Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume VII, Arms Control and Disarmament

117. Memorandum for the Record⁰

Washington, January 8, 1962.

SUBJECT

• Daily Staff Meeting, January 8, 1962

[Here follows discussion of Berlin, Latin America, public relations, security, the Military Assistance Program, and the forthcoming State of the Union speech.]

h. There was a rather fuzzy, involved discussion of atmospheric testing. Evidently Bundy and Schlesinger have written memorandums to the President¹ which promote maintenance of a laboratory state of readiness to resume atmospheric testing by utilizing underground tests to accomplish certain fundamental testing objectives. Mr. Bundy plans to talk “quietly” to Seaborg and Wiesner about the feasibility of this approach. State has submitted a paper outlining a suitable statement in the event that we do resume atmospheric testing.²AEC has submitted an underground testing program which includes 23 or more shots.³ Kaysen suggested that Wiesner convene a panel to re-study the problem. Bundy takes a dim view of these panels because they usually come out in favor of testing. Kaysen said if we decide to go to underground testing completely, perhaps we should use this decision to sandbag the British into giving us Christmas Island for atmospheric testing if necessary, and should also use the decision to entice the Russians to renounce atmospheric tests. Bundy said that he was impressed with this line of reasoning also. He felt that we also ought to keep in mind the necessity for avoiding a nuclear testing arms race. According to Bundy, most people think that we can live with the present situation, i.e., that the Russians haven’t gained too much in the recent test series. As a result, the basic policy question is—can you deter the Russians from testing? Bundy quoted Kaysen as stating that the need for ballistic missile defense related to atmospheric tests was not really very great because such tests would only show how much harder it is to defend against missiles by the Zeus approach. He originally thought there is no point in making a test to increase your difficulties. The only useful type of test is one that makes things easier for you. Kaysen, to his credit, said that this wasn’t entirely true, whereas such tests would tend to undermine the Zeus approach itself. It is also possible that some aspect of the test would lead us to a different approach to missile defense. My own reaction to this confused discussion is that the non-atmospheric testing boys have discovered another rationalization to postpone atmospheric tests, i.e., the “laboratory state of readiness” slogan.

JJE

0. Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Daily Staff Meetings Jan-Apr 62. Secret. Drafted by Ewell. The records of White House staff meetings were routinely circulated to Taylor and members of his staff.
1. Documents 113 and 114.
2. Not found.
3. Document 102.