as though the Wets might get four inspections annually but not 12 to 20. Concluding the discussion Lord Hood remarked that going to the comprehensive treaty seemed to be the most constructive thing which we could do. Mr. Foster replied that perhaps the threshold could be reduced but it would be difficult to make the treaty comprehensive from the outset.

Attachment A

Washington, March 3, 1962.

ACDA MEMORANDUM

We are now urgently studying several possible modifications in our position on the draft test ban treaty of April 18, 1961, as follows:

1. We are considering reiterating and possibly elaborating our proposals of last August 28 with respect to lowering the threshold.⁴ It may be possible to make the treaty a comprehensive one, to all intents and purposes, from the very beginning.

2. We are considering proposals for giving greater authority to the Preparatory Commission provided for in the April 18 treaty. For example, the Preparatory Commission could:

(a) Upon receipt of data indicating a suspicious event had occurred in the territory of an original party, make arrangements for verifying the nature of the event through an on-site inspection.

(b) Arrange for observers to visit known or declared nuclear test sites used by the original parties in order to check whether preparations for testing had reached an advanced stage.

(c) Begin the construction of control posts in the territories of the original parties as soon as the treaty is signed. Arrangements worked out by the Preparatory Commission for performing the above functions could be carried over, as agreed, into the period between ratification of the treaty and the date upon which control posts begin to provide data.

3. We are considering proposing a new article to the treaty providing that no party to the treaty could be legally freed from its obligation not to test nuclear weapons in outer space, in the atmosphere, on or under the oceans, and underground if such tests produce signals of 4.75 seismic magnitude or above, until six months after such party had given notice of its intention to withdraw from the treaty. Under the present treaty it is legal to withdraw from the treaty one day and to test the next.

4. We are considering making an offer for a “nuclear disarmament” package, which would link a test ban to one or more disarmament measures, such as the cut-off of production of fissionable material for use in weapons. It would then be possible to merge the control systems required for the various measures. The control system for a nuclear test ban might then not be at all disproportionate to the measures proposed.

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 700.5611/3-662. Confidential. Drafted by Goodby.
1. See footnote 1, Document 140.
2. Reference presumably is to the President’s concerns about any delay in the implementation of the provisions of a disarmament treaty negotiated with the Soviet Union, which he expressed at his press conference on February 7. See Documents on Disarmament, 1962, vol. I, p. 31.
3. Attachment B is an extract from Ormsby Gore’s March 1 letter to Rusk attached to Document 142. The extract, not printed here, comprises the five paragraphs outlining the four major points of difference between the U.S.-U.K. and Soviet positions on nuclear testing.
4. See Document 57.